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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview 
This dissertation is an investigation of a number of themes in financialisation and financial 
stability in a European and cross-border context. Continental European countries are the 
primary objects of interest, though the US and the UK are also considered given the 
relationship and similarities between the different regions. The PhD follows a three essay 
structure but with several unifying threads. Among them are financialisation as a 
demand-led process (that is, the growth of finance has been driven by factors external to 
financial markets), comparative and cross-border dynamics, interactions between 
institutional investors and the banking system, and housing market dynamics. In particular, 
the thesis examines the transformation and growth of banking activities, the nature and 
financial stability consequences of the expansion of financial trading generally and also 
proprietary trading in particular, and the determinants of cross-border debt flows in Europe 
in the 2000s. From these a number of diverse policy implications emerge. Common among 
them, and a unifying theme of the PhD, is that financialisation needs to be managed as 
opposed to reversed.  
 The PhD adds to existing research on financialisation in a number of ways. The 
chapter on the growth of banking identifies the aggregate growth of investment banking as 
driven by the increase in scale and scope of modern capital markets. Deregulation and/or 
disintermediation processes have not been the driving force. The imposition of the first 
Basel Accord is found to be the largest single factor in the rise of mortgage lending over the 
past four decades or so. A capital market-led view of investment banking is a novel 
approach, whereas the invocation of the Basel agreements in this study is one of greater 
emphasis compared to existing literature.  
The following chapter finds that in the post-Bretton Woods landscape Europe 
graduated from recurrent currency crises to repeated credit-based housing crises. Financial 
trading has recently played a more indirect role in financial instability through the provision 
of liquidity to the banking system. Proprietary trading is largely dependent on the 
institutional investor-led increase in trading volume and, while important, has not posed the 
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same threat to stability as housing market dynamics have. These points have not been 
adequately appreciated in the financialisation literature to date. 
 The final content chapter develops this point further. It finds that institutional 
investors were the principal driving force in the expansion of debt-based capital flows in 
Europe in the 2000s. This point has not been appreciated thus far. Position taking by large 
banking groups was important, but banks largely availed of opportunities for gain as they 
arose. Institutional investors, in contrast, had a structural need for those instruments that 
were central to the expansion of flows. 
 This dissertation utilises institutional and historical political economy analysis with 
frequent use of descriptive statistics. While aspects of the social world occasionally exhibit 
relatively stable relationships and forms (for example, lognormal distribution of income, 
Pareto distribution of city size, and so on), this is not the norm. Typically in quantitative 
social science and economics such forms are assumed a priori, and quantitative techniques 
such as regression then applied. However, there are reasons to be doubtful of this approach in 
general, which leads us to favour institutional analysis. For one, free-will imparts on 
economic agents behaviour that eludes capture by a formal deterministic or stochastic 
model. A deterministic (or stochastic) view of human agency violates our everyday 
intuitions that we have control over our actions and lives. The fact that people in general try 
to influence some outcome in their lives rather than just stay in bed because it has already 
been determined implies they believe their actions have the capacity to affect their world. 
Second, the social world is highly complex. Independent of free-will, the conditions under 
which a deterministic or stochastic model can be applied are highly circumscribed outside of 
laboratory conditions. Lawson’s (1997) example of a leaf blowing in the wind is a case in 
point. The problem of complexity applies, writ large, to human action. Further, institutional 
reasons include distortions arising from model-induced bias reinforcement, publishing bias, 
and issues surrounding the cleanliness of data. It is for such reasons that quantitative 
modelling is deemed inappropriate. Institutional and historical analysis also allows the 
examination of contextual factors which enable interpretation of events, processes, and so 
on.   
Some of the dissertation’s findings complement existing research. Others entail a 
difference in emphasis while others still are minority positions and contrary to a number of 
12 
 
presuppositions held in the financialisation literature. The next section provides substance 
to that claim. The following section outlines the content of the chapters and describes the 
overall layout the thesis. 
  
1.2 Financialisation: Issues and conceptual underpinnings 
Financiaisation is a term that has perhaps been around for some time but which has come 
into more frequent use since the 1990s (Sawyer, 2013). As a phenomenon, it has been 
subject to extensive investigation across a broad range of disciplines (see, for instance, 
Lapavitsas, 2011; van der Zwan, 2014). Possibly the earliest definition of the term is 
offered by Phillips who in 1994 defined financialisation to be ‘a prolonged split between 
the divergent real and financial economies’ (quoted in Sawyer, 2013: 6) The most 
commonly-cited definition is given by Epstein (2005) who defines it to be ‘the increasing 
role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the 
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein, 2005: 3).  
 However one defines it, within the critical political economy and heterodox 
economics literature financialisation has invariably been viewed as a negative development. 
The more noted aspects of financialisation include a rise in wealth and income inequality, a 
slowdown of accumulation, greater frequency and severity of financial crises, a narrowing 
of the democratic space, and a marketisation and permeation of financial calculus into 
social services and everyday life. Though these processes are highly interconnected and 
mutually interacting, some developments are more fundamental, from which other trends 
derive. One is the development of financial and capital markets. Another is the 
commodification and financialisation of housing. 
 The primacy of capital market development can be seen when one considers other 
celebrated aspects of financialisation. For instance, the rise of shareholder value 
maximisation among non-financial companies (NFCs) derives from the need of 
institutional investors to have a set of uniform metrics against which firm performance can 
be evaluated. Shareholder value maximisation has, in turn, been associated with weak 
investment performance and the slowdown of accumulation. Strip away the development of 
capital markets and the concomitant growth of institutional investors, and shareholder value 
maximisation, financial asset-based wealth inequality, and other ills are significantly 
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diminished. The converse, though, is not true. A financial asset wealth tax, for instance, 
does much less to alter the size of capital markets. 
 Similarly, as we shall see, the frequency and severity of recent financial crises, 
non-financial wealth inequality, and other processes originate in housing market 
developments, particularly the expansion in mortgage lending. With appropriate 
interventions, it is possible to greatly diminish the likelihood of housing bubbles. But it is 
difficult to envision how the large increase in frequency and severity of housing crises 
could have happened had there not been a corresponding increase in mortgage lending. 
Both capital market developments and the growth in mortgage lending are subject to 
enquiry in the following chapter, and form the basis for the rest of the thesis.  
  Regarding the former, Lysandrou (2016) notes how the starting premise in much of 
the financialisation literature is to view the expansion of financial markets through the lens 
of speculation, or as a dysfunctional divorce from the real economy. As such, he notes, 
some of the colourful adjectives ascribed to the increased size of the financial sector 
include ‘bloated’, ‘inflated’, among others. This has been facilitated by financial 
deregulation wherein financialisation ‘was made possible’ (Stockhammer, 2015a). 
Deregulation allowed financialisation to develop as it ‘unleashed speculation in financial 
assets’ (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011: 545) or ‘set the financial sector free’ (Kotz, 
2008: 8). 
 When financialisation is viewed in cross-border terms, again there is an emphasis 
on financial deregulation and liberalisation. The period of analysis here has often involved 
a contrast between the Bretton Woods era of restricted international transactions and the 
post-Bretton Woods breakdown and expansion in capital flows (Lapavitsas, 2013). For 
Stockhammer (2010; 2015b), liberalisation of international flows has been a key enabling 
factor in financialisation. International liberalisation was key in the lead-up to the financial 
crisis as it allowed countries to run large current account deficits (ibid). Much of the 
cross-border financialisation literature also focuses on the deleterious effects capital flows 
have on developing countries (see, for instance, Kaltenbrunner, 2010). 
 A somewhat different approach has emphasised financialisation as emerging from 
processes linked to the real economy (Dos Santos, 2009a; 2009b; Lapavitsas, 2009; 2012; 
2014; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013). The withdrawal of non-financial firms from credit 
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markets as firms increasingly use internal funds and capital markets for their financing 
needs has put pressures on the traditional source of banking income, lending to business. 
Coupled to this has been an integration of households into financial markets. Through 
neoliberal restructuring, households have come to rely on financial markets for social needs, 
such as pension funds for the provision of retirement savings. In response to declining 
income from lending to business, banks have reoriented their activities towards households 
and financial markets. 
 We are in agreement that financialisation has had an overwhelmingly negative 
effect on advanced capitalist and European countries, the units of concern in this study. Our 
point of departure from the prevailing literature is that among advanced countries the 
growth of financial markets should not be viewed primarily through the lenses of 
speculation, deregulation, and/or withdrawal of non-financial firms from credit markets. 
Neoliberal restructuring and greater entanglement of households in financial markets gets 
closer to the mark, but still misses. As we outline in the following chapter, the expansion of 
financial markets is attributable to a number of developments, only some of which can be 
attributed to neoliberalism. For instance, demographic forces have put upward pressure on 
government spending which has led to an expansion of sovereign debt markets. Similarly, 
along with neoliberal privatisation, a major component of the growth in scale of equity 
markets arises from a desire of firms to expand. More generally, the growth in capital 
markets has put pressures on the banking system to expand its investment services. This, 
more than deregulation, speculation, or a ‘turn’ of the banking system towards financial 
markets explains the growth of investment banking. That is to say, financialisation is a 
demand-led process. 
 In terms of cross-border aspects of financialisation, we agree that capital flows have 
been central to the development of financial instability across the world. That said, we 
refine the common dichotomy between pre- and post-Bretton Woods. Since the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods two periods are discernible in terms of the scale of international financial 
transactions; the period since the 1970s, and the period since the early 1990s. The first 
period was characterised by a large growth in the scale of transactions, including a large 
increase in short-term currency trading. The increase in transactions in the subsequent 
period has been even larger. Elaborating on Grahl and Lysandrou (2006) to an international 
context, we argue in Chapter 3, but also Chapter 4 that the expansion in flows in this period 
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has been due to the rise of institutional investor-led financial trading. Both of these chapters 
also develop how bank proprietary and speculative trading is dependent on institutional 
investor trading to take positions. To date, the critical literature on proprietary trading has 
been underdeveloped and fragmentary. Thus, while we do not deny that speculation is a 
prominent feature of financialisation, it ought not to be the main lens through which capital 
market developments are viewed. 
 The second defining feature of financialisation we address relates to the 
development of housing. The transformation of housing can, in principle, be approached 
from several angles. For one, along with the expansion of capital markets, a major reason 
for the growth in size of the financial sector has been an increase in mortgage lending. 
Second, house prices in many advanced countries have exhibited a steady upward trend for 
over two decades now. As well as having large adverse socioeconomic and distributional 
effects, the expansion in assets prices further inflates the size of the financial sector. Finally, 
boom-bust cycles in housing markets have been a major factor in heightening the instability 
of the financial system in recent years. 
 A number of approaches to the financialisation of housing can accordingly be 
discerned in the literature. First, the expansion of mortgage credit and the rise in property 
prices may be seen as part of a broader process of the financialisation and commodification 
of housing (Aalbers, 2016; Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). Especially prominent within the 
economic geography literature, deregulation of credit, financial innovations such as 
securitisation, liberalisation of property markets, and privatisation of social housing have 
been among the factors which have inflated property prices and/or led to an expansion in 
credit. Second, just as banks have turned towards financial markets in the face of declining 
returns from traditional intermediation activities, they have also sought new revenue 
streams by turning towards households. Thus, a central facet of the expansion of lending to 
households, and of mortgage lending in particular has, it is argued, also been developments 
among non-financial firms. As before, neoliberal restructuring and commodification have 
been important elements, but the driving force has been the ‘turn’ by the banking system 
towards households. Finally, a related literature looks less at mortgage lending per se as it 
does household indebtedness in general. Distributional dynamics are said to have played a 
central role in the expansion of lending to households (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Cynamon 
and Fazzari, 2008; Kus, 2012; Perugini et al., 2016; Stockhammer, 2012; 2015b). Increased 
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dispersion of incomes implies that households are required to take on more debt to keep up 
with historically and socially-determined expenditure and consumption norms.   
 In terms of stability, it is universally acknowledged that financialisation has 
inaugurated an era of more frequent and more severe financial crises. In this regard, the 
financialisation of land and housing literature has emphasised the contribution of property 
bubbles. Though the broader financialisation literature has shied away from 
pronouncements that investment banking poses a greater threat to financial stability than 
commercial banking or conversely, it has been the former that is assumed to pose the threat 
to the latter. Crotty (2008), for instance, highlights how non-interest and trading income has 
increased volatility of earning among banking groups. Hardie and Howarth (2009) argue 
that ‘commercial banks have become more market-based’ which for them ‘represents a 
central explanation for the financial crisis’ (Hardie and Howarth, 2009: 9). More generally, 
calls for the separation of banking functions or proprietary trading restrictions are 
predicated on the belief that it has been investment banking and trading that has made 
commercial banking more fragile, and not the converse. This certainly coheres with the 
view of investment banking as a casino, as outlined previously. 
Chapter 2 examines the determinants of the growth in mortgage lending. Just as we 
find the reorientation of banking activities towards financial markets to be an unconvincing 
account of the increase in scale and scope of investment banking, we similarly find a ‘turn’ 
of the banking system towards households to be an underwhelming explanation of the 
increase in scale of mortgage lending. Distributional dynamics are further found to be of 
only secondary importance. Neoliberalism in the form of deregulation of credit and the 
commodification of housing has played an important role. But where we differ from 
existing literature is the importance we give to ‘standardisation’ as opposed to deregulation 
per se. In particular, the imposition of capital adequacy rules and the first Basel Accord has 
been the key policy shift in mortgage markets over the last number of years. While the 
Basel agreements have often been mentioned as one among a host of factors, to our mind 
their significance has not been grasped. We also unpack the relationship between house 
prices and credit expansion. It is found that they mutually interact but that it has been the 
latter than has generally been the initial driver the former.      
17 
 
 Chapter 3 takes a position on the relative contributions of the growth of commercial 
and investment banking to financial instability. Though the landscape has shifted, housing 
booms have been at the centre of most financial crises in recent decades. Capital market 
developments have fed booms through the provision of liquidity to banks. Investment 
banking practices have also become riskier, including through proprietary trading. It is thus 
not incorrect to state that investment banking has made commercial banking and the 
financial system more fragile. However, the converse is true to a greater extent; commercial 
banking and housing markets have made investment banking even more instable. Our 
reading of the global financial crisis confirms this. 
 Chapter 4 develops the points made by the previous chapter further by examining 
debts flows in Europe in the 2000s. It details how bank trading in debt instruments were 
crucially dependent on a demand for those instruments from institutional investors. The 
trajectory of flows was not driven by banks’ desire to assume ever more risk through 
leverage, but rather the undertaking of risk and the growth of leverage in the sector were 
manifestations of a search for yield among long-term investors.         
 Thus, two central themes run through the thesis. One is the centrality of capital 
market growth and the associated rise of institutional investors. The other is the importance 
of housing market dynamics in financialisation. As before, both processes are fundamental, 
from which others derive. Both are explainable in terms of the framework developed in the 
following chapter based on neoliberalism, accumulation, and standardisation. That said, as 
argued in later chapters the policy implications of these two processes, especially in terms 
of their reversibility, differ somewhat. Because the development of capital markets perhaps 
predominantly arises from demographic pressures, themselves a result of advances in health 
and medicine, it is neither reversible to a substantive degree nor desirable to do so. Because 
mortgage lending has arisen to a large extent as an unforeseen by-product of international 
banking regulation, it is in principle reversible. In practice, it may be unfeasible given the 
likely coordination problems and path dependencies embedded in global agreements and 
institutional forms. No country, aside perhaps the US, can go it alone. Thus, whether 
referring to housing or capital markets, as before, a unifying theme is that financialisation 
needs to be managed, not reversed. As will be discussed in the case of Germany, for 
instance, it is not inevitable that mortgage lending must lead to some of the worse effects 
associated with, namely large undulations in property and housing markets.   
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 In sum, financialisation is a multifaceted phenomenon but which entails a number 
of central processes. This dissertation challenges the often-made supposition that the 
expansion of financial markets is predominantly a dysfunctional divorce of the financial 
from the real economy. From that a number of inferences are made about the growth of 
investment banking, the nature of cross-border and proprietary trading, and on the 
relationship between large banks and institutional investors. The thesis gives significantly 
more emphasis than previous research to the imposition of capital adequacy regulation in 
the trajectory of mortgage lending and housing markets. It also accords housing market 
dynamics centre stage in debates on advanced-country financial stability.       
 
1.3 Outline 
Chapter 2, in particular, examines the determinants of the growth in both mortgage lending 
and investment banking activities. Two core European countries, Germany and France, and 
two peripheral/semi-peripheral countries, Italy and Spain, are considered along with the US 
and the UK. As before, existing analyses of financialisation are found to be unsatisfactory 
accounts of why banking has been transformed along these two dimensions. Neither the 
disengagement NFCs from bank lending (through greater uses of internal finance and 
capital markets), nor competition for deposits in the guise of investment funds led to a 
decline in intermediation income, with the exception of France. As such banks did not 
reorient their business lines towards households or financial markets to compensate for lost 
income. We also find deregulation of financial service activities to be of limited 
explanatory power in the expansion of investment banking, and distributional dynamics to 
be of secondary importance in the rise in household indebtedness. 
As existing explanatory models in financialisation have typically given empirical 
centrality to one or some combination of disintermediation, deregulation of financial 
service activities, or distribution, we correspondingly develop our own analytical 
framework. Our claim is that the three processes of neoliberalism, accumulation, and 
standardisation are central to understanding developments in the banking system. Based on 
Marxian insights, particularly historical materialism, we understand neoliberalism in class 
terms, and accumulation as expansion of economic entities. In terms of the growth of 
mortgage lending neoliberalism has been important in the form of privatisation of social 
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housing and deregulation of property and credit markets, and standardisation in terms of the 
imposition of the Basel Accords. The growth of investment banking has been a result of 
demand pressures placed on the banking system for increased investment services as capital 
markets have developed. The expansion of capital markets, namely equity and debt markets, 
in turn, can be attributed to neoliberalism in terms of privatisation of both state-owned 
companies and social welfare. The rise of capital markets is also a result of accumulation 
pressures through the expansion of companies and public listing leading to greater issuance 
of equities. It is further traceable to the expansion of government services resulting from 
demographic and other pressures, which led to an expansion of sovereign debt markets. 
Expansionary or accumulation pressures have played a more indirect role in the growth of 
mortgage lending as the Basel Accords arose out of the internationalisation of banking. 
Standardisation has been important in more recent developments in investment banking, 
such as the expansion of proprietary trading.   
Chapter 3 similarly addresses two questions and focuses on Europe and also the US 
as a necessary comparator. First, what contribution has financial trading made to the 
development of systemic financial instability? Second, what is the nature and systemic 
implications of bank proprietary trading? With regards to the first question, it is argued that 
financial trading has been a major reason for the heightened instability of the financial 
system among European countries. In the early post-Bretton Woods era, financial trading 
had direct systemic implications as Europe was plagued by repeated currency crises, a 
necessary condition for which were large positions in currencies. Since then, financial 
trading has had more indirect systemic implications through the provision of especially 
cross-border liquidity to banks, the availability of which has contributed to credit and 
housing-based banking crises. The emergence of institutional investor-led cross-border 
trading has been an important factor in the graduation from repeated currency to repeated 
banking crises.  
 The emphasis on deregulation and/or an ever-growing appetite for risk-taking 
among major banking groups is misplaced with respect to understanding proprietary trading. 
Like the expansion of investment banking broadly, the growth of proprietary trading should 
be seen in terms of developments in capital markets. As institutional investor-led capital 
market trading has expanded, so too have opportunities for proprietary trading. Though 
banks can earn trading income in a variety of ways, importantly the growth in trading 
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volume and the absence of a commensurate growth in securities markets has created 
disruptions in pricing relationships and opportunities for position-taking. Though the risk of 
bank proprietary trading has grown, it does not pose the same systemic implications as the 
expansion of property-based lending. Compared to property/mortgage lending, proprietary 
trading is more diversified, less concentrated across the financial system as a whole, and 
because of the complexity and/or leverage embedded in a given allocation of capital, likely 
to be well-hedged. As before, our reading of the global financial crisis does little to 
convince us otherwise. 
 Chapter 4, as mentioned already, applies some of the insights accumulated in 
previous chapters to examine the determinants of cross-border debt flows in Europe in the 
2000s. In particular, debt flows emanating from core Eurozone countries to the US and UK 
securitisation markets are considered on the one hand, and portfolio bank flows into the 
periphery (for instance, bonds issued by peripheral banks and bought by core investors) are 
considered on the other. Based on a dissatisfaction with bank-centred approaches to global 
financial dynamics, we develop an institutional investor-led framework. Specifically we 
argue that long-term institutional investors have a structural need for dated fixed income 
securities that banks do not. This is so because of the need for institutional investors to 
match assets with their longer-term liabilities, whereas banks have mostly short-term 
liabilities and long-term assets. 
 As applied to European debt flows we argue that the role played by institutional 
investors has not been sufficiently emphasised. Though bank-centered approaches are 
well-equipped to explain a significant portion of cross-border debt dynamics through carry 
trades, there is little evidence this constituted the central mechanism for channelling flows. 
As per Chapter 3, bank proprietary strategies are extensively shaped by the actions of 
institutional investors. The expansion in debt flows from the Eurozone is explained by 
depressed returns on fixed income instruments and the ensuing asset-liability mismatches. 
This led institutional investors to move into financial sector debt and yield-producing 
securitised assets.   
 Chapter 5 concludes. The findings of the dissertation are summarised and followed 
by a discussion of their applicability to regions and contexts outside the scope of this study. 
Other avenues for future research are also explored. 
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Chapter 2 : Financialisation and the transformation of banking 
reconsidered 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The last three decades or so have witnessed an enormous growth in financial markets and 
processes, the phenomenon known as financialisation. Starting in the early 1970s with the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, and accelerated through the 1980s to the present 
with deregulation, liberalisation, and innovation of financial systems, advanced capitalist 
economies have undergone major structural transformations. This has manifested itself in a 
number of ways. Among the more documented changes have been a slowdown of 
accumulation (Stockhammer, 2004), a rise in income inequality (Kus, 2012; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), more frequent and severe financial crises, and the overall 
permeation of financial processes into everyday life (Lapavitsas, 2009). 
 A central feature of financialisation among advanced capitalist countries relates to 
the transformation of banking. In particular, the expansion of lending to households, and of 
commercial banking activities into investment banking has been noted in several studies 
(Erturk and Solari, 2007; Dos Santos, 2009a; 2009b). The expansion of credit to 
households in the form of mortgage lending has increased the vulnerability of housing 
markets to boom-bust cycles. The preponderance of major banking crises over the last 
number of years have originated in housing markets, as the most recent global crisis 
demonstrates. The increase in investment banking activities has been associated with 
greater volatility of earnings, conflicts of interest within financial groups, and greater 
fragility of the financial sector generally. The financial crisis as it developed in France and 
Germany, for instance, emerged from major trading losses on mortgage and structured 
finance securities, and eventually sovereign debt instruments. 
 This chapter explains the transformation of banking in terms of the growth of 
mortgage lending and the expansion of investment banking. Two core European countries, 
Germany and France, two peripheral/semi-peripheral countries, Spain and Italy (whose 
status as a peripheral or semi-peripheral country is admittedly debatable), and the US and 
UK as comparators are analysed. It finds that existing research on the transformation of 
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banking and financialisation inadequately explains both mortgage lending growth and the 
expansion of investment banking. In particular, neither disintermediation of non-financial 
firms nor innovation in the guise of investment funds was the major reason for declining 
intermediation returns over the period considered, with the partial exception of France. The 
idea, then, that banking transformed itself due to declining returns in traditional business 
lines is false. Financial deregulation, also, has only partial explanatory power.  
 Theoretically, we find existing approaches to financialisation to be inadequate to 
explain the development of banking. We forward a materialist view of the financial system 
anchored in the concepts of neoliberalism, accumulation, and standardisation. Thus, we 
find the growth of mortgage lending to be attributable to the imposition of Basel I and 
associated capital adequacy regulations in conjunction with domestic liberalisation and 
deregulation – that is, neoliberalisation – of housing and credit markets. Basel I and capital 
adequacy regulations have been particularly important in continental European countries, 
where as broader neoliberal reforms have been more important in the US and especially the 
UK. The increase in scale and scope of investment banking activity arose initially from the 
growth of capital markets, and developed further due to the rise of asset management and 
institutional investors. The growth of capital markets is attributable to neoliberal 
restructuring and accumulation/expansionary pressures. 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows; the next section reviews some literature on 
financialisation and the financialisation of banking, after which it forwards a conceptual 
framework based on the three themes mentioned previously: neoliberalism, accumulation, 
and standardisation. The following section examines empirical evidence in support of the 
leading explanation of banking transformation, disintermediation, and finds it wanting. The 
section after that draws on the conceptual framework outlined before to explain the growth 
of mortgage lending and the expansion of investment banking activity. The penultimate 
section discusses the findings and some policy implications. The final section concludes.   
 
2.2 Financialisation and the transformation of banking  
2.2.1 Theorising financialisation  
Several views exist on the emergence of financialisation. The Marxian tradition generally 
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attempts to link financialisation with underlying dynamics in the real economy. Brenner 
(2002; 2006) and Callinicos (2010) focus on the classic notion of falling rates of profits. 
For Brenner growing international competition in particular led to a profit squeeze. 
Financial and credit expansion enabled a restoration of prosperity. Dumenil and Levy (2004) 
see financialisation in terms of a restoration of the power of a financial class, restored 
through the advent of neoliberalism. Magdoff and Sweezy (1987) and Magdoff and 
Bellamy-Foster (2014) argue that in capitalism monopolistic enterprises tend to generate 
large surpluses. Through the latter part of the 20
th
 century the sphere of production 
increasingly had difficulty absorbing the expanding surplus, which led to stagnation. 
Financialisation emerged to support accumulation such that capital was channeled into 
speculative and financial circulation. 
 The strength of such traditional Marxian literature is that it links financialisation to 
underlying processes in the real economy. It also keeps class dynamics to the forefront, a 
point which we return to. But empirical anomalies can be found that undermine each strand. 
Brenner’s emphasis on trade in declining profitability has been convincingly attacked (see 
Crotty 1999), and profits have recovered as financialisation has continued to deepen. 
Dumenil and Levy’s work implies, erroneously, that neoliberalism preceded or co-existed 
the advent of financialisation (see Kotz, 2011), though more recent writing inverts the 
timeline (Dumenil and Levy, 2014). As for Sweezy and Bellamy-Foster, many of the key 
features of financialisation almost certainly inhibit rather than augment accumulation. This 
is particularly true of the non-financial corporation, which plays a key role in their 
monopoly capital theory (see Stockhammer, 2004). 
 Arrighi (1994) likewise sees financialisation as an inherent tendency within 
capitalism. The current incarnation of financialisation is the culmination of historical events 
that began in the late 19
th
 century. Financialisation represents the autumn of the period of 
US hegemonic expansion as it falters relative to Asian strength under its lagging productive 
structures. Through their decline, hegemons become creditors to emerging powers through 
which a financial expansion emerges. As well as the obvious empirical failures given the 
status of the US as a debtor nation, it raises important methodological questions that apply 
equally to other Marxian long-wave historical analyses. As Pollin (1996) alludes, the 
problem with such an analysis is that economies are complex systems, and correspondingly 
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subject to a complex array of interlocking forces. Outcomes in a given period are, as such, 
indeterminate, but path dependent. Trajectories of development, though, are subject to 
persistent resetting through socioeconomic upheaval. To trace the lineage of the current 
phase to a previous period since which several epochal shifts have taken place underscores 
the difficulty of explaining current events with long-wave historical narratives. 
 The regulation school seeks to map-out the key institutional features of ‘modes of 
accumulation’ as they exist in the economy. Boyer (2000) views the rise of a finance-led 
growth regime in terms of the decline of Fordist production structures. For Kotz (2011), the 
neoliberal mode of accumulation and its tendency towards liberalisation set the stage for 
financialisation. Financialisation, however, is an inherent tendency within capitalism and so 
is not simply an outcome of neoliberalism. This is so as gains from technical innovation 
within industrial capital are constantly under threat from competition and new entry. To 
escape such risks capital prefers to hold wealth in a form that can be exited easily, namely 
financial capital (ibid.).   
Stockhammer (2008; 2015a), a post-Keynesian, similarly uses the language of 
‘mode of accumulation’ in describing the emergence of financialisation. Like the regulation 
school, but somewhat more policy-oriented than theoretical, the importance of financial 
deregulation is emphasised in the generation of financialisation. Leaving aside the 
relationship between income distribution and financialisation which is addressed in the 
following section, the post-Keynesian approach also highlights the unleashing of a parasitic 
financial capitalist class or ‘rentiers’ through financialisation (Dunhaupt, 2012; Pollin, 
2007). Similar to Marxian approaches, a key feature of financialisation in this approach is 
the detachment of the finance sector from underlying production as financialisation 
“elevate(s) the significance of the financial sector relative to the real sector” (Palley, 2016: 
106). Á la Keynes, euthanasia of the rentier through effective reregulation is necessary to 
rebalance the economy.  
 In our view these approaches correctly identify financialisation as part of broader 
neoliberal restructuring. Both approaches, though, have important conceptual shortcomings. 
For the regulation school, the holding of wealth in liquid financial assets as opposed to 
concentrated industrial holdings does diversify risk, but financialisation is multifaceted. 
How does the emphasis on industrial capital relate to the expansion of household debt, for 
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instance? As for the post-Keynesian emphasis on deregulation, the financial sector, like any 
other, requires not only a stable institutional base in which to operate, but also a system of 
goods and services in which to transact. Just as it is amiss to speak only of the deregulation 
of airspace or the invention of airplanes, and not the demand for transportation services to 
explain the growth of commercial aviation, financial sector growth must similarly be 
explained in such terms. That is to say, though correctly identifying deregulation as a major 
phenomenon, the post-Keynesian approach does not provide an account of where the 
demand for financial goods and services has come from.   
Two further approaches are worthy of mention which provide a useful segue into 
our own paradigm. Beginning from the centrality of commodity exchange within capitalism 
(Lysandrou, 2005), Lysandrou (2016) sees financialisation and the growth of the financial 
sector as assisting state and other socio-economic institutions meet the growing burdens 
placed on them by society. Accordingly, the size of the financial sector is not necessarily 
bloated relative to the underlying economy. As financial securities represent claims on 
entities due at a future date, akin to globalisation representing a form of colonisation in a 
geographic sense, financialisation represents a form of colonising the future. 
  Also drawing on Marx, Fine (2014) sees financialisation in terms of the increasing 
presence of ‘interest bearing capital’. Interest bearing capital is money lent for the 
expansion of accumulation. In ‘extensive forms’ interest bearing capital is the permeation 
of financial capital to new forms of activities and provision such as, for instance, social 
housing. In ‘intensive forms’ it relates to the detachment of finance from the production of 
commodities. For Fine, moreover, it appears neoliberalism and financialisation mutually 
interact as financialisation ‘underpins’ neoliberalism (ibid.: 47), though neoliberalism is 
also ‘associated with sustaining financialisation’ (Fine, 2009: 53). The state plays a key role 
in restructuring financialisation and accumulation (ibid.: 64). 
 As for Lysandrou, we are in agreement and endeavor to show throughout that the 
commonly-held view of the financial sector as having grown out of proportion is much too 
simplified. But while Lysandrou’s view provides a useful way to think about capital 
markets, we feel ‘colonising the future’ is not quite flexible enough to incorporate another 
key feature of financialisation, the expansion of household lending. Fine’s distinction 
between extensive and intensive interest-bearing capital potentially allows for such a 
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generalisation, though as before the perceived divorce of finance from production is in our 
view a misunderstanding. We also argue that while there is mutual interaction between 
neoliberalism and financialisation, it has more been the former that has preceded the latter. 
The challenge then is to provide a framework that is sufficiently broad so as to capture 
financialisation’s central features, but also avoiding the limitations of existing literature. 
 
2.2.2 Rethinking financialisation 
According to orthodox or classical historical materialism as outlined by Marx in the preface 
to The Critique of Political Economy (1977) and later elaborated by Cohen (1978), history 
develops in stages. Stages are characterised by sets of relationships of control and 
ownership of the economy, the ‘relations of production’, and by the development and 
technical capacity of the economy, the ‘forces of production’. The level of the forces of 
production at a given juncture gives rise to the relations of production which, in turn, give 
rise to the legal and political ‘superstructure’. As the forces of production have an 
inherently dynamic character, a level in the economy may be reached such that the current 
configurations of the levels and forces of production are incompatible. When the breaking 
point is reached, a rupture or reconfiguration of relations comes about so that they no 
longer impede the forces. A new set of relations emerges that harnesses and optimises the 
new productive structure. Capitalist arrangements are but one set of relations, and feudal 
and hunter-gatherer are examples of others. 
Importantly economic processes impose a certain directionality on the trajectory of 
history. As developed by Wright et al. (1992), this is true for several reasons. For one, 
knowledge of productive techniques persists through time, unlike physical assets. More, 
once a given level of economic development is reached, human needs become entangled in 
maintaining that development. Finally and crucially, all elements of a society have an 
interest in improving the productivity of labour, ceteris paribus. Under capitalism this need 
arises from competition and the profit motive whereas before it may have arisen from a 
desire to reduce the working day. These tendencies render social change directional in the 
sense that once a given level of development is reached progression is much more likely 
than regression. 
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If directionality of history is a feature of political economies broadly, a 
distinguishing feature of capitalism is that it is a ‘commodity system’ (Lysandrou, 2005). In 
this sense it is an economic system in which commodities are produced for exchange but, 
contra previous systems, it is also one in which the capacity to produce them are bought 
and sold. When a firm hires a worker, for instance, it is not so much her direct labour that is 
sold but the promise or the capacity to produce labour. The increasing commodification of 
capacities for production implies the increasing separation of agents from their own 
production. That is to say, production is no longer geared towards subsistence in which a 
person produces for their own or kin’s consumption, but for exchange in the mass market. 
The more agents are separated from production the greater the opportunities, and indeed 
necessity there is for mass production for exchange. Thus, while market processes have 
been a feature of societies throughout history, the current commodity system is 
characterised by the widespread separation of agents from the means of production. 
The growth of the commodity system is not merely the organic result of initiatives 
among private actors, but requires the helping hand of the state to underpin the process. The 
commodification of goods and services requires a set of standards or mark of quality if they 
are to be accepted in exchange on a mass scale. The dissemination and enforcement of such 
standards is most suitably undertaken by the state. Similarly, the commodification of the 
capacity to produce goods and services bears the hallmarks of state intervention. That the 
enclosure movements, in which the state lay the foundation for mass production by driving 
peasants off their land into factories, is often taken to be a foundational moment in the 
beginning of British capitalism speaks to our point made previously that a defining feature 
of the current system is the commodification of the capacities to produce goods and 
services.  
Historical materialism is clearly a highly simplified account of historical change and 
fails to account for innumerable other processes that affect the course of history. First, and 
on its own terms, it is questionable that such explanatory primacy should be accorded to the 
forces over the relations of production. This is especially the case if one considers change 
over an intermediate period as opposed to long-term and large-scale epochal shifts. Unless 
relations are taken to serve forces by construction, class dynamics, for instance, may have a 
powerful causal presence that operate relatively autonomously of accumulation or 
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productive forces.
1
 Moreover, few if any of even the most loyal adherents to historical 
materialism would today embrace its encompassing economic determinism. Insofar as the 
two can be detached from economic processes, gender and racial dynamics similarly have 
powerful impacts on the course of history. So too do moral understanding, randomness, 
religious and autonomous cultural development, and other phenomena. 
However, economic and by extension financial dynamics are distinct from other 
processes in their ability to affect change. Most importantly class dynamics, for instance, 
always and everywhere have an institutional imperative towards class conflict. The 
mentioned forces of competition and the profit motive systemically lead toward ever 
greater forms of domination in a way that other structures of oppression and change do not. 
Even in a country such as Saudi Arabia, one of the most gender unequal societies in the 
world, it can be argued that the trajectory of change is more driven by class dynamics as 
other, comparable or more severe structures of oppression lay dormant. Whether class 
structures are necessarily the most important in a given context cannot be answered a priori 
but, as we have outlined, there are reasons to believe class forces are dynamic. In issues of 
economic import such as the emergence of financialisation, this is true to an even greater 
extent. 
The identification of capitalism as a commodity system giving rise to 
standardisation is but one of the myriad of ways in which states intervene in the economy. 
As production expands so does the need for state intervention to govern, facilitate and often 
mitigate that production. This may come in the form of industrial policy so as to promote 
capital accumulation, welfare spending so as to promote social stability in the face of 
market-produced inequalities, or the regulatory apparatus more generally. But financial 
markets in particular are characterised by unusually large informational and positional 
asymmetries among self-interested participants who earn returns through creating money, 
                                                          
1
 There are circumstances under which class or ‘relations’ may overwhelm ‘forces’ or accumulation. Kalecki 
(1943), for instance, noted that “discipline in the factories and political stability are more appreciated than 
profits by business leaders”. It may be argued that these conditions are highly contingent and/or merely a 
means to achieving longer-term profitability so that accumulation retains primacy. Under conditions of 
fundamental uncertainty it is impossible to say whether such forgoing of short-term profitability ultimately 
serves longer-term stability. We thus find it analytically useful to separate the two so as to unpack more 
precisely the causal mechanisms underpinning financialisation. 
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managing wealth, trading often complex products, among other means. A set of common 
standards and metrics is essential for their governance.  
We thus find it useful to theorise financialisation in relation to the transformation of 
banking as per Figure 2.1 below. Neoliberalism, accumulation, and standardisation all have 
explanatory power in accounting for financialisation and the transformation of banking. 
Neoliberalism here is understood to be the reaction of the capitalist class to the 
labour-empowering and redistributive tendencies of post-war or ‘Golden Age’ economic 
arrangements (see, for instance, Glyn, 2007). As Harvey puts it, it is a political-economic 
project ‘to achieve the restoration of class power’ (Harvey, 20005: 16). As such, 
neoliberalism as a class project entails a set of policy prescriptions that reorganises market 
and state structures according to corporate and investor prerogatives. A central feature of 
this has been the roll-back of the power of organised labour. But insofar as the driving force 
behind policies is the transfer of income and wealth to economic elites, it also includes 
privatisation, financial deregulation, and so on. 
 
Neoliberalism 
             
Standardisation     Financialisation 
 
Accumulation 
Figure ‎2-1: Understanding financialisation. 
 
Accumulation is taken to mean the process whereby an economic entity expands. It 
includes the expansion of capitalist firms but as states are major economic actors, 
accumulation also includes the expansion of the state through public investment or through 
growing its services. In both cases accumulation/expansion is driven by production forces 
in two senses; innovation/knowledge creation and technical change on the one hand, and 
investment in capital goods on the other. For instance, as firms invest, they expand. But due 
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to technical change, particularly the large R&D and other resources required of the major 
firms to remain competitive, implies size is a prerequisite if economies of scale are to be 
realised. Technical change has had a major effect on the expansion of the state as well. 
Progress in medical knowledge and accompanying behavioural changes (Mathers et al., 
2015) have increased the demand placed on both the welfare system and public health as 
populations age. More generally, the state provides services, whose price tends to rise over 
time as innovations in production lead to falls in the price of manufactured goods, putting 
upward pressure on the monetary value of state outlays.      
As before, standardisation is the implementation of common metrics and rules such 
that it leads to new forms of financial behaviour or the growth of existing practices. It is 
often related to neoliberal deregulation/liberalisation in that it reflects the distribution of 
power among financial actors (see Dymski, 2011) or is concurrent with broader liberalising 
reforms. The difference is that it need not be public or legal regulations but could be 
industry standards. It should also be understood as adding to existing rules, regulations, and 
other arrangements. That is, it is the common adoption of new rules rather than the deletion 
of old ones.   
Our contention is that the financialised period is a distinct phase in the history of 
capitalism. As well as adding standardisation as a distinct analytical category, our 
framework obviously provides a somewhat different interpretation to socioeconomic 
change than that enunciated by classic historical materialism. Given the precedence of 
forces over relations, neoliberalism would likely be seen as determined by accumulation 
pressures. While competition and the profit motive ultimately shape class dynamics under 
capitalism, as before, it is useful to separate our categories as above so as to unpack the 
causal mechanisms of financial change more precisely. The key distinction between 
neoliberalism and accumulation pressures for instance, is that the former is driven by class 
considerations over and above what is necessary for the continuation of growth, investment, 
stability, and so on. 
There nevertheless remains mutual interaction between the different processes at the 
causal, if not the conceptual level. Neoliberalism has facilitated expansion or accumulation 
through, for instance, external liberalisation. International expansion in turn has fuelled 
standardisation. Financialisation has deepened neoliberalism and has arguably led to a 
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slowdown of accumulation. It is our contention, though, that causal or explanatory 
significance runs primarily in the direction above. Before that claim is substantiated, we 
consider literature on financialisation and the transformation of banking. 
 
2.2.3 The transformation of banking  
Marxian analysis offers a comprehensive and ambitious theory of banking transformation 
(see Dos Santos, 2009a; 2009b; Lapavitsas, 2009; 2014; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013). 
Drawing on Hilferding’s analysis of finance capitalism, financialisation and the 
transformation of banking derive from the social relations of production, and between the 
real and financial sectors, with the retreat of the former from the latter. Concretely, the 
transformation of banking activities is primarily attributed to the growing disengagement of 
NFCs from the financial system in general, and the banking system in particular. The 
increased tendency of NFCs to finance themselves through the 1980s and beyond using 
internally-generated funds on the one hand, and through capital markets as opposed to loans 
on the other led to a decline of banks’ traditional activity, lending to firms. As a result of 
reduced income or profitability from traditional lending, banks, it is argued, reoriented their 
activities towards household credit in the form of mortgage lending, and investment 
banking activities. Extra-banking processes such as the rise of institutional investors and 
privatisation of social housing played an enabling role, but the reorientation of bank income 
streams has been the driving force. As Lapavitsas (2009) argues:  
 
“Commercial banks have been greatly transformed in the course of financialisation. The driving 
force of this transformation has been declining reliance of large corporations on bank 
finance …This fundamental trend presupposes increasing involvement of workers with the 
mechanisms of finance in order to meet elementary needs, such as housing, education, health, and 
provision for old age. Only then would banks be able to extract significant profits directly from 
wages and salaries” (Lapavitsas, 2009: 126-29). 
  
A variant of the above theme emphasises the impact of the rise of various forms of 
institutionalised savings on banking. Demographic changes, marketisation of social security 
systems, but particularly financial innovation have found institutional expression in the 
expansion of ‘money managers’. This has led to a shift of savings away from deposits to 
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various forms of institutional investor savings and investment vehicles. The resultant 
increase in competition for savings constituted a decline in the profitability of traditional 
intermediation activities. Banks have had to pay higher rates to entice depositors and charge 
lower rates to businesses on loans in order to prevent them from migrating to institutional 
funds and sources. This has stimulated the rise of non-traditional, investment banking 
activities and mortgage lending as banks seek to maintain profitability (see Davis, 2004; 
Hackethal, 2004).
2
 
 While many analyses of financialisation and the financial system do not deploy an 
overarching or explicit Marxian framework as above, it is fair to say that traditional 
banking decline and/or disintermediation constitutes the leading explanation of the 
reorientation of banking activities across the social sciences. For instance, Davis (2004), a 
neoclassical economist, Hackethal’s (2004) historical-institutional analysis of Germany, 
Rethel and Sinclair’s (2012: 51-70) international political economy examination in relation 
to Europe, and Seccareccia (2012) analyses the transformation of Canadian banking using a 
post-Keynesian circuitist framework all put disengagement on the part of non-financial 
firms as central to the transformation of commercial banking. An exception to this trend is 
the work of Hardie and Howarth (2013) who document the rise of ‘market-based banking’ 
and the growth of financial asset trading. They point out that the extent of disintermediation 
is often overstated. They do not, however, systematise an explanation for the rise of 
market-based finance and investment banking activities.  
Deregulation plays a central role in the understanding of the growth of investment 
banking as well. This is particularly the case of post-Keynesian approaches as evidenced by 
the emphasis given to rentiers as before, and the repeal of Glass-Steagall in the US (see 
Epstein and Montecino, 2016; Pollin, 2000). A focus on the regulatory framework is not 
limited to the post-Keynesian school as Hager (2012) develops the growth of investment 
banking in the framework of neoliberal regulation and monopoly capital theory. 
Seccareccia (2012) also observes deregulation as a major reason for the transformation of 
Canadian banking in his circuitist framework, along with other factors as mentioned. Thus, 
                                                          
2
 That this is a variant of the previous paragraph can be seen when one considers that as deposits are swept 
from the banking system to investment funds, the latter has a pool of cash which it must invest. This allows 
NFCs to access capital markets. The loss of deposits may also (arguably) make banks more reluctant to lend, 
which further pushes firms towards capital markets. 
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the issue is one of emphasis and a single factor or cause is rarely identified. But it is 
reasonable to assert that financial deregulation as probably the major theme in 
post-Keynesian understandings of banking financialisation.          
More germane to the growth of mortgage lending, post-Keynesian, sociological, and 
other approaches also highlight the role of income distribution in the deepening of 
financialisation in a voluminous literature (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Cynamon and Fazzari, 
2008; Kus, 2012; Perugini et al., 2016; Stockhammer, 2012; 2015b). The relative 
stagnation of incomes for the preponderance of the workforce during the neoliberal era, in 
conjunction with historically and socially-determined consumption norms renders debt 
increasingly important as households attempt to maintain their desired living standards. 
Debt-fueled consumption, moreover, was a key source of aggregate demand as it 
substituted for real wage growth. These approaches also usually highlight feedback 
mechanisms whereby asset price inflation leads to further indebtedness through, for 
instance, home equity withdrawal, which can lead to asset price inflation, and so on.        
 Krippner (2011) offers a policy-centered narrative in her comprehensive study of 
financialisation in the US. In this view, the rise of financialisation is the outcome of 
unintended regulatory decisions taken by administrators. The growth of bank credit was the 
culmination of decisions by monetary authorities to abdicate responsibility for control of 
monetary variables to the market. Fernandez and Aalbers (2016) identify a number of 
variables that characterised those countries with housing-centred financialisation cycles. It 
includes high loan-to-value ratios, tax incentives, openness to capital inflows, and, so on. 
Thus the expansion of household and mortgage lending is seen as part of a broader package 
of credit market and financial liberalisation. 
 To sum the literature, disintermediation is seen as the leading cause of the growth of 
investment banking across a wide range of schools of thought. Other variables play 
important facilitating roles such as the emergence of institutional investors, though an 
emphasis on deregulation features particularly prominently in post-Keynesian 
understandings. Disintermediation also features prominently in the expansion of mortgage 
lending, especially in certain Marxian renderings. But there are a number of accounts which 
do not draw on disintermediation such as the inequality-debt literature, credit market 
liberalisation, and the commodification of housing.    
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 A priori, though, there are a number of anomalies in all these accounts of the 
transformation of banking. One is the extraordinary degree of synchronicity across 
countries in the expansion of mortgage lending. Disintermediation is quite varied in its 
scope and timing across locales (Schmidt et al.: 1999). Similarly, housing market reform is 
the domain of national policymakers and is variegated temporally and spatially. The 
contemporaneous nature of banking and particularly mortgage development is at odds with 
these facts. Second, the mechanisms through which the banking system can, in aggregate, 
‘turn’ or engage in greater levels of investment banking activities are somewhat opaque. 
Lapavitsas (2009) points to commercial bank mergers with investment firms as an entry 
point into new revenues streams. It is certainly the case, in the US and France at least, that 
disintermediation has encouraged banks to consolidate and for commercial banks to move 
into fee and investment services (see, for instance, Dymski, 1999; 2000; Kregel, 1998). But 
Lapavitsas et al. and Dos Santos go further in that they analyse trends at the aggregate level. 
While the overall growth of financial markets is remarked on (Lapavitsas, 2009: 133), in 
this view the turn towards privatised personal income has been enabled primarily by the 
rise of pension funds and other savings vehicles. But the privatisation of social welfare 
services only creates a demand for institutional saving. Institutional savings must also have 
a ready supply of securities in which to invest. That is to say, if we are to fully apprehend 
the expansion of investment banking, rather than being a mere aside, the growth of capital 
markets merits our undivided attention.  
 Regarding the inequality-debt nexus, while it is no doubt true that debt-fueled 
consumption maintained demand under neoliberalism, we find the mechanisms through 
which it has been posited to emerge unconvincing. Indebtedness has overwhelmingly been 
driven by mortgage not consumer debt, which is not always acknowledged (for example, 
Perugini et al., 2016). The determining factor in lower income groups’ indebtedness is 
largely banks’ and other agents’ willingness to lend (see Coibion et al., 2014), itself shaped 
by regulatory-based evaluations of credit-worthiness such as debt-to-income and 
loan-to-value ratios, and other metrics. Further, in many European countries the state 
withdrew from housing provision, which tends to increase mortgage indebtedness  
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independent of increases in inequality.
3
 This is recognised by the credit market 
liberalisation/geography literature and the commodification of housing literature. But as 
above this literature has difficulty explaining the simultaneity in the expansion of mortgage 
lending.   
 This chapter thus reassesses the transformation of banking through the rise of 
household/mortgage lending and investment banking in Germany, France, Spain and Italy, 
and the US and the UK. We first examine how well existing theories conform to the 
experiences of the four countries through an exploration of the process of disintermediation. 
Having ruled that out as the central cause, we then put forward our own analysis of the 
expansion of mortgage lending and investment banking based on neoliberalism, 
accumulation, and standardisation. In so doing we address and critically analyse other 
explanations of banking transformation: distributional dynamics in the case of mortgage 
lending and deregulation in the case of investment banking. 
With regards to disintermediation, non-mortgage lending, essentially lending to 
NFCs, has demonstrated little decline, and there is little evidence that bank intermediation 
income was under pressure as banks expanded mortgage lending. Likewise competition for 
deposits through the institutionalisation of savings is not the major reason for the decline in 
intermediation income. An exception is France (and likely the US before the period under 
consideration) where the growth of investment funds appears to have significantly eroded 
intermediation returns. Even then, we do not find this to be the most compelling account of 
aggregate banking transformation. In general, the expansion of mortgage lending initiated 
the decline in intermediation income. Similarly, the expansion of investment banking bears 
little relationship to disintermediation and the decline of traditional business lending. This, 
of course, follows from above as the decline in intermediation income is a result of the 
expansion of mortgage lending. 
The evident growth in mortgage lending is instead explained by the imposition of 
                                                          
3
 We do not discount the potential for emulation-based consumption in housing, but dispute the importance 
accorded to it in explaining the increase in indebtedness. Societies did not suddenly become unequal during 
neoliberalism, but rather became more unequal, albeit significantly so. Much of the increase in inequality, 
however, has been driven by gains of the super-rich. This leaves less scope for debt-based emulation which, 
as discussed, is constrained by bank and regulatory limits. Insofar as emulation processes may become 
apparent as such limits are eased, a major component must be latent consumption desires that predate the 
advent of neoliberalism-induced income inequality growth.  
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the Basel Accords and associated capital adequacy rules, in conjunction with domestic 
neoliberalisation of housing and credit markets. As banking became increasingly 
internationalised through internationalisation of production and the removal of barriers to 
cross-border investment under neoliberalism, a set of globally-agreed international 
standards was required for its operation. The Basel standards in turn created the single 
strongest incentive for banks to expand mortgage lending in continental Europe in 
particular, and the process was deepened by liberalisation of credit and property markets. 
Distributional dynamics have played a secondary role while reference to mere credit market 
liberalisation lacks precision, especially outside of the US and UK.   
The increase in the scale and scope of investment banking is the result of the growth 
of capital markets, itself a result of neoliberalising forces and accumulation pressures. The 
marketisation and privatisation of social security and state-owned enterprises, the growth of 
equity issuance, and growth in government indebtedness have been among the factors 
responsible. The growth of capital markets has put demand pressures on the banking system 
for greater investment services, which it has provided. Institutionalised savings such as the 
emergence of pension funds is a concomitant of capital market growth (as explained later), 
and has reinforced the demands placed on financial intermediaries. But ultimately it has 
been capital market expansion per se and not deregulation or disintermediation that is the 
basis for the growth of investment banking. 
 
2.3 Financialisation and the transformation of banking 
This section shows that existing accounts based on disintermediation or a ‘turn’ towards 
households do a poor job empirically in explaining the transformation of banking in the six 
countries. While households increased their indebtedness and parked their savings in 
institutional funds, and greater recourse to internal finance and capital markets by NFCs is 
also evident, this, in general, did not initiate a decline in margins or reduce bank lending to 
business. Lending to business remained robust. Mortgage lending was thus not a response 
to disintermediation. In fact, mortgage lending likely initiated the decline in margins. 
France is a partial exception in the sense that there is evidence of a decline in lending 
margins, but a ‘turn’ or reorientation towards households is not the most convincing 
account of banking transformation.  
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2.3.1 Households savings and non-financial firms  
Recall the mechanisms through which disintermediation is posited to give rise to the 
transformation of banking. Increased resort to internal finance by NFCs on the one hand, 
and greater use of cheaper (debt-based) capital market funding in external finance on the 
other led to a decline in banks’ traditional source of earnings, lending to NFCs. As a 
consequence banks reoriented their activities towards households and financial markets. 
Moreover, the flipside of greater use of capital markets in external financing of NFCs is the 
existence of capital market investors who desire and need to invest in NFC securities. The 
competition for household savings between banks (held as deposits) and institutional 
investors further drives down the profitability of traditional bank income, and increases the 
reorientation of banks towards household lending. The emergence of institutional savings 
and/or privatisation of welfare is typically
4
 seen as an enabling factor.  
We show here that consistent with the consensus in financialisation literature and 
elsewhere, households have indeed simultaneously incurred greater levels of debt from the 
banking system and increasingly parked their savings with institutional vehicles. Firms 
have also been resorting to greater use of internal finance and capital market in external in a 
relative sense. We are skeptical, though, as to how powerful an influence this has had on 
transforming banking activities in aggregate. 
In relation to households, the large-scale holdings of financial assets and 
institutionalisation of savings is a relatively recent phenomenon. The post-war period was 
one of large tax-funded expansions of social provision, and savings held in deposit form. 
The system of limited finance began to unravel the 1980s. Households became engaged in 
financial markets and institutionalised forms of savings as can be seen in Figure 2.2 below. 
In all six countries, household ownership of financial assets has increased over time. 
Financialisation is, however, uneven across regions in that households in Germany and 
Spain show lower levels of financial accumulation. In the former, starting in the mid-1990s 
household accumulation of capital market-based assets accelerated. Initially greater equity 
holdings was a significant factor but as the 2000s progressed institutionalised forms of 
                                                          
4
 We say typically as this is not always the case. Hackethal (2004) merely states that ‘Declining interest 
margins have caused banks to seek alternative sources of income’ (Hackethal, 2004: 23). But no reference is 
made to the potential facilitating role of financial market growth. Given that it is all but impossible for 
investment banking to grow without, for instance, more securities to underwrite (and may just be an omission 
on Hackehtal’s part), we focus critical attention on the stronger thesis that the turn towards households has 
been enabled as above.    
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savings began to dominate. Except for the post-crisis period, commensurate increases in 
deposits did not occur. Household liabilities in the form of loans increased in Germany in 
the 1990s too, but fell back to initial levels during the late 2000s and early 2010s. In Spain 
and the US, accumulation of financial assets, driven by equity and mutual fund purchases, 
similarly began to grow in the mid-1990s. Interestingly, the absolute level of deposits 
(relative to GDP) declined overall in the 1990s in the US and the 2000s in Spain, reflecting 
the reliance on market-based funding in these countries’ banking systems. Only in the case 
of the UK did households not switch their savings into financial assets, though this may be 
due to the short timespan of the series. Institutional holdings of securities are somewhat less 
developed than in Germany.  
Less data is available in the cases of Italy and France than for Spain or the US. 
Nevertheless a pattern of expansions in the mid-1990s followed by post-dot-com bubble 
declines, and further expansions in the 2000s is apparent. In France, as in Germany and the 
UK, long-term institutional holdings are the primary vehicle through which households 
channel their savings. This reflects the strength of the insurance sector in this region. Direct 
securities holdings also expanded relative to deposits. Italy follows a comparable path 
except that institutional holdings are lower, and direct debt as opposed to just equity and 
mutual fund holdings are also important. This, no doubt, reflects the high level of domestic 
holdings of sovereign debt instruments both historically and presently. Household loans as 
a share of GDP increased gently but steadily in both countries over the series. 
A process of financialisation of households is thus evident across all countries. The 
share of deposits in household financial assets fell in favour of greater reliance on financial 
markets. While equity holdings grew in all regions except the UK, this was matched or 
exceeded by institutional holdings, especially in France and Germany. Except for Germany, 
households increased their financial liabilities in the form of loans. Thus, a process of 
increased marketisation and institutionalisation of savings on the one hand, is coincident 
with an expansion of lending to households on the other. At first glance it appears that 
banks have turned towards households through greater provision of credit, while 
opportunities for managing institutional savings have also risen. 
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Figure  2-2a: Household assets (LHS) and loans (RHS) (% GDP).    
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Figure  2-3b: Household assets (LHS) and loans (RHS) (% GDP).    
Source: OECD Financial Balance Sheets. 
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In terms of disintermediation of NFCs, Table 2.1 below shows that the share of 
internal finance in total external finance has been growing. In all countries except Spain 
and the UK, from the 1970s to the beginning of the 1990s NFCs increasingly utilised 
internally-generated finance to source funding for investment. The primary reason being a 
small need for external funds as advanced economies slowed after the post-war boom. The 
oil crisis of the 1970s and the shift away from expansionary macroeconomic policy in the 
1980s dampened investment and lessened the need for external finance (Galizia and 
Steinberger, 2001).
5
 Much of the 1990s, in contrast, were boom years. In Germany and 
Spain, the overall share of internal finance remained stable from the mid-1980s through the 
1990s. In the UK it fell, though apparently recovered. Another exception is the first half of 
the 1990s where reunification in Germany resulted in large borrowings. In Italy, the 1990s  
 
 1970-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1990-99 
Germany 75.7 79.7 89.3 71.8 86 
France 64 67.9* 84.7 92.1 98 
Italy 38 69.9 98.2 17.1 73 
Spain - - 96** - 96 
UK 100.2 115.4 81.2 81.2 98 
US 83 89.6 103.7 109.8  
Table ‎2-1: Internal finance as a share of overall finance in NFCs. 
Sources: Cobham et al. (1999), Cobham and Serres (2000), and Corbett and Jenkinson (1997). 
Spanish figures and 1970-79 and 1990-99 are based on Galizia (2004). 
Notes: *1978-84. **1980-89. Galizia (2004) uses the so-called ‘savings gap’ approach which is 
methodologically different from the others. 
                                                          
5
 Much debt issuance is likely due to refinancing, rather than financing (Toporowski, 2002). More generally 
we would expect firms to favour internal finance over external funding as exclusive reliance on the latter 
would potentially link a firm’s solvency with the vagaries investment returns (ibid:23-28).    
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constituted a large shift away from internally-generated funds. This was particularly 
dramatic in early part of the decade as many state-owned banks and firms were privatised, 
which created a large demand for external funds (Galizia, 2004). Buoyed by strong 
corporate savings, only in France is a continued trend of disintermediation away from 
external finance apparent in all periods. Since the 1990s corporate reserves have been 
growing as large profits imply large retained earnings. De Souza and Epstein (2014) present 
aggregated data on Germany, France, the UK and the US and find a continuing trend away 
from external finance in the 2000s. Thus, with the exception of Spain and perhaps the UK, 
an overall shift away from external finance is apparent. 
In terms of the composition of external finance, Figure 2.3 depicts the evolving 
liability structures of NFCs in the six countries. From the beginning of each series to the 
2000s, in all six countries the share of loans in total liabilities decreased significantly as 
securities issuance has grown. In the 2000s in Spain and the UK, and to an extent in Italy, 
the share of loans rebounded whereas in the three other countries the share remained stable 
or declined further. The relative strength of loans in Italy and Spain may in part be due to 
the unusually large number of small and medium-sized enterprises there. In the case of 
Germany and particularly France, Schmidt et al. (1999: 50) present data that the increasing 
share of securities on the liability side of NFC’s balance sheets began at least in the early 
1980s. Corporate bond issuance did takeoff in the mid-to-late 1990s in the major European 
countries (Deeg, 2009: 557). But with the partial exceptions of France, the UK and the US, 
as can be seen from Figure 2.3 debt has not been a major component of NFC’s liabilities 
overall. The declining share of loans in all six countries is overwhelmingly attributable to 
greater recourse to equity issuance. Other liabilities, comprising mostly trade receivables 
and other payments due, has been an important component through the series, but has not 
grown to extent that equity liabilities have.  
With the exception of the UK, there is thus clear evidence of greater recourse to 
internal finance and a growing inclination towards capital markets in the external financing 
operations of NFCs. But two qualifications are necessary which cast doubt on the relevance 
to the transformation of banking. In relation to internal finance, while idiosyncratic factors 
have been important, the most significant driver pre-2000s has been cyclical downturns.  
This provides a peculiar setting for the expansion of either mortgage lending or investment
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Figure ‎2-4a: Non-financial company financial balance Sheets (% GDP).      
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Figure ‎2-5b: Non-financial company financial balance sheets (% GDP).      
Source: OECD Financial Balance Sheet. 
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banking. In relation to external finance, firms’ greater use of capital markets has been 
primarily driven by the growth of equity markets, as noted. It is questionable, though, to 
what extent this truly represents a substitute form of finance to bank lending, rather than 
initial public offerings, privatisation, and funding financial operations. The level of NFC 
loans to GDP generally held firm, or increased as in Italy, Spain and the UK. The more 
likely candidates to compete with bank lending, commercial paper and debt markets, 
exhibited little signs of growth, with the partial exception of France and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries.  
At this juncture, we summarise two key developments as they relate to 
disintermediation. First, households have shifted a large component of their savings into 
market-based and institutionalised sources while at the same time incurring greater amounts 
of debt through bank loans. Second, there is also evidence of greater use of internal finance 
and capital market finance relative to bank lending among NFCs. The conditions under 
which banks both desire to, and are capable of reorienting towards households appear to 
have been met. Contrarily, a disengagement of firms from the banking system in absolute 
terms is not observable. Greater reliance on internally-generated funds and the growth of 
equity markets appears to have complemented rather than substituted for bank lending. 
Except for France, within continental Europe there is little evidence of recourse to 
market-based sources driven by institutionalised savings vehicles. The following section 
assesses whether these developments have been responsible for a decline in lending 
income.  
 
2.3.2 Transformation of banking and intermediation returns  
We now turn to the expansion of mortgage lending and investment banking activities. A 
central claim in much of the financialisation literature is that these activities should be seen 
in the context of a reorientation of bank priorities due the decline of traditional 
intermediation activities. It is argued that withdrawal of NFCs or, more commonly, 
disintermediation instigated a decline in the profitability of business lending such that 
banks responded by increasing mortgage lending and investment banking (Dos Santos, 
2009a; 2009b; Hackethal, 2004; Lapavitsas, 2009; 2014; Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013).
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We examine this claim and find little evidence for it except for in France. While we 
find little evidence for it in the case of the US, given that disintermediation has been a 
widely-studied and accepted explanation of the decline in lending income, this is most 
likely a function of our analysis beginning in the 1980s. We examine both interest income 
as a proportion of credit (relative intermediation income) and interest income relative to 
GDP (absolute intermediation income). The former captures changes in the margins from 
lending while the latter captures changes in the overall level of interest income. 
Non-interest income is used as a proxy for investment banking activities.    
In confirmation of our previous belief based on sectoral data, bank level data show 
that mortgage lending complemented business lending (proxied by non-mortgage lending), 
which remained stable over the series. Rather than being a response to depressed returns, 
we find mortgage lending growth to either be independent of or to have precipitated a fall 
in intermediation income relative to the amount of credit. It is the case that despite the large 
growth in bank lending overall, a commensurate increase in intermediation income relative 
to the GDP is not apparent. This weak growth and stagnation, however, occurred 
subsequent to the growth of mortgage lending. Mortgage expansion was not a response. 
While the enhanced ability of NFCs to access cheap market funding and institutional 
sources may have contributed to the decline in intermediation income, it has not been the 
driving force. Rather than being a result of the decline in lending margins, the evidence 
points to mortgage lending initiating the decline, along with a host of other factors. Only in 
the case of France is there evidence that non-traditional activities acted as bulwark against 
sluggish returns from business lending. However, this relates to the expansion of 
investment banking, not mortgage lending. Moreover, as we show in the next section the 
aggregate expansion of investment banking activity is more plausibly seen as a response to 
the growth of capital markets, not to a decline in intermediation activities.
6
 
Figure 2.4 below illustrates the trajectory of different types of lending, and relative 
and absolute intermediation income. As a general observation, a sharp increase in mortgage 
lending is apparent since the mid-1990s in the three countries with the exception of France, 
                                                          
6
 In terms of aggregate activity, financial intermediation is still the most important source of income for the 
banking system as a whole. This, of course, masks compositional trends in which investment banking-related 
income is more important for large, systemically important mega-banks, which we deal with in the following 
chapter. 
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the US and the UK. France began its expansion in the early-2000s around the same time 
mortgage lending in the US began its secular (as opposed to cyclical) climb. The expansion 
of mortgage lending in the UK was steadier over the series, with a large and steady 
expansion in the 1980s, stagnation for much of the 1990s, and acceleration again in the 
2000s. These patterns are consistent with the rising share of mortgage and household 
lending identified in much of the financialisation literature (Lapavitsas, 2009: 14-15; 
Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013: 370). Moreover, consistent with the rise of investment 
banking, non-interest income increased in all six countries, increasing sharply in the 
late-1980s in France and in the 2000s in the UK, but more gradually since the 1990s 
elsewhere. 
More specifically in Germany, we see an expansion of mortgage lending starting 
around 1992 and continuing until the early 2000s, after which it stabilised. The growth in 
non-interest income followed the expansion in mortgage lending by some five years. The 
increase in mortgage lending coincided with an initial increase in non-mortgage lending 
and a subsequent decline around the turn of the century. In contradiction to claims of the 
unprofitability of intermediation, the large expansion in total lending increased absolute 
intermediation income. 
Detzer et al. (2013) present evidence that the decline in interest margins in Germany 
was a result of the growth of investment funds. We see that the expansion in mortgage 
lending relative to non-mortgage lending coincides with a secular decline in interest income 
relative to credit created (except for the early 1990s when the expansion overlaps with an 
increase in relative intermediation income). It is important to emphasise that this decline is 
apparent only after the expansion in mortgage lending. Thus, the expansion in mortgage 
lending was not a response to declining intermediation margins. While it may be the case 
that the growth of investment funds contributed to the squeezing of margins, the timing 
more plausibly indicates the expansion of mortgage lending actually initiated the squeeze as 
opposed to being a response to it. The secured nature of mortgage lending compared to 
non-mortgage lending implies that an expansion of the former is likely to reduce aggregate 
lending returns. Overall, there is little evidence to support the view that either reduced 
profits or declining margins in intermediation income caused or substantively contributed 
to the growth of German mortgage lending. 
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Figure ‎2-6a: Bank credit and income. 
Notes: Mortgage and non-mortgage lending expressed as a percentage of GDP. NII denotes net interest income. 
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Figure ‎2-7b: Bank credit and income. 
Sources: Upper panel kindly provided based on Jorda et al. (2017). Bottom panel based on OECD Bank Profitability Statistics. 
Notes: Mortgage and non-mortgage lending expressed as a percentage of GDP. NII denotes net interest income. 
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Non-interest income exhibits a steep growth period from the mid-1990s to the turn 
of the century after which it fluctuates and declines post-crisis. Thus, it could be argued that 
the expansion of investment banking was a response to sluggish intermediation returns, 
which witnessed declines relative to credit created around the same time. But as argued 
above, the major reason for the decline appears to be the expansion of mortgage lending. 
Overall intermediation income actually increased. The expansion of investment banking in 
Germany is therefore not plausibly attributable to a decline in traditional banking activities. 
 The French case is somewhat different. Here we see both relative and absolute 
intermediation returns in steep decline over the entire series up until the crisis. As described 
by Kregel (1998), the major reason for this was the growth of investment funds which 
offered consumers attractive returns relative to deposits and also enabled companies to 
borrow cheaply in commercial paper markets. This is consistent with the point made earlier 
that NFC debt issuance in France has been greatest. It is certainly plausible and likely that 
individual banks grew their investment banking activities in the face of declining lending 
returns. Consolidation and perhaps more aggressive sales are likely mechanisms to this end. 
 But how can it be that banks, in aggregate, engage in more fee-producing income? 
The turn toward intermediating household savings, whose increasing institutionalisation is 
posited as an enabling factor, is problematic in this regard. For the increasing 
institutionalisation of savings presupposes the existence of large capital markets as portable 
stores of value. But larger capital markets require more underwriting services, 
market-making, and so on. In other words, the existence of household institutinalised 
savings through, for instance, pension funds necessitates, a priori, an expansion of 
fee-income and investment banking services. Accordingly, there is an incoherency in 
saying that banks’ turn towards mediating financial market, enabled by institutionalised 
household savings, can explain the expansion of investment banking activities. For to say 
this implies the sector must already have grown.  
 The only alternative would be that both asset management (such as mutual fund 
management) and investment banking functions were both previously the domain of the 
non-bank financial system, perhaps finance companies. Then, insofar as certain functions 
have been previously performed outside the banking system, a disintermediation-induced 
‘turn’ (through consolidation, for instance) toward financial market intermediation can 
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explain an aggregate rise in banking non-interest income. While there is some evidence that 
mutual funds and asset-management functions were brought into the French banking 
system (Creel and Viennot, 2013), to our knowledge it has not been argued that the same 
applies to market-making, underwriting, and so on. Thus, the point remains that a ‘turn’ of 
the banking system towards households and their savings is at best a partial explanation of 
the overall the growth of the sector.
7
      
As for mortgage lending it began its secular rise in France only in 2002/03. It 
appears to have had the effect of inducing a decline in absolute and relative intermediation 
income, whose declines had apparently levelled off. The fall in absolute intermediation 
income is particularly counterintuitive given the large expansion in total lending. It may 
point to the historical difficulty the French financial system has had in implementing 
competition without inducing large declines in profitability. Overall, while it is the case that 
large declines in intermediation income preceded the expansion in mortgage lending, it 
seems unlikely this was a response by the banking system. The decline in intermediation 
had stabilised, and mortgage growth failed to generate growth in relative or absolute 
interest income. In fact, as noted the expansion of mortgage lending coincides with a 
second phase of decline in intermediation income.      
Turning to Italy, we see that the growth in mortgage lending began to accelerate in 
the mid-1990s. This was not initiated by declines in intermediation income. Both absolute 
and relative interest income had hovered around trend up to the middle of the decade 
despite an intensification of geographical and operational competition in the 1980s and 
1990s (see Gabbi and Matthias, 2014: 122). More than in France and Germany, the large 
increase in mortgage lending precisely coincides with a decline in intermediation income 
per unit of credit. A slight curiosity is why the increase in both mortgage and non-mortgage 
lending from the mid-1990s onwards served only to maintain rather than increase absolute 
intermediation income at its trend level. Part of the reason is likely explained by 
competition for deposits from the growing intituionalisation of savings. Investment funds in 
                                                          
7
 Disintermediation is likely to be associated with an aggregate increase in non-interest banking income, 
independent of a reorientation of bank business functions. As deposits are swept into mutual funds, asset 
management fees rise. As NFCs issue debt instead to borrowing from banks, the demand for underwriting 
services rises. NFC debt and indeed private debt markets generally have traditionally comprised a relatively 
small portion of European debt markets, especially under the period in question. These demand channels are 
thus likely to constitute only a limited share of the overall increase in investment banking income.    
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particular experienced large growth from the early 1990s to about 2000. Note, though, that 
this follows by a number of years the initial growth in mortgage lending around the 1980s, 
and the subsequent acceleration and decline in relative intermediation income in the 
mid-1990s. Much of the poor performance in intermediation income is attributable to the 
recession and financial crisis of the early 1990s as well as common factors such as 
declining interest rates, a flattening of the yield curve, and between 1993 and 1997 large 
banking losses due to household defaults (BIS, 2006: 1). Thus, rather than being a result of 
declining intermediation income, in Italy mortgage growth triggered its decline.  
A gentle growth in non-interest income is also evident, coinciding with the 
development of mortgage-based lending and the decline of relative intermediation income. 
The same comments, though, apply as in the case of Germany. That is, the decline in 
relative intermediation income is most plausibly seen as having been triggered by the 
expansion of mortgage lending. The fact that absolute intermediation income remained 
stable over the period also undermines the hypothesis that investment banking activities 
grew in response to declining intermediation activities.        
Spain follows an intermediate path with similarities to both Italy and to a lesser 
extent France. A trend increase in mortgage lending is apparent from the early 1980s. 
Mortgage growth accelerated in the mid-1990s and again in the early 2000s in particular. 
Consistent with a reorientation-based explanation, the initial expansion does appear to have 
substituted for declining non-mortgage lending. That said, over the entire series 
non-mortgage lending rebounds and grows along with mortgage lending in the second half. 
It is important to note that the early period in which the two forms of lending appear to be 
substitutive, neither absolute nor relative intermediation income changed much overall. 
Thus the ‘decision’ to expand into mortgage lending appears less to have been driven by 
ailing business lines than it may be an outcome of external conditions.  
The liberalisation of the Spanish banking system in the 1980s gave rise to greater 
competition for liabilities. Money market funds in particular experienced massive growth 
from the early-to-mid-1990s, after which they fluctuated and declined (Altuzarra et al., 
2013: 48). But relative intermediation income began a sharp decline only around 1994-95. 
If the institutionalisation of savings in money market funds was a central cause of the 
decline in intermediation income, we would expect the impact to be felt through the period 
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of strongest growth, rather than a period of continuity. While we do not discount some 
contribution, like most European countries (except France) the fact that asset management 
activities take place within the banking system in Spain may temper competition for 
liabilities.  
The decline in relative intermediation income in Spain coincides with the 
acceleration in mortgage lending (and decline in business credit) approximately, though the 
sharp decline in relative intermediation income does appear to precede the acceleration in 
mortgage income by one year. However, it is certainly not the case that a trend decline in 
relative intermediation income led to an expansion of mortgage credit. Mortgage lending 
growth may be independent of the initial decline in relative intermediation income. Or, 
more plausibly given the experience of other countries, it may have contributed to it, along 
with a range of other factors. Similar to Italy, Spain experienced a recession in the 
early-1990s. Thus, while mortgage and non-mortgage lending display some substitutive 
properties, there is this little evidence this constituted a reorientation of activities based on 
declining income from intermediation as opposed to, for instance, external or demand 
conditions.   
Non-interest income displays a gentle trend increase over the entire period, but with 
little correlation with the trajectory of intermediation income. Moreover, similar comments 
apply to Spain as in Germany and Italy in terms of the role of mortgage lending in the 
decline in margins. Aggregate non-interest income growth was not a result of a 
reorientation on the part of banks. 
In the UK, overall intermediation income increased through the series. Relative 
intermediation income may have been in decline before the series began, but over the 
course of available data went into a secular decline from 1999. This predates the initial 
expansion in UK mortgage credit, but coincides with the second expansion in lending. This 
is similar to the Spanish case in which the initial growth in mortgage lending was not 
correlated with intermediation margins, but the pick-up in the 1990s coincided with a 
decline. It could be that the pre-1990s (that is, pre-Basel I) expansion in mortgage lending 
did not put pressure on lending margins, but subsequent lending did. In any event, it is clear 
in the UK that mortgage lending growth was not a response to the decline intermediation 
returns. Furthermore, neither was non-interest income growth, which began its acceleration 
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in the mid-1990s, well before the decline in margins around the turn of the millennium. 
In the US, overall intermediation income expands over the entire series. Relative 
intermediation income is steady but volatile. After expanding in the 1980s, relative income 
then declines from 1992, the year Basel I was implemented. Both relative and absolute 
intermediation income may have been in decline before the series began, which would be 
consistent with evidence presented by others on the effects money market funds on lending 
margins (Kregel, 1998; Dymski, 1999). The is little evidence, however, that the aggregate 
growth of either mortgage lending, which fluctuated but began a secular increase in the late 
1990s, or non-interest income, which grew predominantly from the mid-1990s was a 
response to declining income from traditional lending.       
In sum, there is little evidence to support the contention that either the increase in 
mortgage lending or the expansion of investment banking activities arose as a response to 
declining intermediation income from lending to business. The fact that the apparent 
disengagement of NFCs from the banking system is driven by cyclical and structural 
declines in investment demand, and also the growth of equity markets should in any event 
sit uneasily with disintermediation being the driver of banking change. Though the share of 
business lending declined, the absolute level (relative to GDP) remained robust in all 
countries. With the partial exception of Germany, relative intermediation income did 
exhibit a decline in all countries. Insofar as a decline in intermediation is evident, it tended 
to coincide with the expansion of mortgage lending, especially since the 1990s. 
 Despite the large increase in all types of lending overall, absolute intermediation 
income generally did not increase. Competition for savings from institutionalised vehicles 
have thus contributed to the squeeze in intermediation incomes but have not been the 
driving force. Dynamics in intermediation income bear only limited correlation to 
investment banking activities. There is no relationship between the growth of non-interest 
income and the overall levels of intermediation income, which remained stable. The 
expansion of investment banking activities does tend to coincide with declining relative 
intermediation income. But as we have argued declining relative intermediation income 
was first and foremost a result of the expansion in mortgage lending rather than due to 
declining business lines. Finally, the idea that disintermediation has been responsible for 
the transformation of banking activities in France is at best a partial explanation as it 
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presupposes an expansion in services in the case of investment banking. The expansion of 
mortgage lending in France was, moreover, much subsequent to the trend decline in returns, 
and appears to have reinitiated a squeeze in margins. 
 
2.4 Transformation of banking: An alternative story  
This section explains the expansion of mortgage lending and investment banking by 
invoking our framework of neoliberalism, accumulation, and standardisation. We find that 
the expansion of mortgage lending is attributable to standardisation in the form of the 
imposition of Basel I and associated regulations, in conjunction with domestic 
(neo)liberalisation of housing markets. The growth of investment banking reflects the 
expansion of capital markets. The increase in the scale of capital markets in turn has been 
driven by both neoliberalism and accumulation/expansionary pressures on firms and states. 
2.4.1 Expansion of mortgage lending 
The level of credit in an economy is of course shaped by a host of macroeconomic, 
demographic, and domestic institutional factors. But to understand how mortgage credit has 
expanded to its current levels across a range of institutionally distinct entities we appeal to 
a more generalisable set of processes, as outlined previously. Most countries have at some 
stage implemented a range of credit market restrictions such as interest rate controls and 
directed credit. Credit market restrictions were gradually lifted under neoliberal reforms 
and pressure from the EU such that by the 1980s in France and by the 1990s in Italy and 
Spain credit markets were fully liberalised based on quantitative metrics (see Abiad et al., 
2008). In Germany, such controls were either never in place or were lifted by the early 
1970s.   
Housing markets continue to be shaped by a variety of domestic institutional factors. 
Among them, rent and, historically, price controls are and have been an important feature 
of the landscape of European property markets. Embedded in a variety of legal and 
institutional structures rent controls are strongest in Germany and France, and relatively 
less strong in Spain and Italy (Cuerpo et al., 2014). More specifically in Spain, 
liberalisation helped erode the dominance of regional banks (cajas) and allowed 
commercial banks to enter the mortgage market in force (Altuzarra et al., 2013: 133). In 
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Italy, Nobili and Zollino (2012: 9) point to the introduction of tax incentives for house 
purchase in the 1990s. The BIS (2006: 2-3) also identifies an expansion in the range of 
products and mortgage providers as an important driver of the property market in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Despite the apparent absence of credit restrictions and the large privatisation of 
social housing, Germany has a heavily regulated property sector. Liberalisation, moerover, 
has been limited since thee 1980s (Geiger et al., 2016: 2). Mortgages in Germany require 
large down payments (30-35%) and tenant associations strive to make rents affordable, 
which weakens commodification (Monnery, 2011). 
 In France the trajectory of mortgage lending compared to the other continental 
countries is quite distinct so it is worth dwelling on more. Despite abolishing interest rate 
controls and directed credit in the 1980s, France’s property market did not experience 
growth until the 2000s. Since then, tax incentives and a relaxation of lending standards 
have reportedly been important drivers. Extension of mortgage maturities and resultant 
increases in the loan-to-income ratio have expanded the pool of borrowers (Levasseur, 
2014: 251), while at the same time maintaining their repayment capacity (Avouyi-Dovi et 
al., 2014). Third party credit guarantees have also been an important development (ibid.). 
Thus while France’s development is not hugely different to other countries, some of its 
liberalisation and deregulation happened later. All four continental countries have therefore 
undergone neoliberalisation of their credit and property markets to varying degrees. 
 Among Anglo-Saxon countries, rent controls were a feature of the British landscape 
for most of the 20
th
 century, only full abolished in 1989 (Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). Aside 
from its strict controls on land use (see Cheshire et al., 2015), today the UK property 
market is one of the most liberalised in Europe (Cuerpo et al., 2014). During the 1980s, for 
instance, Thatcher embarked on privatisation of social housing to encourage home 
ownership. On the financial side, this complemented the liberalisation and, in the case of 
housing mutuals, the privatisation of credit institutions in the 1980s (Ryan-Collins et al., 
2017: 133). 
 The US housing market is characterised by a high degree of diversity and regional 
variation. Accordingly state intervention has varied with rent controls, for instance, often 
being a feature of the landscape in major urban areas. Public ownership of the housing 
stock has historically been limited, though the state has actively supported home ownership. 
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This came in the form of various funding and guarantees provided to savings and loan 
(S&L) institutions, local thrift institutions that provided mortgage loans (Monnery, 2010: 
34-35). It also came in the form of setting up government sponsored agencies (GSEs), 
which securitise and guarantee the loans of a range of banks and other mortgage originators. 
Over time, however, GSEs became more privatised (Pollin and Heintz, 2013: 164-174), 
while S&L institutions were deregulated in the 1980s.
8
              
 The major structural change in our view entails neither disintermediation nor 
national dynamics, but rather comprises the imposition of the first Basel Accord and 
associated capital adequacy measures. A series of bank failures in the 1970s following the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the growing internationalisation of the sector 
necessitated a coordinated international regulatory framework. Basel I began negotiations 
in the 1980s and formally came into effect in the EU in 1993 with the first Capital 
Adequacy Directive. The synchronicity in the expansion of mortgage lending here and 
elsewhere at precisely or approximately the time of its implementation points to its 
importance as a stimulant to domestic mortgage markets. 
Under Basel I, banks were required to hold a minimum of 8% of capital against 
risk-weighted assets. Corporate, commercial, and retail lending carried risk weights of 100% 
whereas residential mortgage lending carried a weight of only 50%. That is to say, in 
lending to business and consumers banks were required to hold capital of 8%, but only 4% 
needed to be held against mortgage lending. The Basel Accords are furthermore so-called 
portfolio invariant in that risk is evaluated on the basis on an individual asset, rather than 
the marginal change in risk to a portfolio. Thus, it fails to reward diversification and to 
penalise concentration (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 2010: 4). Basel II, agreed upon in 
2004, and the recently-agreed to Basel III provided more nuanced risk weight categories, 
but in effect expanded the advantage to mortgage lending. Mortgage lending risk weights 
under Basel II and III could be as low as 35% whereas except for consumer lending, 
non-mortgage lending risk weights remained at 100%. Larger banks were able to apply 
                                                          
8
 Another important move was the phasing out of regulation Q in the early 1980s which limited the rates 
payable to deposits (see Gilbert, 1986). While this and the deregulation of the S&L industry arose mostly due 
to competition from money market funds (and the Eurodollar market), our concern here is with the trend rise 
in mortgage lending, not the fluctuation in mortgage and non-mortgage lending that characterised the US in 
the 1980s. The level of mortgage lending-to-GDP stood at the same level around 2000 as it did in 1975. So 
we maintain our contention that disintermediation is of only secondary explanatory importance.    
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their own risk weights using internal weighting models, but the point stands that Basel 
penalises non-mortgage lending more. Some asset categories similarly carried low risk 
weights under Basel I such as government bonds, which had a risk weight of 0%. Other 
types of fixed-income categories carried different weights, but were generally significantly 
lower than non-mortgage lending.  
Figure 2.5 illustrates the shift in bank portfolios, including holdings of government 
and fixed-income securities. These are adjusted for the overall level of fixed income 
securities in the economy in the case of Germany, France, and Spain. We see most clearly 
in the case of Germany that the expansion of adjusted bank holdings of government debt as 
a proportion of the total balance sheet coincided with the growth in mortgage lending 
relative to GDP. The contemporaneous growth of the two series in the 1990s is strongly 
indicative of a common underlying dynamic. As the 1990s progressed government debt 
experienced a secular decline in returns and likely explains relative disengagement in the 
2000s.  
Up to the mid-1980s Spain had a largely closed financial system after which it 
began to liberalise as part of the process of joining the EU. Mortgage credit began to 
increase in 1985, the year Spain implemented a Basel-like risk-based capital accord. 
Interestingly, partly a response to a recent banking crisis, the introduction of risk-based 
capital adequacy rules were an addition to the existing ruleset and were seen as necessary to 
enhance financial stability. Like Basel it penalised non-mortgage lending relative to 
mortgage lending (Carbo, 1993: 58-105). The 1990s witnessed an acceleration of mortgage 
credit growth that coincides with the actual implementation of Basel I. 
Italy similarly introduced a raft of reforms in its 1985 Bank Directive which, inter 
alia, was to prepare the banking system for the introduction of Basel I (Consolando et al., 
2013: 25). Capital adequacy reforms were to be completed by June 1987 (Reuters, 
unknown). Again we can see that mortgage lending began to accelerate after 1986. 
Mortgage growth was briefly interrupted during the early 1990s recession, after which it 
continued to grow. 
France and the US are somewhat different cases, but still point to the importance of 
Basel I. In France, the expansion of bank holdings of government debt did not coincide 
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Figure  2-8a: Mortgage lending (% GDP) and bank holding of government bonds (% bank assets).  
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 Figure  2-9b: Mortgage lending (% GDP) and bank holding of debt securities (% bank assets).     
Sources: Mortgage Lending based on Jorda et al. (2016) as before. German and French bank holding of government debt based on national central bank 
figures. Deflation figures for Germany based on national central bank statistics. For France pre-1990 deflation based on IMF World Economic Outlook 
general government gross debt. Post-1990 figures are based on World Bank Financial Structure outstanding public debt securities. Notes: To control for 
the overall amount of debt securities in the economy, bank holdings of debt securities are deflated by growth of government debt (base = 1980).    
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with an increase in mortgage lending. Nevertheless the large increase in government debt 
holdings underlines the powerful allocative impact of the Accord. As mentioned, though, 
France engaged in liberalisation of its housing market only in the 2000s. Similarly in the 
US, mortgage lending, having fluctuated significantly in the 1980s, did not begin its secular 
climb until the turn of the millennium. Hall (1993) shows a strong compositional shift 
towards mortgage lending (as a proportion of total assets) among US banks under Basel I, 
even if a large, absolute increase was absent in the prevailing recessionary conditions. As 
well as the scale of lending, an additional difference between the US post-2000 expansion 
and the 1980s is that mortgage lending in the earlier expansion correlated well with 
non-mortgage lending as Figure 2.4b illustrates. Although mortgage lending boomed in part 
due to deregulation of S&L institutions, it appears that a general loosening of or appetite for 
credit was responsible the increase in mortgage growth. Given the importance of Basel I in 
other countries, the compositional shift in the US, and the historically unprecedented 
expansion a few years after its implementation, it is reasonable to infer that Basel I has had 
a major, if relatively delayed affect on mortgage lending in both the US and France. The 
differing trajectories in these countries nevertheless points to the importance of interactive 
dynamics between international regulation and domestic institutional and macroeconomic 
factors. The imposition of the Accords, on their own, is not sufficient to explain the growth 
of mortgage lending. 
The UK experience is similar to the US and France but that it experienced an even 
larger expansion in mortgage lending pre-Basel. This may be a result of the fact that 
pre-Basel the Bank of England already required its banks to set minimum capital 
requirements with the ratios being set on a bank by bank basis (BIS, 2004: 51). As 
mentioned, the Thatcher government undertook a program of privatisation of social housing 
and liberalisation of credit markets in the 1980s. This led to a large expansion in both 
mortgage and non-mortgage lending as per Figure 2.4b. After a recession of the early 1990s, 
mortgage lending plateaued, after which it resumed its upward growth in the 2000s. Again 
this suggests an important role for Basel I in addition to, as elsewhere, favourable 
macroeconomic conditions, such as the decline in long-term interest rates for instance. That 
said, general neoliberal policies appear to have played a relatively larger role than 
standardisation in the UK.   
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It could be argued that the expansion of credit whether due to deregulation or 
standardisation is not the central driving force, but rather responds to underlying 
fundamentals. A comprehensive historical analysis of housing markets in the six countries 
is, needless to say, beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead Figure 2.6 explores the extent 
to which mortgage credit may have been driven by real house prices or whether credit has 
been the preeminent force. In Germany, real house prices display little change over the 
entire series, perhaps reflecting the willingness of the state to restrict upward price 
movements. Thus, the expansion in mortgage credit has been driven less by housing market 
dynamics than it has by financial considerations. In Spain, house prices track the expansion 
of credit, but the latter precedes the former in both the 1980s and 1990s expansions. In Italy, 
house prices fluctuate considerably but, as in Spain, the trend increase in prices during the 
1990s comes after the expansion in credit. Naturally, there is a strong element of mutual 
causation and interaction between house prices and mortgage credit. A rise in house prices 
necessitates an expansion of credit to support that increase. It may also encourage further 
lending as collateral values become inflated. It is clear, though, that the initial push 
originated in credit markets, and that that push can be traced to the imposition of the Basel 
Accords. 
France, the UK, and the US are again somewhat of exceptions to the general 
continental experience. In all three of these countries house prices fluctuated, but began 
their secular expansion in the in the mid-to-late 1990s. Here we see that mortgage credit 
follows rather than initiates the increase in prices that began in the late 1990s, reinforcing 
the earlier point of mutual interaction between the two series. Official reports in France, for 
instance, highlight the sluggishness with which supply responds to demand in France 
(Tresor, 2010). The UK similarly has highly restrictive planning regulations. 
Supply-demand imbalances, an endemic feature of fixed-supply land and property markets, 
are also suggested by the fact that the beginning of the expansions in house prices coincides 
with the economic recovery in the mid and late 1990s. That is to say, an improvement in 
the economies appears to have led to an increase in house prices (and confidence), which 
necessitated an expansion in mortgage lending, beginning the chain of mutual interaction. 
But under the Basel Accords (and prevailing macroeconomic conditions of the 2000s), the 
lending-price dynamic sustains itself for much longer. It is more a secular increase than it is 
a cyclical one.     
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Figure ‎2-10a: Mortgage credit (% GDP), house Prices, and price-to-Income. 
     
Notes: Mortgage credit depicted on right axis. House price is an index figure. Price-to-income shown in percentage terms. 
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Figure ‎2-11b: Mortgage credit (% GDP), house Prices, and price-to-Income. 
     
Sources: Mortgage credit as per Figure 2.5. House prices and price-to-income taken from OECD. 
Notes: Mortgage credit depicted on right axis. House price is an index figure. Price-to-income shown in percentage terms. 
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Such developments point to insights into role of liberalisation and deregulation, that 
is neoliberalism. As we have seen, neoliberalism played an especially large role in the UK. 
Furthermore, neoliberal reforms such as the removal of price controls are a prerequisite to 
rising prices. But much of the credit-based liberalisation of the 2000s supported and 
reinforced as opposed to initiated the upswing in prices. This is strongly indicated by the 
fact that house prices closely mirror the price-to-income ratio in the continental European 
countries in particular. As well as indicating banks’ greater willingness to lend to 
households multiples of their income, it necessarily implies a broader relaxation of lending 
standards such as an extension of loan maturities. Thus, credit reforms are to a significant 
extent endogenous with respect to prices. As prices have increased, a progressive loosening 
of lending standards has been necessary to support further expansion. Thus, the neoliberal 
package of policies have both facilitated and sustained the expansion in mortgage lending.  
These trends also point to distributional factors playing a relatively secondary role 
in the expansion in mortgage credit.
9
 The close relation between house prices and the 
house price-to-income ratio as the former fluctuates indicates it is house prices rather than 
incomes that has driven the ratio. Given that the house price-to-income ratio is but the ratio 
of nominal house prices to nominal income per head – that is, per capita or average income 
– even for an ‘average’ earner, whose income reflects overall increases in output, a 
mortgage comprised a growing share of his/her income. That is, independent of the 
distribution of income the average earner would have to incur increasing indebtedness to 
afford a mortgage given the rise in prices. While inequality may have exacerbated this trend 
for some, it is worth noting that mortgage lending caters to more middle income groups 
who can, for instance, afford to pay deposits. Notwithstanding the fact that middle income 
groups would have experienced a large increase in indebtedness anyway, the importance of 
inequality in the expansion of mortgage debt then hinges on to what extent their incomes 
have stagnated (counterbalanced by the reduced indebtedness of upper income groups 
                                                          
9
 Expansion is the key word. In circumstances of perfect income equality a desire for larger, more 
sophisticated housing, and hence indebtedness, is likely to be diminished. In a situation of a perfectly equal 
distribution of housing assets, there would be no need for the acquisition of further housing, and hence 
incurrence of indebtedness. The point is not that distributional factors are unimportant, but that they fail to 
explain the growth of indebtedness in recent times.     
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through upward redistribution).
10
 In any event, with the exception of Germany most of the 
increase in credit occurred from the late 1990s on and into the 2000s. In Germany, 
Gini-measured inequality stagnated in the 1990s as credit expanded, whereas in Spain 
inequality fell in the 2000s as the economy boomed and credit accelerated. In France there 
is a gentle increase in the 2000s coinciding with credit growth, whereas inequality was flat 
in Italy over the decade, despite some fluctuation (OECD, 2011: 25). On this measure the 
relationship is ambiguous at best. As we have seen, the initial push was driven by the 
imposition of the first Basel Accord which then stimulated price increases, which lay the 
foundation for further credit expansion, and so on. 
In sum, the imposition of the first and subsequent Basel Accords incentivised banks 
to reallocate their portfolios towards putative low-risk assets. The expansion in mortgage 
lending led to upward pressure on prices in several countries, which has, in turn, stimulated 
greater mortgage lending. Early neoliberal reforms of credit and property markets have 
been essential in enabling the process, after which credit expansion and house-price growth 
have created pressure for further reforms through credit market liberalisation and 
deregulation.   
 
2.4.2 Expansion of investment banking  
Given the relative stability of overall intermediation income and the fact that the decline in 
relative intermediation income was not due to declining business lines as discussed, the 
growth of investment banking activities is similarly difficult to explain in terms of a 
reorientation of activities in the face of an ailing lending sector. Though arguably more 
invoked in a US context, we nevertheless explore the possible effects of financial services 
deregulation and find it to be of limited explanatory power (see introduction, Kotz, 2008; 
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011). We instead explain the rise of investment banking in 
terms of development of capital markets more generally. The enormous growth in securities, 
and the consequent rise of institutional investors created a need for financial goods and 
                                                          
10
 This is so if we consider income groups to be divided into lower, middle, and upper groups. Given lower 
income groups are excluded from mortgage markets (outside the US) any redistribution from lower to middle 
or lower to upper income groups should lower mortgage indebtedness or at least be neutral, ceteris paribus. 
For a rise in inequality to result in increased indebtedness it must then be driven by redistribution from middle 
to upper income groups. 
67 
 
services which the investment banking sector has met.  
Looking at the regulatory landscape, continental European banking systems have to 
varying degrees subscribed to the universal banking model in which commercial and 
investment banking activities take place under the same entity. The classic example is 
Germany in which banks were set up with few restrictions on business lines, and with the 
express intention of providing long-term funding to large industry. Banks were empowered 
to offer the full range of financial services, without having to set up a separately capitalised 
subsidiary. Similarly, in Spain banks historically kept and traded large holdings of 
industrial stocks, and also public securities. Despite unsuccessful forays into separating 
industrial and commercial banks by the authorities, Spain retained a universal banking 
model (Perez, 1997).  
In contrast, and most famously, the US instituted a separation of investment and 
commercial banking activities in the wake of the Great Depression, the Glass-Steagall Act. 
This was gradually eroded, especially in the 1980s and finally abandoned with the 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.  Italy instituted a Glass-Steagall-type separation of 
banking activities with its 1936 Banking Act. Formal separation was gradually eroded with 
a series of developments in the 1980s and especially the 1990s (Howells and Bain, 2008: 
151). The 1990 Amato Act and the 1993 Banking Code in particular enshrined the ability of 
intermediaries to operate as universal banks (Gabbi and Vozzella, 2014: 72; Gabbi and 
Matthias, 2014: 122-123). France likewise instituted separation of commercial and 
investment banking in the post-war period. The system came under pressure through 
international openness, the international debt crisis of the early 1980s, and, as discussed, 
competition from non-bank funds for deposits (Creel et al., 2014: 12-14; Howells and Bain, 
2008: 136). This culminated in the 1984 Bank Act that instituted a wave of deregulatory 
reforms, including an end to separation. The UK move to universal banking was probably 
the most sudden, being as it was part of the ‘Big Bang’ wave of deregulation in the 1980s. 
The 1986 Financial Services Act was a key bill in paving the way to a universal banking 
model (Shabani et al., 2015).    
Figure 2.7 below re-examines the trajectory of investment banking activity, proxied 
by non-interest income. We see that non-interest income is least important in Germany, 
comparatively speaking. An important qualification is that this relates to the economy as a 
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whole, rather than large individual institutions. An analysis of the large (so-called) 
commercial banks in Germany may reveal quite a different picture, which we deal with in 
the following chapter. Despite a highly permissive institutional environment towards 
investment banking, non-interest income fails to reach 2% of GDP over the entire series. In 
Spain, surprisingly, the level of investment banking activity is relatively higher than in 
Germany. Data for France and the UK extends only to the post-liberalisation period. 
Nevertheless, although banking activities were only very recently liberalised, the level of 
investment banking-related income at the beginning of the series was around 1% of GDP in 
France and 1.5% in the UK, comparable and in fact greater than the level in Germany at the 
same period. Certainly, as the series progressed the level of investment banking-related 
income in France and the UK far surpasses that of Germany and Spain. But in the UK at 
least, non-interest income did not take off until the late-1990s, well after its deregulation. 
The US and Italy are the only countries for which we have data on investment 
banking-related income before and after separation of activities. The expansion of  
 
 
Figure ‎2-12: Non-interest Income (% GDP). 
Sources: Non-interest income taken from OECD Bank Profitability and ECB post-2009. 
Notes: ECB data for 2009 set equal to OECD data for 2009 for ease of display. Thereafter the ECB 
series is unchanged. 
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non-interest income is unremarkably gradual in the US, with the level not particularly high 
relative to other countries. In Italy, a sharp increase in non-interest income is apparent since 
the early 1990s, the period in which it liberalised its banking activities. This may point to 
the importance of the regulatory framework in structuring its bank operations. 
Liberalisation, however, is not sufficient to explain the rise of investment banking. 
Germany, for instance, exhibited a very similar trend to Italy. 
The growth of investment banking should instead be seen in terms of the expansion 
of capital markets more broadly. As capital markets develop so does the need for an 
increase in the scale of financial services to support that development. For instance, as 
firms issue more equity or governments issue more debt, the demand for underwriting, 
market making, and other services necessarily grows. While deregulation may increase the 
ability of investment banking groups to extract more income from other intermediaries or 
take on greater risk, the current scale of activities implies the secular expansion of the 
industry must arise from the growth of capital markets.     
A question arises as to what has driven the growth of capital markets. In the case of 
equity markets, both neoliberalising forces and accumulation pressures are apparent. The 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises was a major boon to European stock markets in the 
1990s. As that process has slowed or been completed, the continued growth of equity 
markets is the result of the drive to expand as firms accumulate. Public listing not only 
opens up avenues to equity finance, but also facilitates debt issuance as investors have a set 
of publically available metrics against which to gauge creditworthiness. The largest debt 
markets, though, are government debt markets. Historically governments may have 
incurred debt to finance war or other large projects, but since World War II a major 
component of public disbursements has related to large capital spending projects, and 
particularly welfare spending. The former can be seen in terms of the pressures placed on 
governments in a modern globalised context and is likely to result in preference for debt 
issuance over taxation or loans (Lysandrou, 2017). But it is the latter that has been the 
single biggest reason for the expansion of government services. Particularly in European 
countries retirement provision and healthcare costs continue to escalate as populations grow 
older due to advances in healthcare. If European countries proceed to emulate a US-style 
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health system, much of the increased cost will be due to bureaucratic inefficiencies 
associated with marketisation. Suffice to say, similar to equity markets, the growth of debt 
markets and indeed capital markets generally is attributable to a constellation of 
accumulation pressures and neoliberalising dynamics.   
In recent decades governments have been increasingly reluctant to fund the 
mentioned programs. Again this is partly due to class interests as capital resists ever 
increasing taxation. The degree to which revenue raising burdens can be passed onto more 
middling classes is similarly limited. It should also be acknowledged that a non-trivial 
debate exists in a country such as France with public spending of 56% of GDP in 2016 as 
to when further taxation becomes burdensome, especially in a globalised world.
11
 The 
more important point regarding the reluctance of the state to provide welfare is that it raises 
the salient question of how and for whom the increased supply of securities has been 
managed. As a matter of logic, the increase in the supply of securities must be met by a 
corresponding increase in demand for securities. The banking sector has historically been a 
major investor in home-country government debt and, along with households, the major 
investors in equity as alluded to. But for contemporary banks financial liberalisation has to 
a large extent severed the bank-state nexus. More, capital charges are likely to limit 
holdings of equity and investment in debt must also be considered against the effects of 
adding to maturity mismatches that mortgage lending has brought. The abdication of 
welfare responsibilities by the state implies that the latter, households, can and must take up 
demand as they increasingly provide for their current and future welfare needs. Thus, 
whether due primarily to class dynamics or expansionary/accumulation pressures placed on 
the state it is ultimately households, including high-net worth households, that demand the 
increase in supply. As most individuals lack the expertise and scale to effectively manage 
all but the smallest portfolios, the increased demand for capital market instruments provides 
the basis for the rise of institutional investors and the growth of professional asset 
management. 
The emergence of institutional investors places additional demands on the banking 
system, over and above those placed on it by the expansion of capital markets. For as long 
                                                          
11
 Of course, it could also be acknowledged that there has been less debate as to whether France’s level of 
military spending is justified, or whether such large redistributive actions would be required if there were 
higher levels of ‘market’ income equality.  
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as securities are held by retail investors, namely households, securities are likely to be 
merely held and infrequently traded. But as a larger and larger share of securities becomes 
institutionally held, securities are more frequently traded as investors seek to maximise 
risk-adjusted returns (within the confines of their investment mandate). In addition to asset 
management services, the growth of institutional investors creates a need for the provision 
of market making and hedging services by investment banks. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, with market making and derivatives trading comes opportunities for 
proprietary trading.     
These themes are self-reinforcing. A trend increase in supply government securities, 
for instance, is likely to be associated with an increase in demand insofar as the growth in 
supply relates to welfare obligations that the state only partially fulfills. The increase in 
demand then encourages entities to issue securities as issuance can be conducted more cost 
effectively. The rise in demand also changes the composition of supply. Casey and Lanoo 
(2005: 20-25) report how institutional investors have stimulated the development of 
long-dated public debt markets to lock-in cheap funding in European countries.
12
 Public 
debt instruments, in turn, play a central role in repo markets which, in turn, are a key 
funding mechanism for dealer banks and hedge funds, and so on. Although some element 
of mutual interaction exists in that a willingness of the banking sector to provide, for 
instance, market making services to investors may encourage the latter to issue securities, 
ultimately it has been the growth of capital markets that has provided opportunities for 
banks to earn income from non-traditional sources. 
 Note the difference in causal processes operating in a demand-led view compared 
to a disintermediation-led view. Under the latter, household institutionalised savings enable 
banks to turn towards investment services. Thus, insofar as there may be evidence of NFC 
withdrawal from the banking system inducing a decline in intermediation returns (as in 
France), privatised, now institutionally-held household savings play the central role in 
enabling an aggregate expansion of investment banking. Capital market growth per se, or 
the various socioeconomic trends underpinning it, is not the centerpiece. Here, under a 
demand-led view, institutionalised savings is a concomitant to capital market development, 
especially in Europe. As above, an expansion in government debt is also likely to entail 
                                                          
12
 Concurrent to our work Lysandrou (2016) also makes this point. 
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more asset management as public provision only partly meets social needs, be they welfare, 
health, or otherwise. As asset management grows, so do the opportunities for households to 
substitute managed capital market securities for deposits. The ensuing indebtedness of the 
banking system to institutional investors may encourage the former to issue debt 
instruments to the latter, further encouraging capital market growth, and so on. For sure, 
professionally-managed institutional savings places demands on the banking system for 
investment services over and above mere capital market growth, but capital market growth 
is a sine qua non, the lynchpin from which the process derives.       
This is evident in Figure 2.8. In all six countries we see a significant correlation 
between non-interest income and the level of securities outstanding in the economy. The 
relationship is strongest in the historically more closed financial systems of Spain and Italy, 
but generalises for the six countries. The relationship weakens somewhat in the early 1990s 
in the UK, and the mid-2000s in Germany and France. For the former, this is mostly likely 
due to the internationalisation of the UK banking system then as it became a global centre. 
For the latter two, the 2000s coincides with the internationalisation of European megabanks 
as detailed in subsequent chapters. Large international investments (in US and British 
securitised products, for instance) will weaken the link between investment banking income 
and capital market expansion at the individual country level. That said, the relationship is 
weakened only somewhat and will continue to hold at the aggregate global level. 
This then points to explaining differences between national investment banking 
structures not in terms of differing bank (de)regulatory frameworks or disintermediation, 
but in terms of historical and institutional factors as they relate to the development of 
capital markets. For instance, Germany’s adroit adherence to a bank-based financial system 
for decades implied that firms resorted to credit as opposed to the market for finance. The 
unusually strong dedication to price stability on the part of the Bundesbank further nullified 
one of the main appeals of equity investment over other securities, inflation-adjusted 
returns. Coupled with low levels of public indebtedness, the low levels of capital market 
activity more generally explain the low level of investment banking income. Low public 
indebtedness is also a feature of the US, but this is partly compensated for by strong equity 
and private debt markets. Similar comments apply to the UK, but as before dynamics are 
clouded by its hosting of international financial  institutions. France has  both  steadily 
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Figure ‎2-13a: Non-interest income (% GDP) and financial market development (% GDP).  
Notes: Non-interest income shown on left axis. Total securities = Stock market capitalisation + 
resident issued debt outstanding.  
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Figure ‎2-14b: Non-interest income (% GDP) and financial market development (% GDP).           
Sources: Non-interest income as per Figure 2.7. Securities data taken from BIS (debt statistics) 
and World Bank Financial Development Database (stock market capitalisation). 
Notes: Non-interest income shown on left axis. Total securities = Stock market capitalisation + 
resident issued debt outstanding.  
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expanded its public indebtedness and cultivated capital market development since the 
1980s. It is both a powerhouse of European insurance and a center of mutual fund 
activity. Consequently, France witnessed stronger growth in investment banking activity. 
The unusually high number of small and medium-sized enterprises in Spain and Italy 
undoubtedly retarded the development of financial markets there. The overall levels of 
investment banking activities are still significant though, possibly a result of large 
public debt markets.   
In sum, having established the limitations of disintermediation-oriented 
explanations previously, we find the framework of neoliberalism, accumulation, and 
standardisation to be a useful heuristic in understanding the transformation of banking. 
For household lending, the six countries examined here implemented a series of 
liberalising reforms to housing markets since the 1980s, and indeed before. The 
synchronicity in the expansion of mortgage credit points to a common dynamic. The 
imposition of the first Basel Accord and associated capital adequacy regulations created 
incentives for banks to switch their portfolios towards putative safe assets, such as 
mortgage loans. The ensuing expansion of credit precipitated an upward trend in real 
house prices, reinforcing the expansion of credit and promoting further liberalisation. In 
relation to the increase in scale of investment banking, the timing of financial 
liberalisation in Italy (but probably France and UK as well) and the adherence to 
universal banking in Germany and Spain point to factors others than financial 
liberalisation/deregulation in its growth. A constellation of accumulation pressures on 
firms and government to expand and neoliberal class dynamics have led to the growth 
of capital markets. This, combined with the associated development of institutional 
investors and asset management, has created a demand for a variety investment services 
which the banking system has fulfilled. 
 
2.5 Discussion and policy implications  
Based on a dissatisfaction with existing theoretical approaches as being either too 
narrow or misconceived, this chapter has advanced an understanding of financialisation 
based on the concepts of neoliberalism, accumulation, and standardisation. Up to now 
the expansion of household lending has been explained in terms of neoliberalism and 
standardisation, whereas our account of the growth of investment banking has relied 
more on neoliberalism and accumulation. It is certainly the case, though, that an 
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understanding of accumulation pressures is central to understanding the growth of 
mortgage lending and that standardisation plays an integral role in the development of 
investment banking activities, especially market making and proprietary trading. We 
discuss both here, though a more complete discussion of market making and proprietary 
trading takes place in the following chapter.  
The growth of domestic mortgage lending is paradoxically attributable to the 
growth and standardisation of cross-border banking, among other factors. The impetus 
for the first Basel Accord arose from a number of developments. First, the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 and the liberalisation of capital accounts in the 
major countries shortly after greatly expanded the potential for cross-border financial 
transactions and instability.
13
 The 1980s was one of continued expansion of 
international banking, a large portion of which related to the increasing cross-border 
expansion of production. As described by Kregel (1994), internationalisation of 
production requires internationalised banks to act as FX clearing houses so that firms 
that engage in international trade can transact in their home country currencies. Once 
established, multinational banks often provided traditional commercial banking services 
to their clients as well. In addition, a large portion of the expansion of banking across 
borders was due regulatory arbitrage. Goodhart (2011: 96-126), for instance, describes 
the demise of Italy’s then largest bank through large loan losses in a subsidiary as a 
backdrop to the first accord. But it was the growing competition between US banks less 
capitalised Japanese banks (which also had a different definition of capital) that 
accelerated the 1987 US-UK agreement on capital adequacy, the basis of the 1988 
Accord. In other words, though liberalisation and opening up of markets has been an 
important component of and precipitating factor in the internationalisation of banking, 
accumulation pressures have also been a central driving force. Neoliberalism and 
standardisation are then most directly implicated in the expansion in mortgage lending, 
                                                          
13
 A key event occurred in 1974 with the failure of New York’s largest commercial bank, Franklin 
National Bank, as a result of a series of speculative foreign exchange transactions with a small German 
bank. Coupled with skyrocketing oil prices, the first meeting of the Basel Committee took place in 1975. 
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but it has been accumulation dynamics that drove standardisation.
14
 
 In terms of market making and proprietary trading among investment banks, we 
again turn to developments in capital markets. As discussed, the increase in supply of 
capital market instruments has been accompanied by an associated increase in demand. 
This increase in demand for securities has in turn engendered the development 
professional asset management and institutionalised forms of savings. One issue that 
has arisen is how best, and upon what principals are such pools of savings to be 
managed? This is so as it is notoriously difficult to beat the market and returns of a 
typical index tracking fund have traditionally outperformed the majority of comparable 
active management strategies. In light of such failures, so-called core-satellite 
investment strategies emerged in which the majority or core of a portfolio is invested 
conservatively (Welch, 2008). The core portfolio may, for instance, be passively 
managed, or if not managed according to an outright passive strategy, the degree to 
which it can stray from benchmarks is limited by investment mandates. Investment 
mandates are typically shaped by regulatory factors as well, though prescribed 
requirements are not the norm given the complexity involved in managing individual 
portfolios.
15
 The satellite section of the portfolio is more devoted to yield and is more 
actively managed. The standardisation of asset management through the widespread 
adoption of core-satellite investment strategies has been the major driving force in the 
expansion in trading volume in capital markets as funds intensively trade the most 
liquid instruments to abide by investment mandates (Grahl and Lysandrou, 2006). As 
we detail in the following chapter, this expansion in trading volume has greatly 
increased the demand and opportunities for market making and proprietary trading 
                                                          
14
 It might be argued that the Basel Accord is just code for neoliberal (de)regulation. The submerging of 
the regulatory framework under the rubric of neoliberalism or material interests, though, comes at the cost 
of significant explanatory power. The first Basel Accord, unlike subsequent editions, was not designed as 
a comprehensive framework for banking regulation. As above, it was intended as a device to level the 
playing field among internationally active banks and prevent regulatory arbitrage. For countries such as 
Spain capital adequacy ratios were an addition rather than a loosening of the existing policy framework, 
which admittedly was also being deregulated. But the complete absence of liquidity and interest rate 
provisions as the accord stimulated a massive increase in maturity transformation indicate its effects were 
largely unforeseen. Standardisation, therefore, has its own logic and causal force, related but not to be 
conflated with neoliberalism or deregulation. 
15
 As discussed more in a later chapter, duration, for instance, is a net present value-weighted measure of 
maturity. For long-term institutional investors the duration of liabilities cannot drift too far from that of 
assets. An OECD study notes: “investment regulations can put restrictions on the maturity or duration 
matching of assets and liabilities. It is rare to find, either in insurance or in pensions legislation, 
prescribed maturity matching requirements for assets and liabilities. This is because it is difficult to detail 
within legislation such a complex requirement. Nevertheless, even though it is not specified formally 
within the legislation, it is a recognised duty of regulators to monitor any significant mismatching of 
assets and liabilities, since such mismatching is a central aspect of the investment risks faced by life 
insurance companies and by pension funds.” (Dickinson, 2001: 8). 
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among investment banks. Thus, while accumulation pressures and neoliberal reforms 
have ultimately been responsible for growth of investment banking, standardisation has 
greatly expanded and deepened that process.           
 The identification of accumulation pressures and standardisation as central 
processes in the emergence of financialisation has important policy implications. 
Interventions designed to reduce the size of the financial sector are likely to fail insofar 
as such interventions focus primarily on the banking sector. As the growth of 
investment banking reflects the expansion of capital markets it is only by curtailing the 
latter can the size of the former be reduced. And this is no easy task. A reduction in the 
size of equity markets would require either renationalising and/or delisting large 
swathes of industry. A reduction in the size of debt markets would require large declines 
in public expenditure. Some of this is desirable in and of itself, through, for instance, 
reductions in military expenditures. As previously mentioned, large increases in pre-tax 
income equality would also mitigate the need for large social transfers. Even then, given 
that much of the expansion of capital markets is relatively independent of class struggle, 
a larger investment banking sector appears to be a permanent feature of the new 
economic landscape.  
 Reducing the scale of mortgage lending may be more feasible in principle given 
that much of its growth is an unforeseen result of banking regulation. In practice, aside 
from perhaps the US, countries cannot ‘go it alone’ and withdraw from international 
agreements without large adverse consequences. Coordination problems in global 
agreements, moreover, militate against easy reform of the international financial 
architecture. Despite the huge upheaval caused by the global financial crisis, the 
incentive structures embedded in the Basel Accords to create mortgage credit have 
changed little, if at all. Coupled with the time it would take for existing mortgage 
holders to pay off their debt, somewhat larger mortgage markets are likely to be around 
for some time.    
That said, one means of reducing the size of the financial sector is to reduce 
house prices. This would, in turn, reduce the level of indebtedness and contribute to 
reducing, but not eliminating the current size of mortgage markets. The experience of 
Germany demonstrates that the trend of rising property prices is not an immutable 
economic law. Its system of rent controls, willingness of the state to stimulate supply 
when needed, and comparatively empowered tenants go some way toward explaining 
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the relative price stability of its property market. Price stability may not be sufficient as 
Germany again demonstrates with its large expansion in mortgage lending despite 
stagnant property prices. A possible reason for Germany’s continued credit growth in 
the face of flat property prices has been its steadily increasing homeownership rates 
during the 1990s (see Jorda et al., 2016: 121). Large-scale social housing programs 
would thus complement and indeed be made more affordable by efforts to reduce 
property prices. As well as aiding efforts to reduce of the size of the financial sector, 
this, as we shall see in the following chapter, would also have beneficial financial 
stability implications.  
The Basel agreements and the salience of standardisation highlight a further 
issue of note when it comes to effective policy design. The amorphous nature of the 
financial system in conjunction with the importance of rules in governing financial 
behaviour give rise to large uncertainties in policy outcomes. That the imposition of 
Basel I would lead to a massive expansion in mortgage lending and large increases in 
property prices is a case in point. The problem of unforeseen consequences is probably 
more acute in financial markets than in property markets. Financial markets are both 
more opaque, and the transactions and instruments decidedly more complex. While a 
‘de-financialisation’ of advanced economies may not be entirely feasible for reasons 
already outlined, some interventions and curtailing of market mechanisms may be 
desirable, not least so that policymakers do not have to constantly play catch-up. Social 
housing and rent controls have already been mentioned in the case of commercial 
banking. In the case of asset management, much of it undertaken within investment 
banks, as well as the large fees already in existence, one wonders whether the 
proliferation of different types of funds serves consumer choice or merely furthers fee 
incomes even more (see Judge, 2012; 2015). Investment banks also cream income from 
institutional investors through a variety of mechanisms, as we show in the following 
chapter. Addressing such abuses would not only serve households well but might also 
go some way towards mitigating destabilising reaches for yield.   
            
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered a defining feature of financialisaion, the transformation of 
banking. It has been our contention that existing theories of financialsiation suffer 
conceptual and empirical shortcomings, or can only explain certain aspects of banking 
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transformation. Building on existing research, we have forwarded an alternative 
materialist view of financialisation based on neoliberalism, accumulation, and 
standardisation. We have found a framework anchored in these processes to be both an 
accurate depiction of how financialisation develops and sufficiently encompassing to 
capture its essential features.  
 There is little evidence to support the view that disintermediation of NFCs was 
the main cause of the decline in intermediation income, except for in France (and likely 
the US before our series begins). For one, bank lending to business remained robust 
over an extended period, as did overall intermediation income. The decline in 
intermediation margins has tended to coincide with the expansion of mortgage lending, 
which is a secured form of lending. The squeeze in margins was more an outcome than 
a cause of mortgage lending. Again, France is a partial exception, but we find other 
explanations more compelling. Neither the ascendancy of mortgage lending nor 
investment banking can be attributed to a decline in traditional bank income.   
 The expansion in mortgage lending is instead due to the imposition of the Basel 
Accords and associated capital adequacy regulations, which has been facilitated and 
deepened by liberalisation of property and credit markets. As firms and banks expanded 
through internationalisation in the context of increasingly open markets, a global 
framework of standards became necessary. By incentivising certain types of asset 
holdings over others, the agreements have had a powerful impact on the allocative 
decisions of banks, and have been the single largest factor in the growth of mortgage 
credit. The expansion of credit, in turn, has put upward pressures on house prices. The 
upward trend in house prices has then stimulated further credit expansion and 
liberalisation. Distributional factors have played only a secondary role. The UK is 
somewhat of an exception in that like the US and France the effects of Basel I did not 
manifest until later, but also neoliberalism rather than standardisation played a larger 
role..  
The increase in the scale and scope of investment banking is in the first instance 
an outcome of the growth of capital markets, and then the associated rise of asset 
management and institutional investors. As securities markets expanded through 
neoliberal restructuring of the economy and also through expansionary pressures, an 
array of investment services was required to support that growth. The effects of 
neoliberal restructuring on capital markets is evident through privatisation of public 
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services and the increasing abdication of welfare responsibilities by the state, whereas 
accumulation and expansionary pressures are evident in the desire of companies to go 
public as they expand, and through rising government indebtedness due to demographic 
factors, themselves a result of advances in the provision of healthcare. Regulatory 
factors may have reinforced the growth of investment banking, and the system is one of 
constant evolution and change, but ultimately the expansion of the sector is a result of 
the rise of capital markets.    
The multitude of processes that impinge on financialisation and banking poses 
difficulties for policymakers in designing effective systems of governance. As we have 
seen, though neoliberalism and standardisation have been most directly implicated in 
mortgage lending, whereas accumulation pressures and again neoliberalism have been 
more prominent in the ascendency of investment banking, neither standardisation can be 
excluded from the latter, nor accumulation dynamics from the former. The prospects for 
large-scale de-financialisation of the economy are accordingly slim, which then raises 
the difficulty of intervening without creating contradictions or pressures for change 
elsewhere in the system. An alternative solution may involve less use of market 
mechanisms and greater consideration of financial services as public utilities. 
Regulators would then not have to constantly try to align public and private goals as the 
financial system inevitably evolves. 
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Chapter 3 : Institutional investors and the geography of 
financial trading instability 
 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Main thesis 
This chapter asks two seemingly innocuous but big questions. First, what role has 
financial trading played in the development of systemic financial instability among 
advanced countries? Second, what is the nature of bank proprietary trading and what 
role has it played in the development of said instability? The first question is of general 
economic interest and is intended to clarify a sometimes muddied debate. The second 
question follows from the first and is motivated by the recent regulatory moves to 
restrict proprietary trading in a number of regions and countries. It is also motivated by 
the fact that the nature of bank proprietary trading has been largely misinterpreted. 
Financial trading is understood to be the purchasing and selling of financial assets such 
as currencies and securities.
16
 The emphasis here is on European countries, especially 
major European countries. As required by data constraints the US is considered as a 
comparator when needed.  
 We argue that the growth of financial trading has greatly contributed to the 
increase in systemic financial instability among advanced countries over the last number 
of years. Specifically, financial trading exhibits a phased pattern of financial instability. 
In the post-Bretton Woods era, European countries were plagued by repeated currency 
crises. Financial trading instability therefore arose from positioning in currencies, 
mainly by banks. Since the early 1990s international financial transactions began to 
expand rapidly due to the rise of institutional investors. Given this, the adoption of the 
euro, and domestic reforms as per the previous chapter the pattern of financial 
instability shifted from repeated currency crises to repeated banking crises. Financial 
trading has since played a more indirect in the propagation of instability, now 
endangering the system more through the provision of liquidity by investors to bank-led 
                                                          
16
 International financial trading is the cross-border purchases and sales of financial assets. Capital flows, 
including what are misleadingly labelled gross capital inflows or outflows, are aggregated or netted 
measures of international financial trading. Most countries do not keep disaggregated data on 
cross-border financial trading, but instead record capital flows. When we refer to international financial 
trading we mean non-netted purchases and sales, whereas capital flows refer to the commonly-used 
measure. We use the term international financial transactions in a general sense, referring to either. See 
section 3.2.3 for a fuller description.    
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property and credit bubbles, rather than positioning in assets per se. The nature of this 
shift has not been adequately appreciated in the literature (see, for instance, 
Brunnermeier et al., 2013; Kohler, 2014; 2015).       
In terms of bank proprietary trading we also make number of assertions. One is 
that the common characterisation of bank proprietary trading as underpinned by ever 
greater risk taking (see, for instance, Erturk, 2016) and/or fostered by a wave of 
deregulation or speculation is misconceived (Epstein and Habbard, 2011). Just as is the 
case with international financial trading, institutional investor-led trading has been 
responsible for the observable increase in proprietary trading. A second observation we 
make is that the contribution of proprietary trading, as understood to be risky bets 
placed by banks, to systemic financial instability in recent times has been limited as 
compared to say credit-based asset inflation. Insofar as proprietary trading has been 
responsible for the heightened instability of advanced capitalist and European countries, 
it too has been geographically contingent. Careful reading of the recent global crisis 
shows that at first large trading losses were attributable to losses in property markets 
and also to the ceding of political-economic control to supranational institutions. The 
policy implication is that rather than investment banking having made commercial 
banking more unstable, we argue that the converse is more accurate.      
   
3.1.2 Literature review 
Systemic risk is a widely-used but difficult-to-pin-down concept. Sometimes viewed as 
a ‘know it when you see it’ phenomenon, it can and has been approached from a variety 
of angles (Benoit et al., 2017). Within mainstream economics and finance, it has been 
analysed in terms of sources of risk-taking such as leverage and liquidity risk, 
propagation and contagion, and amplification through market freezes, runs and so on 
(ibid.). An alternative way is to distinguish between risks that accumulate over time 
versus risks that have a cross-sectional dimension (Caruana, 2010). What it is not is 
‘normal’ risk-taking that a financial institution might engage in or risk-taking that does 
not lead to widespread fragility. That is, the system as a whole ought to be affected.  
    There are similarly several ways to measure and assess systemic risk. Central 
banks and policymakers typically keep a watchful eye on aggregate macroeconomic 
indicators such as credit growth and capital inflows, as well as bank-based individual 
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and aggregate indicators. These include the balance sheet compositions, currency 
mismatches, market data such as credit default swap spreads, and simulations of stress 
conditions (Cerutti et al., 2012; Gerlach, 2009). Systemic risk can also be approached at 
the institutional level in terms of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) or 
at the sectoral level by examining the asset management industry, for instance (Elliot, 
2014). Several attempts have been made to construct single index measures of systemic 
risk based on value-at-risk (VaR) and other metrics (Brunnermeier et al., 2013; Laeven 
et al., 2016). In terms of financial trading, non-interest and trading income among banks 
is invariably found to increase systemic risk (see, for instance, Brunnermeier et al., 
2013). This echoes the finding among several institution-level studies that investment 
banking income is more volatile or unstable than traditional intermediation income, 
especially for larger entities (Stiroh, 2006; Kohler, 2014; 2015).      
 There are several drawbacks with such approaches. One is the age-old problem 
of correctly specifying a quantitative model of social reality in a complex, ‘open’ world. 
VaR in particular has a number of problems (see Crotty, 2009). Relatedly, it is 
methodologically individualist in that it attempts to decompose risk into its constituent 
parts whereas causal power often only emerges at the more aggregate level. This applies 
as much to econometric inferences about different sources of bank income risk as it 
does to assertions about the stability implications of the asset management industry. For 
instance, based on interconnectedness, investment horizon, and liability structure 
compared to banks, it has been argued that long-term institutional investors pose 
relatively low systemic risk implications (Geneva Association, 2010). This view, 
however, neglects the fact that such institutions are part of a system and have the ability 
to affect risk-taking among banks, the foci of the financial system, through demand for 
securitised products, for instance.
17
 Finally, such approaches to systemic risk are 
ahistorical and provide little context with which to assess claims about the significance 
of some event, institutional formation, or entity. 
 There is of course no shortage of theories of systemic financial instability 
grounded in institutional understandings of capitalism from Smithsonian to Marxian to 
                                                          
17
 That is not to say radical holism is to be embraced. Judgements can be made about the relative 
contributions of subcomponents of a system in explaining some phenomenon. Rather, we are sceptical of 
attempts to isolate and quantitatively measure that contribution. For instance, we cannot reduce or 
quantitatively measure the contribution of player A and then her teammate, player B, to winning the 
football game. With reference to overall team performance, we can, however, make contextual and 
qualitative judgements about their respective contributions and relative importance. The same applies to 
subcomponents of the financial system and systemic risk.       
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more contemporary theories (see Toporowski, 2005). Veblen, for instance, developed 
‘the first financial cycle theory’ (Toporowski, 2005: 45). For Veblen, borrowing 
enabled firms to secure better control of industry, rather than to increase output. 
Borrowing against collateral may inflate collateral values which, as a result, stimulates 
further industrial borrowing. More recently and more famously, Minsky developed his 
financial instability hypothesis. His famous taxonomy of increasingly unstable balance 
sheet structures comprising hedge, speculative and Ponzi units is key. As expectations 
of gains increase and an economic boom proceeds, payments increase, along with rising 
interest rates. Debts accumulate and hedge units turn into speculative units, and 
speculative into Ponzi. As markets slow Ponzi units are forced to sell which brings 
about a fire sale. Importantly for Minsky financial fragility emerges not through policy 
errors or accidents but ‘from the normal functioning of our economy’ (Minsky, 1976: 
3). 
 The emphasis on industrial borrowings in both Veblenian and Minskian (and 
many other classic) analyses makes their application in original form inappropriate in a 
modern context. There is, of course, no shortage of contemporary research on waves of 
risk appetite, periodic financial cycles, and co-movements in capital flows, credit, and 
financial asset/housing markets (Claessens et al., 2012; Rey, 2015; Adrian and Shin, 
2010). Minskian theory has similarly been updated to include developments in 
investment banking (Wray, 2015), cross-border financial transactions (Dymski and 
Shabani, 2017), and also, incidentally, housing dynamics (Dymski, 2010). While such 
analyses necessarily provide a richer understanding of systemic instability, our concern 
here is financial trading per se, with housing as a systemic comparator. Given the large 
changes trading and the financial system have undergone in the last fifty plus years and 
also more recently, following critical-minded chronologies influenced by the breakdown 
of Bretton Woods (Block, 1977; Eatwell and Taylor, 2001; Helleiner, 1996; Strange 
1986; 1998), we feel that only a historically-minded analysis provides the necessary 
context with which to assess the contribution financial trading has made to the 
development of systemic instability. 
 We find that financial trading, particularly cross-border trading, has been a 
major cause of the heightened instability of the financial system. As mentioned, this 
may be of no surprise to observers of capital flows for a variety of reasons. Among 
them are a tendency and ability of cross-border transactions to disrupt established 
lender-borrower relationships (Allegret et al., 2003), an inability of recipient entities to 
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effectively absorb global financial flows so that existing assets are bid-up rather than 
new ones created (Dymski and Shabani, 2017), and so on. What is less recognised is 
how the international financial system has changed since the 1970s to the present. As 
well as having grown enormously since the the breakdown of Bretton Woods, 
cross-border financial transactions began another rapid expansion beginning in the early 
1990s. The failure to appreciate and understand this shift has, in turn, inhibited our 
understanding of how global flows have contributed to and reinforced the changing 
patterns of financial instability. As we will see institutional investors emerged as the 
major force in capital markets and cross border transactions, and have played an 
important role, along with the adoption of the euro, in the graduation from repeated 
currency to repeated banking crises among European countries. 
The nature and stability implications of bank proprietary trading have been 
studied less intensively, not least because of financial system opaqueness. Erturk and 
Solari (2007) note the ‘reinvention’ of bank income from interest to fee-based and 
trading income. They juxtapose this transformation with the transformation of 
household assets, though it is not clear as to whether they view banks as having 
transformed themselves or whether banks are responding to external pressures. Though 
capital markets have played a facilitating role, Dos Santos (2009a) sees the growth of 
proprietary trading as part of the broader reorientation of bank activities away from 
interest income discussed in the previous chapter (see also Lapavitsas et al.). Epstein 
and Habbard (2011) note that ‘financial speculation is associated with the rise of global 
financial conglomerates’ and highlight deregulation and other trends against this 
backdrop.  
The global financial crisis beginning in 2007/08 is sometimes seen as a 
culmination of events that have manifested themselves in related and repeated trading 
crashes. O’Brien and Keith (2009), for instance, see the global financial crisis as 
‘belonging to the same lineage’ of previous trading crashes such as Long-Term Capital 
Management of the late 1990s and Enron of the early 2000s. Erturk (2016) similarly 
sees the JP Morgan Chase ‘big whale’ trading losses as part of the broader risk-based 
business models. In Erturk’s reading banks ‘re-locate risks according to conjunctural 
market and regulatory arbitrage conditions’ and through the requirement to sustain 
persistently high returns on equity (ibid.: 60). The framework of risk-based business 
models and an emphasis on financial trading (especially derivatives) also informed a 
series of OECD papers (Blundell-Wignall et al., 2014a; 2014b). This, in turn, has 
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informed the OECD advocacy of separation of investment and commercial banking 
activities. In fact, to our knowledge all proposals in advocacy of separation of banking 
functions have been premised on the belief that it is investment banking that poses the 
risk to commercial banking, and not the converse. While there is a large literature on 
how lending has been transformed under financialisation, especially as it relates to 
housing (for instance Aalbers, 2016), insofar as both commercial and investment 
banking have been considered, it has generally been assumed that it has been the latter 
that poses greater risk. Thus, a la more quantitative measures, institutionally-minded 
analyses emphasise the risks of proprietary trading rather than conventional 
intermediation. 
 The major shortcoming of the literature on cross-border financial transactions is 
the failure to identify how the financial system has changed since the 1970s to the 
present. As is universally recognised, cross-border financial transactions have grown 
enormously since the breakdown of Bretton Woods. What is less or only occasionally 
recognised, and never convincingly explained, is that cross border flows began another 
rapid expansion beginning in the early 1990s. This failure to appreciate and understand 
this shift has, in turn, inhibited our understanding of how global flows have contributed 
to, and reinforced the changing patterns of financial instability. As we will see, 
institutional investors emerged as the major force in capital markets and cross border 
transactions, and have played an important role in the graduation from repeated 
currency to repeated banking crises among European countries. 
 There are two principal shortcomings of the proprietary trading literature as we 
see it. One is the failure to understand why proprietary trading has grown. This stems 
from the failure to understand the growth of financial transactions since the 1990s, 
which as well as having expanded in a cross-border context, have also grown 
domestically. That is, as we shall argue, bank proprietary trading has grown as a result 
of the institutional investor-led expansion in financial trading. The second 
misunderstanding is the belief, implicitly or explicitly stated, that (investment) bank 
trading and associated activities pose greater risks than traditional intermediation 
activities. As will be argued, though bank trading has certainly become riskier, it is 
more the case that commercial banking has made investment banking more unstable. 
Insofar as proprietary trading has had systemic implications, it too has been shaped by 
processes of geographic import.  
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 This chapter fleshes out our core two points relating to the effects of 
(cross-border) financial trading on the development of financial instability on the one 
hand, and on the nature and stability implications of proprietary trading on the other. 
The next section examines the post-war and post-Bretton Woods history of financial 
crises and the emergence of institutional investors. In the following section, the growth 
and consequences of bank proprietary trading are considered. The penultimate section 
explores the policy implications of our findings, after which we conclude. 
 
3.2 A modern history of financial crises 
This section examines the history of financial and banking crises since World War II, 
especially since the breakdown of Bretton Woods. The post-war period constitutes a 
phased pattern of financial fragility in which different varieties of financial crises 
feature more prominently than others through time.  The initial expansion in financial 
flows accompanied a series of currency and inflations crises. The global system then 
graduated to episodes of banking and also stock market crises through the late 1980s 
and 1990s, and to the major banking collapses of the recent global crisis. Cross-border 
financial flows have grown enormously during this period, particularly since the early 
1990s as institutional actors have emerged as a major investor class. This, along with 
the adoption of the euro, has reinforced the trend away from currency crises towards 
banking crises.  
3.2.1 1946-1980s: Post-war stability and the breakdown of order   
To chart the trajectory of financial stability we construct a series for European countries 
and the US based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), but extended to the current period. Á 
la Reinhart and Rogoff an inflation crisis is defined to be a period in which the annual 
rate of inflation is 20% or higher. A currency crash is a period in which the annual 
depreciation of the country’s currency with respect to its anchor (typically the dollar or 
euro/deutsche mark) equals or exceeds 15%. A stock market crash is a cumulative 
decline in real equity values of 25% or more. More qualitatively, a country is deemed to 
have a banking crisis if there is a bank run and/or sections of the banking system are 
merged, taken-over, or provided with large-scale government assistance. A sovereign 
default arises when a government fails to meet its obligations through either outright 
default or through debt rescheduling. The countries series represents the number of 
countries experiencing a crisis. 
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Figure 3.1 below shows the development of financial crises among our selected 
countries. The immediate post-war period entailed triplets of crises for many countries 
in the form of currency, inflation, and stock market crashes. But as economies began to 
recover from war the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls 
inaugurated an era of relative financial peace. Financial crises were comparatively rare 
events from the beginning of the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, the so-called 
Golden Era of Capitalism. But the unravelling of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 
ushered in a period of global financial turbulence.  
The countries series is particularly revealing in that it demonstrates the 
synchronicity of financial crises across countries. 1971 represented record year in terms 
of the low incidence of financial crises in the post-war period.
18
 But the sharp spike 
from 1971 to 1973 in the number of countries in crisis and the continuation of this trend  
 
Figure ‎3-1: European-US financial crises. 
Sources: Currency and inflation crises based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) to 2010, after 
which data is based on XE and Trading Economics. Remaining crises based on Behavioral 
Finance and Financial Stability database.   
 
throughout point to the centrality of common, global factors in the propagation of 
fragility. 
                                                          
18
 In fact, though not shown here, the limited historical record reveals such a period of extended 
tranquillity to be unprecedented in the history of advanced country capitalism (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009: 
252-254). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
9
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
5
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
1
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
7
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
3
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
7
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
5
European-US financial crises 
Currency Inflation Banking
Sovereign Stock market # Countries
90 
 
Those common factors of course can be traced to the growth of cross-border 
financial flows, which Table 3.1 below depicts for the period from 1970-89. Whereas 
cross-border financial flows were heavily restricted in the Bretton Woods era, the two 
decades or so after experienced large levels of cross-border financial transactions 
among the major European countries and the US. With the exception of Spain, which 
did not fully liberalise its capital account until the early 1990s
19
, the major category of 
capital flows were mediated by the banking system. Of the major European countries, 
where bank flows are more pronounced, these were dominated by bank loans in France 
and Germany. For instance, in France bank inflows from 1970-89 were 3.2 in that 
French or French-domiciled banks incurred net cross-border (mostly) loan liabilities of  
 
 FDI in FDI 
out 
Portfolio 
in 
Portfolio 
out 
Bank in Bank 
out 
Loans 
& 
credits 
out 
Loans 
& 
credits 
in 
France 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.4 3.2 3.5 0.1 0.1 
Germany 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.3 3.6 0.3 1.0 
Italy 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 2.4 0.4 0.4 1.2 
Spain 1.2 0.2 0.5 .. 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 
UK 1.6 2.6 2.4 2.2 8.5 6.1 0.3 1.4 
US 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.2 1.4 1.2 0.1 0.2 
Table ‎3-1: European country and US capital flows (% GDP): 1970-89 
Sources: IMF BOPS. GDP data from World Bank WDI database. Deflated using CPI from 
Macrofinancial History and New Business Cycle Facts database. 
Notes: Figures relate to total real capital flows for the period expressed as a proportion of total 
real GDP for the period. Bank flows denote the sum of currency and deposit transactions, and 
banks loans from the ‘other’ category of historic balance of payments data. Loans and credits is 
the residual of ‘other’ flows after banks flows have been extracted. FDI and portfolio flows are 
as per normal IMF BOPS classification. Figures for Spain and France are only available from 
1975 and for Germany from 1971. Figures are rounded to the nearest 0.1% so that blank entries 
imply that capital flows were less than 0.05 % of GDP.  
                                                          
19
 The leading countries vacillated in their use of capital controls through the 1970s. Full capital account 
liberalisation, for instance, can broadly be dated to 1974 in the US, 1979 in the UK, and 1981 in Germany 
(see Bakker and Chapple, 2002; Roy et al., 2006: 6). 
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3.2% of GDP. At the same time, French-based investors (be they banks or non-banks) 
incurred net claims on foreign banks amounting to 3.5% of French GDP from 1970-89.     
The figures of 8.5% and 6.1% for the UK are particularly revealing. Unlike in 
France, Germany, and the US, bank flows in the UK were dominated by currency and 
deposit transactions. The large figures of 8.5% and 6.1% reflect London’s status as an 
international banking centre generally, and its status as the centre of foreign exchange 
transactions in particular. That said, given the netting involved in capital flow statistics, 
the figures actually understate the true scale of trading. For instance, by 1985 daily 
turnover in the foreign exchange market in London was estimated to be $45 billion 
(cited in Strange, 1986: 9), which, if scaled would equal many multiples of the figures 
presented in Table 1.     
The growth of capital flows and international financial trading helps explain the 
pattern of fragility observable in Figure 3.1. Though some of the growth in capital flows 
and international currency trading can be attributed to the internationalisation of 
production and international diversification of securities portfolios (see Kregel, 1994), 
the vast majority of currency transactions were between banking entities, mostly in spot 
markets. As described by Andrews (1984), the liberalisation of exchange controls 
entailed large increases in exchange rate volatilities, and consequently opportunities for 
position taking through so-called ‘in-and-out’ spot trading. The post-Bretton Woods 
landscape in Europe was thus one of repeated attempts, and repeated failures to sustain 
coordination of exchange rates in the face of increasingly mobile cross-border capital 
and episodic inflation crises due to spikes in energy prices. German-led attempts to 
insulate European currencies from international financial turbulence through the 
so-called ‘Snake-in-the-tunnel’ (1972-73) and then the European Monetary System 
(EMS) (1979-92) succeeded at times, but ultimately proved illusory. As detailed by 
Toporowski (2009), and as is evident in Figure 3.1 above, currency crises were an 
endemic feature of European financial systems through the 1980s, and up to the 
collapse of the EMS in 1992. 
It is worth pointing out that the emergence of hedge funds renders the emphasis 
on banks in the perpetuation of financial instability during this period somewhat 
anachronistic. It is true that the size of the hedge fund sector was relatively limited up 
until the 2000s. And hence, though accounting for a relatively high share of total funds 
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then, the size of macro ‘directional’ funds 20  associated with foreign exchange 
speculation was also small in the 1980s (see Lysandrou, 2017). But it is the ability of 
hedge funds to rapidly deploy capital as opportunities for gains arise that is one of their 
defining features compared to, say, the more regulated banking sector. For instance, it 
was George Soros’ Quantum Fund that famously broke the pound and dealt the death 
knell to the EMS in 1992. 
Thus, the growth of financial trading constituted probably the major single 
reason for the heightened instability of the financial system in the post-Bretton Woods 
period. But it has not been the growth of trading per se that has upset the financial order 
– though there were several stock market bubbles – but the ability of financial capital to 
cross borders. Financial crises come in waves and thus have international underpinnings. 
Though banks have led the way, the emergence of nimble speculative players outside of, 
and unburdened by the conventional regulatory system adds an additional layer of 
complexity. This is all the more so today as such flows are regulated at the institutional 
as opposed to geographic level.    
  
3.2.2 Late 1980s to the present: banking crises and the continuing importance of 
cross-border flows 
Patterns of financial fragility began to change from the late 1980s on. Aside from the 
stock market crashes of the early 2000s, the most prominent feature of this change was 
an evolution from repeated currency and inflation crises to a system in which recurrent 
credit-based and capital flow-led banking crises have been the norm (see BIS, 2004; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). Figure 3.2 below depicts systemic banking crises in Europe 
and the US since 1970 based on Laeven and Valencia (2012; 2013). While a series 
exists for banking crises based on Reinhart and Rogoff’s methodology as per Figure 3.1, 
Laeven and Valencia’s series focuses on banking crises and contains more detail for our 
purposes. Laeven and Valencia describe a banking crisis to be systemic when there are 
both significant signs of financial distress in the banking system and when there are 
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 A global macro fund is one that places bets on the overall direction of an economy.  
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significant policy interventions in response to losses in the banking sector.
21
 The cost of 
a crisis is taken to be the sum of lost output (estimated based on deviation from trend), 
fiscal outlays to the banking sector, and the increase in public indebtedness (estimated 
from the difference between pre and post-crisis projections). The parenthesised ‘cl’ 
indicates whether the banking crisis was associated with non-performing loans greater 
than 20% of assets, and ‘cb’ indicates if there was a credit boom in the lead-up to the 
crisis.
22
 As with the cost of crisis, data are taken from Laeven and Valencia’s database. 
Additionally, we identify whether a banking crisis was associated with a boom in house 
prices a year or less prior to the start of a crisis based on Goodhart and Hofmann 
(2008).
23
        
 
Figure ‎3-2: European-US banking crises costs.   
Sources: House price data based on OECD Analytical House Price database. Otherwise data is 
from Laeven and Valencia’s Systemic Banking Crises database. 
Notes: Data is patchier for Eastern/former Soviet block countries, especially for costs and house 
prices in the 1990s. Costs should therefore be interpreted as minimums during this period.  
                                                          
21
 Signs of distress include bank runs, losses, and/or liquidations. Policy interventions are significant 
when three of the following six criteria are met: deposit freezes and/or bank holidays, significant bank 
nationalisations, bank restructuring gross costs of at least 3% of GDP, liquidity support of 5% or more to 
non-residents, significant guarantees in place, and asset purchases of at least 5% of GDP. Exceptions to 
the three of six criteria apply when closures, losses, or fiscal costs are particularly high (see Laeven and 
Valencia, 2013: 228-230).    
22
 Defined as a period in which the deviation of credit-to-GDP is greater than 1.5 times its historic 
standard deviation and its annual growth exceeds 10% of GDP, or its annual growth rate exceeds 20% of 
GDP. 
23
 A house price boom is 12 consecutive quarters or more in which house prices deviate by greater than 5% 
from a Hodrick-Prescott smoothed trend (parameter = 100,000). 
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Consistent with Figure 3.1, we see that the frequency of banking crises in 
Europe and the US began to accelerate from the late 1980s on. The incidence of banking 
crises is heavily concentrated around the early 1990s and late 2000s with a smattering 
of crises in the mid-to-late 1990s as well. We see that 22 out of 32 banking crises 
entailed either a credit boom/large credit losses or a housing price boom. If we put aside 
the rather unique transitions of former communist countries to capitalism, the 
proportion increases to 18 out of 25. Of the banking crises with a total cost of over 50% 
of GDP 13 out of 15 had either a housing boom or major credit event, and 11 of them 
had house price booms. That is, housing and credit market dynamics have been deeply 
implicated in the most severe banking crises that have taken place in Europe and the US 
over the last number of decades.  
There are, though, many distinctions to be made between the various types of 
credit and housing banking crises. For instance, Denmark experienced a boom in its 
housing market, a boom that the central bank at least considered to be a bubble (Arne 
Dam, 2011). When the crisis hit in Denmark, credit losses were not as severe as in other 
countries. Part of the reason lay with Denmark’s welfare institutions, with 
unemployment rising less than in other countries and with high automatic stabilisers 
better able to sustain payments (Gyntelberg et al., 2012). Spain’s two banking crises 
similarly point to difference. The first, associated with a housing boom, was not driven 
by a major credit boom or credit losses. Instead, liberalisation and deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions have been implicated (BIS, 2004).
24
 The 2008 boom was 
instead associated with a credit boom, large losses, and a housing bubble. In general we 
see that it is credit booms rather than large cross-sections of banking assets not 
performing that are associated with the worst crises, perhaps indicating the importance 
of concentration effects. That is, it is lending booms, especially into the property sector, 
that engender and coincide with large macroeconomic swings that have the greatest 
potential to inflict harm.   
The above distinctions suggest inherent problems in identifying especially 
banking crises based on quantitative measures given the arbitrariness of cut-off points 
and the importance of contextual factors. In contradiction to Figure 3.2 the US S&L 
crisis of the 1980s was associated with large real estate losses whereas the French and 
                                                          
24
 As discussed in the previous chapter, mortgage lending did not begin its secular rise in Spain until the 
1980s. For BIS (2004), though, the Spanish banking crisis was associated with a rapid expansion in 
lending. This suggests that the lending may have been concentrated in certain sectors, rather than a large, 
macro-level credit expansion. The UK small banks crisis is a similar phenomenon (ibid).     
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other crises were not. Banking losses among core-European countries, notably Germany 
and France, were associated more with trading losses from financial vehicle investments 
in US mortgage securities than classic credit losses. Other countries suffered on 
sovereign debt losses as the Eurozone crisis developed and the ECB refused to ‘do what 
it takes’. Thus for many countries it was not collapse of the domestic housing market, 
but stresses in mortgage and asset markets elsewhere that precipitated losses.  
Despite these qualifications it remains the case that whether imported from 
abroad and/or domestically-induced most of the major banking crises over the last 
number of decades have manifested themselves in credit and, particularly, housing 
markets. As with financial crises previously, Figure 3.2 reveals banking crises to be 
driven by common, international and/or regional factors. The clustering of crises in 
Scandinavia in the early 1990s, then in Eastern Europe, and finally the recent outburst 
of crises during the global crash are cases in point. Though governance failures at the 
state level have been a reality, a more causally powerful argument is that it is the failure 
of global and international institutions to regulate global and international financial 
dynamics that is the ultimate reason for the frequency of banking crises. But, as 
previously, for the early post-Bretton Woods era currency crises were most directly 
implicated, and hence currency-based financial trading, that is no longer the case. 
Financial trading now provides the liquid fuel, rather than being the centre of the fire. 
In sum, the data presented is consistent with the findings of earlier research of 
advanced-country banking crises. For instance, the BIS (2004) in a study of the major 
banking crises up until then found that it had been credit and particularly real estate, as 
opposed to market losses that had been the main fracture point. While we analyse the 
role of proprietary trading more fully later on, our analysis suggests that this trend has 
continued for European countries and the US. A la Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) (and 
many others), the synchronic and episodic nature of crises indicates cross-border 
financial transactions have played a key, albeit indirect role. That is, (cross-border) 
financial transactions have been central in the provision of liquidity to banks as opposed 
to precipitating crises directly through position taking. In other words, whereas before 
the trading activities of (mostly) banks heightened the risk of currency crises, now it is 
bank-led credit and housing booms that pose the greatest threat. Such booms are 
increasingly funded through banks’ securities issuance and other non-deposit sources, a 
perquisite for which is the existence of investors that trade and invest in those securities. 
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To further probe its systemic implications, the following section explores the nature of 
global financial trading in the current period.   
3.2.3 Early 1990s to the present: The rise of institutional investor trading and its 
stability implications 
That institutional investors are a major force in international financial flows is not, in 
itself, a controversial statement. That institutional investors are responsible for the 
secular increase in cross-border transactions that began in the early 1990s has, however, 
not been recognised. Table 3.2 below shows the development of capital flows, a 
measure of international financial trading, from the 1990s up until the beginning of the 
crisis. We can see a dramatic shift in the scale and composition of capital flows as 
compared to the previous period, both of which point to the growing importance of 
institutional investors. In terms of composition, whereas before it was bank-based 
transactions which was the largest category in all countries, that is no longer the case. 
With the major exception of the UK and the minor exception of Germany, portfolio 
flows – that is, cross border purchases and sales of equity and debt securities – is the 
largest category of capital flows. This is true to an even greater extent if we examine 
FDI flows, a major component of which is also purchases and sales of equities.
25
 And it 
is institutional investors that are the largest holders of securities worldwide in general, 
and for advanced-country securities in particular (see Lysandrou, 2013). 
 FDI in FDI 
out 
Portfolio 
in 
Portfolio 
out 
Bank 
in 
Bank 
out 
Loans/ 
credits 
out 
Loans/ 
credits 
in 
France 2.4 4.2 5.3 6.6 5.6 0.7 .. 2.5 
Germany 1.4 2.2 4.9 3.9 3.2 7.2 .. 2.0 
Italy 0.8 1.5 4.1 2.6 2.3 2.3 .. 0.1 
Spain 3.1 4.5 6.5 3.3 5.9 1.0 0.2 2.4 
UK 3.7 5.3 7.8 4.8 15 13.5 .. 0.8 
US 1.4 1.5 4.3 1.3 2.1 1.0 .. 0.6 
Table ‎3-2: European country and US capital flows (% GDP): 1990-08 
Sources: As per Table 1 
Notes: Categories as per Table 1 
                                                          
25
 When a foreign entity purchases (or sells) more than 10% of a company’s equity, it is deemed to be 
FDI. FDI, of course, also includes greenfield investment. 
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 Reference to mere capital flows, however, does not fully capture the 
transformation in the scale of international financial transactions, and the role of 
institutional investors therein. Recall that capital flows, including so-called gross 
inflows and gross outflows, are aggregated measures of international financial 
transactions. More formally, the relationships is as follows: 
 
In = PDf – SDf   ( 3-1) 
 
where In, PDf, and SDf denote (so-called) gross capital inflows, purchases of domestic 
assets by foreign agents, and sales of domestic assets by foreigners. Similarly, the 
following holds:       
 
 Out = PFd – SFd   ( 3-2) 
 
where Out, PFd, and SFd denote ‘gross’ capital outflows, purchases of foreign assets by 
domestic agents, and sales of foreign assets by domestic agents. Finally, as is 
well-known: 
Net = In – Out   ( 3-3) 
 
where Net denotes net capital flows, or the current account balance. International 
purchases and sales/trading of securities, denoted by PDf, SDf , PFd, and SFd is therefore 
not synonymous with capital flows, including gross capital flows. The vast majority of 
countries only record gross capital flows and not the total trading in securities that 
underpins it. Germany (and the US), fortunately, is an exception. Table 3.3a and 3.3b 
develops the point further in relation to international debt transactions. 
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 PDf  SDf PDf – SDf   Gross inflows 
(IMF) 
1992 57.7 48.5 9.2 3.8 
2000 66.0 62.3 3.5 3.5 
2008 69.2 69.2 0.0 2.6 
Table  3-3a: International debt trading and capital inflows (%GDP) 
 
 PFd SFd PFd – SFd Gross outflows 
(IMF) 
1992 30.5 30.0 0.5 0.2 
2000 66.5 63.3 3.2 3.3 
2008 67.8 67.4 0.4 0.7 
Table 3.3b: International debt trading and capital outflows (%GDP) 
Sources: International debt trading statistics taken from the Bundesbank. Capital flows data 
taken from IMF BOPs. 
 
As can be seen from the table, overall purchases and sales of securities/trading 
volume, by both domestic and foreign agents dwarf the respective capital flow statistics, 
sometimes by two orders of magnitude. PDf – SDf  should equal gross inflows and PFd 
– SFd should equal outflows, but owing to the different data sources some discrepancies 
arise in relation to IMF statistics. Note also that over the series a large increase in 
international trading volume relative to GDP is observable both by domestic agents 
investing in Germany and by German agents investing in foreign securities. This 
coincides with the large increase in capital flows observed since the beginning of the 
1990s, as discussed previously. Thus, what has driven international trading volume has 
driven the expansion in capital flows.
26
  
                                                          
26
 Of course, this need not be the case. It is possible that capital inflows could increase without any 
overall increase in trading volume. For instance, if foreign purchases of domestic securities stayed the 
same and sales decreased.  
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Standard explanations of capital flows based on portfolio balancing, or financial 
integration and development provide little guidance as to why capital flows have grown 
so precipitously since the 1990s (see, for instance, DeSantis and Gerard, 2009; 
Coeurdacier and Guibaud, 2011; Hau and Rey, 2008). As discussed more in the 
following chapter, while portfolio balancing explains some of the expansion in capital 
flows within the Eurozone due to the advent of the euro, the proposition flounders once 
it is observed that the US witnessed a comparable increase in cross-border flows. 
Similar comments can be made with regard to financial openness and development. 
While European countries and the US opened up to external flows and developed their 
capital markets at different times, as we shall see, the surge in capital flows and 
international financial trading began in the 1990s. Modern literature on cross-border 
index tracking by funds is much closer to the mark (for instance, Didier et al., 2013), 
but has said little about the timing and expansion of flows. 
The subject can be broached, though, through examining the extent to which 
international trading volume, which underpin capital flows, mirror the expansion in 
domestic trading volume and turnover, which has been studied. As described by Grahl 
and Lysandrou (2006), financial markets of advanced countries experienced a steady 
increase in trading volume from the mid-1990s on. Within bond and equity markets the 
growth continued up to the mid-2000s, after which it accelerated in equity markets. The 
initial growth in equity volume was attributable to large-volume block trades in liquid, 
high-capitalisation, well-known stocks. In bond markets the preponderance of trading 
has been similarly concentrated in the most liquid segment, on-the-run treasuries. As 
argued by Grahl and Lysandrou, and as confirmed by asset manager surveys and 
industry reports (see, for instance, BIS, 2003; EDHEC, 2008; Laipply and Woida, 2011), 
the reason for doing so is that trading the most liquid segment is the most cost-effective 
means of abiding by investment mandates and tracking benchmarks. As asset 
management grew and catered to an increasing mass of households in the 1990s, a need 
arose to professionalise and standardise the sector. For equity managers this means 
minimisation of tracking errors whereas for fixed income managers this also means 
regular immunisation of portfolios.
27
 
 
                                                          
27
 Tracking error measures how closely a portfolio follows an index. It is most commonly measured as 
the standard deviation of the difference between portfolio and index returns. Immunisation refers to how a 
portfolio hedges interest rate risk through, for instance, matching the duration of assets and liabilities. 
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Figure ‎3-3: Natural log of trading volume as a proportion of GDP in Germany. 
Sources: International equity and debt, and domestic debt volume taken from Bundesbank 
database. Domestic equity volume based on World Bank Global Financial Development 
database. GDP from WDI. 
Notes: Starting, maximum, and end points are shown in non-log format. Domestic equity 
volume appears to be based on domestic exchanges. Unclear, but it may include some foreign 
agents and non-domestic asset transactions. If the domestic equity series included a large 
component of international then the former should never be greater than the latter, which is not 
the case.   
 
Figure 3.3 below shows the development of securities trading volume as a share 
of GDP across domestic and international markets in Germany. International trading 
volume is taken here to be the sum total of purchases and sales of domestic and foreign 
assets by foreign and domestic agents respectively (PDf + SDf + PFd + SFd). A natural 
log scale is used because of the well-known significantly higher turnover in 
international trading and for comparability of different series of somewhat different 
magnitudes on a single scale. As is apparent, the four series display marked similarities 
in their development across time. We see that in terms of timing, the growth of domestic 
equity is most similar to international equity volume, and domestic debt volume is most 
similar to international debt volume. But in terms of the magnitude of the growth, 
domestic equity is most similar to domestic debt volume, and international equity 
volume is most similar to international debt volume. A plausible explanation for the 
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higher volume in international securities, which has much puzzled the economics 
profession (Tesar and Werner, 1995; Warnock, 2002; Hnatkovska, 2010), is that 
international holdings are more likely to be institutionally held whereas retail investors 
account for a larger domestic share. Like domestic trading, Didier et al. (2013) observe 
(to their surprise) that trading in international equities is concentrated in a relatively 
small number of securities. Despite the much larger pool of investable assets available 
to global mutual funds, for instance, the number of stocks cross-border funds invest in is 
no higher than a specialised fund. Moreover, the composition of stocks changes little 
even as the money entering the fund rises over time (ibid.). 
International debt trading shows a quantitatively similar trajectory to equity 
trading, though levels off in the 2000s. That is to say, while the absolute increase in 
percentage point trading volume was much greater in international debt than domestic 
debt markets, the proportionate increase was similar. These trends are strongly 
indicative that the growth in international trading volume has been driven by the same 
forces that drove the growth in domestic volume, and that those forces lie in the trading 
needs of institutional investors.      
It could be argued that the growth in institutional investor-driven international 
trading volume is not a definitive explanation of the expansion of capital flows. For one, 
an expansion of international trading need not necessarily translate into an increase in 
capital flows if, in the case of inflows, for instance, an increase in foreigners’ purchases 
of domestic assets is matched by foreigners’ sales of domestic assets. Conversely, an 
increase in measured capital flows is in principal possible without any increase in 
volume if purchases, for example (of domestic assets by foreigners in the case of 
inflows), remain constant and sales decrease. Moreover, the expansion of trading 
volume could be due to a growth in securities outstanding, rather than more intensive 
trading of existing assets.  
 This, however, is not the case. Figure 3.4 below shows the trajectory of German 
portfolio equity and portfolio debt inflows alongside their respective international 
turnovers. In both cases turnover expanded significantly meaning that the increase in 
international trading volume was not merely due to the growth of capital markets, but 
also due to more intensive trading of existing securities. As can be seen, equity inflows 
began to expand in the mid-1990s, after which they fluctuated widely with successive 
busts and booms of equity markets. The initial expansion, though, was accompanied by  
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Figure  3-4a: Germany equity inflows and international turnover of equity (% GDP). 
 
 
Figure 3.4b. Germany debt inflows and international turnover of debt (% GDP) 
Sources: International trading volume as per Figure 3.3. Stocks of international securities from 
IMF BOP data on international investment positions. Capital flows as per Table 3.1. 
Notes: Capital flows are measured on the left scale. Turnover measured on the right scale.  
 
a gradual increase in international turnover. The correlation between the increase in 
capital inflows and international turnover shows the expansion of the former has been 
driven by the latter, which rules out the theoretical possibility above that the increase in 
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capital flows may have occurred without an increase in trading volume. During the 
2000s the relationship between international turnover and trading on the one hand, and 
capital flows on the other becomes more unstable. The most plausible explanation is 
that the expansion of international equity trading in this period was driven by the 
emergence of hedge funds and high-frequency traders which buy and sell rapidly, but do 
not take sustained positions in markets. In their presence, turnover and trading volume 
are likely to be poor guides to measured changes in capital flows. 
 In the case of debt flows the relationship is more stable. Although the turnover 
series does not date back far enough to observe the beginning of the growth of inflows, 
it is apparent that the sharp increase in debt inflows at the beginning of the 1990s 
coincided with a sharp increase in trading volume relative to the stock of debt 
outstanding. Turnover then declined sharply in the 2000s. As will be discussed more 
fully in the following chapter, investors during this period began to shift towards 
corporate financial debt and securitised instruments relative to scarce and low-yielding 
government debt. Whereas the latter is traded intensively as a cost-effective means of 
abiding by investment mandates, the former are infrequently-traded, illiquid instruments 
that are associated more with yield-based strategies. Thus, while Germany was not a 
production centre of securitisation, the decline in turnover is consistent with private 
debtinflows substituting for public inflows during the 2000s. The fall in turnover was 
halted post-crisis, perhaps as German sovereign debt became a safe-haven asset. 
The graduation from repeated currency crises to persistent credit and 
housing-led banking crises becomes more readily apparent in this light. For the rise of 
global institutional investors necessitates a supply of safe, long-term assets to store 
value and match assets with liabilities. And as deposits migrate from the banking 
system to institutionalised savings funds, the former becomes structurally indebted to 
latter. As we show in the next chapter, in an environment of scarce and low-yielding 
government debt investors will seek yield in close alternatives such as AAA-rated 
securitised debt instruments or bank bonds. In so doing, a housing bubble may be 
stoked. Banks belonging to countries which, for historical and institutional reasons, 
utilise longer-term capital market instruments as funding may become especially 
susceptible.  
That very scarcity of government instruments also makes currency crises less 
likely. For if investors have nowhere else to go, they have little choice but to park their 
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pools of cash in whatever US government and, to a lesser extent, German government 
debt is available. As argued by Kaltenbrunner and Lysandrou (2016) demand from 
institutional investors is among the major reasons for why the US can run persistent 
balance of payments and budget deficits without incurring the threat of an attack on its 
currency. With the advent of the euro, the Eurozone as a whole is similarly insulated 
from currency crises. Though currently not rivalling the dollar, the growth of Eurozone 
capital markets implies that its securities are increasingly held for safety and stores of 
value for global investors. Thus, the growth of institutional-led international portfolio 
trading has significantly altered the balance of financial stability through a demand for 
safe assets. And the advent of the euro implies smaller countries can piggyback on that 
demand as they become linked to a German-led currency.   
In sum, financial trading has played a central role in the propagation of systemic 
fragility, a role that has changed over time. The liberalisation of cross-border financial 
transactions in the post-Bretton Woods era inaugurated the breakdown of global 
financial peace. The ability of financial flows to rapidly traverse space and national 
boundaries led to repeated currency crises, which also magnified extant inflationary 
pressures in the 1970s and 1980s. Patterns of financial fragility began to shift in the late 
1980s and early 1990s from currency to housing and credit-based banking crises. The 
large increase in cross-border financial transactions has magnified this shift through the 
provision of funding to banks. That this increase in international trading and hence 
capital flows has been driven by institutional investors has solidified the shift from 
currency to banking crises in an additional sense; not only positively through the 
provision of liquidity to banks, but also by diminishing the likelihood of currency 
crashes. The identification of institutional investors in the growth of trading has crucial 
implications for how we conceive of proprietary trading among banks.    
 
3.3 Bank and proprietary trading 
This section examines and explores the growth of trading activities among large 
banking groups in light of recent initiatives to curb proprietary trading. It argues the 
(sometimes tacit) assumption that investment bank trading has grown in aggregate as a 
result of a desire to take on more risk represents a fallacy. Rather than being a 
self-aggrandising dependent through which greater instability is engendered by ever 
more risky business models, the growth in trading income among major banking groups 
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reflects the wider growth in institutional-led financial transactions. The major risk 
factors in trading losses have, to date, originated in credit markets. At the systemic level, 
it has been more credit-based property expansions than it has been positioning in assets 
through financial trading that have been the immediate cause of instability. Within 
national borders geography continues to play a key role. 
 
3.3.1 Bank and proprietary trading 
As we saw in the introduction, the level of proprietary trading that banks currently 
engage in is often seen as part of a broader pattern of a liberalised, risk-taking financial 
sector. Whatever the risks of proprietary trading may be, few would argue that it does 
not overlap with market making, and the boundaries between the two are often blurry. 
When dealers make markets they are often required to hold inventories of illiquid 
securities, sometimes for quite extended periods. This necessarily entails the assumption 
of risk. And it is that access to large inventories of securities that also provides 
opportunities for more discretionary risk-taking. But as we saw in the previous chapter, 
whether we invoke financial deregulation or disintermediation, existing research on the 
growth of investment banking activities leaves something to be desired. 
If, on the contrary, we view investment banking as responding to pressures 
external to the financial system rather than transforming itself from within, a different 
picture emerges. We may then view the level of market making and proprietary trading 
as originating in processes which are relatively external to the banking system. If such 
as picture is correct, then we would expect to see bank trading income growth mirror the 
overall growth in financial trading in the economy. Figure 3.5 below shows such a 
picture using OECD bank ‘net profits on financial operations’ as a proxy.28 As we saw, 
the institutional-led growth in financial trading began in the early-to-mid 1990s. As per 
the figure, for majority of countries bank trading income indeed begins a secular 
increase from the early 1990s on. The series is most striking in the cases of France and 
Switzerland, a major banking centre (shown also because of an absence of data for the 
UK). Up to the early-1990s bank trading income was relatively modest, after which it 
began a secular increase. A similar process is observable in Spain, though the series is 
more erratic. Again, an expansion of trading income from the early 1990s is suggested  
                                                          
28
 This understates true profits from financial trading as it excludes large components of interest income 
on securities such as those relating to hedging (for example, interest rate swaps) and interbank claims (see, 
OECD, 2011).  
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Figure ‎3-5: Evolution of bank trading income (%GDP). 
Sources: Bank income taken from Bank Profitability statistics, OECD. GDP taken from OECD national accounts.
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in Germany, but not enough data exists to be definitive. The downturn at the beginning 
of the series in Germany is observable in the other series and reflects the recession of 
the early 1990s. 
In Italy, trading income expanded rapidly from the mid-1990s but merely 
returned to levels that had prevailed in the 1980s. The major apparent exception to the 
trend, though, is the United States. Here we see a progressive decline in trading income 
from a peak value of the 1980s, to some rebound from the mid-1990s onwards, to large 
losses once the global financial crisis began. One possible explanation is that US banks 
were able to reap large gains during the 1980s which they were never able to recover. 
US banks funnelled large amounts of capital to developing countries during this period. 
Fortunately, Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) provide a detailed breakdown of the 
components of financial revenue in the US. They show that while general trading 
revenue growth in the US was modest in the 1990s, ‘other broker-dealer activities’ 
revenues began to accelerate rapidly from 1993 on. They venture that the growth of this 
category to be fixed income market making and derivatives trading. Thus, whether net 
trading incomes are compressed in the US due to higher costs, or whether OECD data 
lack granularity, trading revenue among large dealer banks in the US began to 
accelerate, as in other countries, at precisely the same time as the overall growth in 
institional financial trading.  
The precise mechanisms through which banks earn profits from trading are 
tightly guarded and remain rather opaque. As mentioned, the intitial expansion in 
trading volume was driven by intensive trading of high-capitalisation stocks in equity 
markets and by liquid, on-the-run treasuries in fixed income markets. The prices of both 
sets of securities are dependent on publicly available knowedge; company information 
in the case of equities and macroeconomic news in the case of bonds. The potential for 
trading gains based on superior knowledge is accordingly limited. Certainly the greater 
volume of capital market transactions would imply, ceteris paribus, greater trading 
revenues through market making operations. But the trend has been one of falling 
bid-ask spreads in both equity and bond markets and progessively lower profits from 
market making (Jones 2002; Casey and Lanoo, 2005: 42-44). SIFMA data on US dealer 
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banks indeed shows that the bulk of trading revenues arises from non-market making 
categories, namely proprietary debt trading and derivatives trading.
29
 
The astronomical growth of derivatives markets and the central role played by 
major banks in intermediating such markets may point to the primacy of these 
institutions in an ever-expanding global casino. Such a view is misleading according to 
Grahl and Lysandrou (2003). For the massive growth in financial trading is but a huge 
growth in transactions. From another perspective, the ratio of deposits-to-financial 
securities has shrunk and, what is more, the turnover on those instruments has 
expanded. This, they argue, has led to the massive growth of money markets in which 
money is recycled at greater and greater speeds to support the growth of financial 
trading. A key money market instrument is the FX swap, the largest derivative market 
in terms of trading volume. Indeed as they point out, FX swaps cannot be used to take 
FX positions, which puts paid to the idea that the growth in FX trading volume 
respresents speculation. Again, data compiled by Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) 
show that short-term money market instruments began their secular expansion in the 
mid-1990s. 
 How then do banking groups earn their income from trading? A major channel is 
through the information that dealers aquire from clients on the general trading 
environment. As Gravelle (2000: 6) explains, major dealer banks are unlikely to have 
superior information on the fundamental value of fungible, highly-traded securities. 
Through their ability to straddle several markets simultaneously and the brokerage and 
market making facilities they provide to clients, major dealer banks do, however, have 
information on the order flow and trading propensities of investors. Thus, it is less the 
underlying fundamental value of securities they infer, but the intervening values and 
how pricing relationships might be temporarily bumped off course by prevailing order 
flow. Generally, the fact that the large increase in demand for securities has not been 
met by a commensurate increase in supply, as indicated by the increase in trunover, 
suggests the potentail for price disruptions to be high. This is ever more the case when 
one considers the concentrated nature of financial trading, driven as it has been by 
institutional investor large block and jumbo orders. 
                                                          
29
 Among US broker-dealers while commissions from exchange traded equities were high (7.7% of total 
revenue in 2001) but now decling (5.6% in 2010), market making during the same period went from just 
1.5% of total revenue and 12.4% of trading revenue to 0.3% of total and 3.3% of trading revenue. Debt 
trading went from 60% in 2001 to 24.0% in 2010 of trading revenue whereas ‘other’ trading went from 
27.7% to 69.8%  (SIFMA, 2011). 
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Again, the trajectory of the derivatives market suggests such a trend. The 
massive expansion in money market flows brought about by the growth in institutional 
transactions implies a concomitant need for, and growth in, hedging to manage the risk 
of those flows. The interest rate swap market is by far the largest derivative market in 
terms of the notional value of transactions outstanding, and the second largest after FX 
swaps in terms of daily turnover. The interest rate swap market expanded rapidly in the 
early 1990s, with the growth in the market increasing rapidly from about 1992 onwards 
among Europe countries, and indeed globally (ISDA, 2006). This coincides precisely 
with the expansion of money markets and of capital market trading generally. But it is 
difficult to attribute its continued growth and modern size to simple hedging. For 
anywhere between one third to four fifths of interest rate derivatives volume comprises 
so-called package trades (Brush, 2017). These are trades in which interest rate swaps 
and derivatives are overlain with two or more (and sometimes as many 20) contracts 
(such as government bonds or futures) and are used to hedge and speculate on interest 
rates. The access to order flow information and large computing power that catalogues 
correlations and scans for disruptions in pricing relationships positions dealer banks to 
capitalise on trading opportunities. But while it may be the case that even a majority of 
trading volume in interest rate swaps constitutes position-taking, the timing of the 
growth of the market indicates it is not inordinately large relative to the scale of capital 
market transactions. That is, bank proprietary and dealing income are dependent on the 
growth of institutional trading.           
Figure 3.6 below shows the breakdown of trading income in fixed income, 
currency, and commodities (FICC) and equity markets among major European and US 
investment banks. Not suprisingly given the size of swaps and related interest rate 
markets, G-10 rates is the largest single source of trading income. Another thing to note 
is that so-called FICC trading on the left of the figure is considerably greater than equity 
based trading income represented on the right. This might seem curious given that 
revenues from equities trading was reportedly twice as large as FICC as recently as 
2000, as reported by the financial press (The Economist, 2013). And that since then debt 
trading volume growth has stagnated relative to equity trading volume, which has 
continued to grow. However, the greater transparency of equity markets has two 
consequences (Gravelle, 2000: 5-7). One is that transactions are consumated at the best 
available price, which is not necessarily the case in decentralised fixed income  
markets. Given  that market making  income has been  a declining source of revenue
110 
 
 
 
Figure ‎3-6: Trading income of major US-European investment banks ($ billions). 
Source: Coalition (2017) 
Notes: The 12 largest investment banks are included in the series.   
 
(though commission income in equities remains high), the more convincing argument is 
that the greater transparency in equity prices and order flows has traditionally made it 
more difficult to profit from market information. 
Of course, the precise channels remain opaque and we cannot push the point too 
far. There are clearly a myriad of ways in which banks earn trading income and not all 
of them can be reduced to profiting from order information. Securitised products, which 
are lightly traded and illiquid, are a case in point. During the 2000s securitisation 
markets grew enormously. As detailed more in the following chapter, European banks 
were able to avail of regulatory loopholes and earn carry trade profits by borrowing low 
in US money markets and investing in higher yielding securitised intruments. In 
particular, no regulatory capital needed to be held against securitised products if they 
were held in off-balance sheet vehicles. US banks, namely Goldman Sachs, infamously 
shorted the market as it sold products on to investors. Post-crisis European banks then 
availed of the ‘greatest carry trade ever’ by positioning in nominally risk-free, but 
high-yielding peripheral government debt. Investment banking entities are thus able to 
exploit opportunities for trading gains as they arise through a variety of means 
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including, but not limited to regulatory arbitrage, carry trading, arbitrage, and order 
information. It is worth pointing out, though, that the major source of demand for 
securitised pruducts during the 2000s originated from institutional investors, and hedge 
funds in the case of structured finance (that is CDOs). The point then remains that the 
expansion in bank trading income has only grown since the expansion in capital market 
volume.    
Finally, as with cross-border flows many of the proprietary and trading functions 
previously under the purview of the banking sector are now also or, in many cases, 
primarily carried out by smaller, more speculative entities. These smaller players 
contribute significantly to equity trading volume and revenues in investment banking. 
Their actions are shaped by capital market trading. Hedge funds in particular have 
experienced massive growth since 2000, and, along with more risk averse mutual and 
other institutional funds, are major players in equity cash and derivatives markets. The 
large prime services revenue in Figure 3.6 is largely prime brokerage services to hedge 
funds. Capital injections from high net worth individuals, the traditional base, along 
with corporate cash pools and endowements have contributed significantly to hedge 
fund growth since 2000. The largest change has come from institutional sources, and as 
of 2010 institutional money comprised 47% of hedge fund capital (Stowell, 2013: 226). 
In terms of market making and trading, high frequency trading (HFT) firms, 
which overlap with hedge funds, have garnered significant attention. As noted 
previously, whereas trading volume levelled off in debt markets in the 2000s, it 
continued to expand in equity markets, and has also expanded recently in spot FX 
markets. HFT firms and hedge funds and, to a lesser extent, banks are largely 
responsible for this growth.
30
 Anywhere between 40 to 60% of trading volume in 
equity markets (Finance Watch, 2012) and 30% of spot FX markets (BIS, 2011a) is 
accounted for by HFT. Technological advances have enabled nimble investors to profit 
from first access to market information through geographical proximity to trading 
venues (see Zook and Grote, 2016). While many of the trading techniques associated 
with HFT are not new (Gomber et al., 2011), the ability to extract handsome revenues 
from ‘lit’ equity and electronic spot markets is. This, in turn, has led to a game of 
                                                          
30
 As well as being widely acknowledged in the literature, it is evident in that the increase in cross-border 
equity trading did not translate into an expansion in equity capital flows in the 2000s. High frequency 
traders are known for high-volume, intra-day positions which are closed at the end of the day. Because no 
net position is sustained in an asset, the cross-border transaction does not give rise to a measured capital 
flow. 
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cat-and-mouse with institutional players in particular, who resort to a variety of means 
to shield their large orders through ‘slicing and dicing’, use of parallel markets which 
only large players have access to, dark pools, and so on. As the BIS notes, HFT firms 
rely on dealing banks to take large positions and “The reverse is not true: dealing banks 
do not need HFT firms to conduct their business” (BIS, 2011a: 9). As we have seen, the 
growth in bank trading income has ultimately depended on the growth of 
institutional-led capital market trading. 
In sum, prevailing accounts of bank trading that centre on risk-based business 
models (or disintermediation) fail to account for the timing of its development. Bank 
trading income and the derivatives and money markets that surround it began to expand 
in the early 1990s as capital markets grew. Thus, the ability of banks and other entities 
to extract proprietary trading incomes must ultimately be seen in terms of trends in 
capital markets, and the investors that shape them. The following section examines the 
systemic implications of bank trading and compares it to the growth of property 
lending.     
 
3.3.2 Bank trading: Comparative systemic implications  
There are multiple channels through which bank trading incomes may pose systemic 
implications. Bank trading is often viewed as part of non-traditional income, which is 
more volatile than interest income, as noted previously (see De Young and Rice, 2004). 
Lending, at least traditionally, has required and fostered relatively stable relationships 
between banks and their customers and accordingly entails high switching costs. Fee 
and trading-based transactions in contrast are often not relationship-based. Especially 
pre-crisis, certain trading activities required little regulatory capital, or had capital 
regulations that could be easily circumvented. They could therefore be funded by debt 
to greater extent, which increases financial leverage and hence earnings volatility.  
 Adrian and Shin (2008; 2010) show pro-cyclical leverage to be more 
pronounced among broker dealers and investment banks than for commercial banks and 
holding companies. Part of the greater resort to leverage among dealers is no doubt due 
to the fact that margins in making markets are thin, so leverage is needed to compensate. 
But more importantly, it is because investment and dealer banks primarily hold financial 
assets on the balance sheet which are marked-to-market that they are susceptible to 
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pro-cyclicality and fluctuations in leverage use. Asset price changes translate into 
changes in book equity values and hence leverage. Investment banks then adjust their 
leverage by expanding balance sheets so as to maintain equity levels proportional to the 
VaR of their assets (ibid.). Thus, an increase in financial asset prices tends to increase 
leverage among investment banks and broker dealers, which can magnify the original 
increase asset values. For commercial banks loans comprise the lion’s share of assets, 
which are priced at book value. This dampens the pro-cyclicality of leverage in 
traditional intermediation.       
 The use of short-term funding instruments adds an additional layer of instability 
through maturity transformation. Dealers and investment banks naturally gravitate 
towards shorter-term market liabilities by necessity of not having access to deposit 
funding. Of course, this is mitigated to the extent to which an investment and/or dealer 
bank also engages in commercial banking activities. But as financial assets are 
marked-to-market, nimble funds that can keep up with price swings are needed which 
necessitates the use of various short-term instruments, especially repos. When things go 
south and asset prices decline, debts cannot easily be rolled over and margin calls may 
be triggered. This can lead to fire sales of assets, in turn depressing prices. This may 
lead to further margin calls and need for funding, and so on. Rapid and destabilising 
price spirals are a structural feature of financial market-mediated banking.   
 That said, it is worth asking to what extent bank trading of financial assets is 
likely to lead to a systemic chain of events, and to what extent such a chain of events is 
an outcome of other systemic processes. Aside from the recent financial crisis which we 
discuss shortly, bank proprietary trading has not been responsible for the series of 
financial crises and systemic events that have plagued the financial system over the last 
number of decades. As discussed, the BIS in its 2004 review of major advanced-country 
banking crises was explicit in that it was credit, as opposed to market risk that was 
responsible for major crashes up until then (BIS, 2004). Our analysis also showed the 
importance of credit losses in banking crises has continued. Contrary to what is 
sometimes assumed, investment banks are not in the habit of sustaining large open or 
unhedged trading positions.
31
 To be sure, the frequency and severity of bank (and other 
institution) trading losses has grown since the 1990s. These losses have often involved 
                                                          
31
 This can be seen in the size of the swaps market and timing of its growth as discussed. It is also 
apparent from the fact that one financial transaction gives rise to a series of offsetting transactions, a point 
made by Goodhart (2013). See Mende and Menkhoff (2003) for empirical evidence on the unwillingness 
of dealers to sustain open positions in FX.  
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large ‘directional’ bets or highly leveraged positions on asset relationships using 
derivatives (see Laurent, 2015). Of the 50 largest inflation-adjusted trading losses listed 
by Wikipedia, 24 of the top 25 have occurred since 1993. Three of the top five have 
been among the major banking groups listed in Figure 3.6, with the remaining two 
being hedge fund losses. Certain types of trading strategies are high-risk propositions 
and as such are perhaps more potent than a given amount of lending. But almost without 
exception, the larger financial system has not been threatened by trading losses. One 
exception was the losses incurred by Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 
which the Fed organised a private bailout (Laurent, 2015). As pointed out by Persaud 
and others (2015: 33), a few people doing things they do or do not believe to be risky is 
unlikely to threaten the financial system. However, many people doing things they 
believe to be safe but are in fact risky is the recipe for disaster. Insofar as proprietary 
trading involves complex and ostensibly risky positioning, it is likely to be strictly 
hedged and/or limited to an individual institution. Paradoxically, then, it has less been 
complex proprietary and/or derivatives-based trading, but the more mundane credit 
losses that have been responsible for the heightened instability of the financial system 
among advanced countries.   
Table 3.4 below develops the point further. It displays the balance sheet 
structure of banks currently or previously labelled as SIFIs by Bankscope, and also 
consolidated national balance sheets for all banks (inside parentheses). Both trading 
assets and loans are given as a proportion of total assets. What we see is that loans 
continue to be the major asset class for the banking system as a whole ranging from 
59.5-70.2% of total assets in 2016, down somewhat from 2001. For the four countries 
for which data is available in both periods, we see that on average loans declined 
somewhat from 70.6% in 2001 to 65.7% of total assets in 2016. Trading assets account 
for between 18.3-37.7% of total bank assets in 2016, which constituted an increase from 
2001. For the four countries, we see that average trading assets remained remarkably 
stable over the two periods (21.1-21.9% in 2016). Thus, at the system-wide level loans 
continue to be the most important asset class. 
For SIFIs, loans went from 23-56.4% of total assets in 2001 to 29-59.1% in 2016, 
and the average figure across countries stayed more or less the same as well (37.2% in 
2001 to 38.8% in 2016). SIFI trading assets ranged between 15.8-53.1% in 2001 to 
between 19.9-45.3% in 2016. The average figure for trading assets also stayed more or 
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 Trading 2016 Loans 2016 Trading 2001 Loans 2001 
France 34.8 (18.3) 29.2 (64.8) 25.1 (23.8) 23.0 (65.3) 
Germany 26.4 (18.3) 30.0 (70.2) 48.3 (22.2) 37.9 (74.8) 
Italy 36.7 (25.5) 45.4 (64.6) 15.8 (17.6) 56.4 (70.0) 
Spain 19.9 (25.4) 58.1 (63.2) 26.4 (20.7) 52.0 (72.3) 
UK 39.9 (37.7) 36.0 (59.5) 37.7 24.7 
US 45.3 34.5 53.1 29.0 
Table ‎3-4: Bank balance sheet structures: Loans and trading assets (% total assets). 
Sources: Individual bank data taken from Thompson database. National level data based on 
ECB and Bank of England. 
Notes: Figures outside parentheses based on aggregate balance sheets of banks that have at 
some point been listed as global systemically important financial institution. Based on Ayadi et 
al. (2016) trading assets are taken to be the residual of the balance sheet once loans and cash are 
taken out. We also remove fixed assets such as goodwill, buildings etc. ECB statistics do not 
separate cash/deposits from derivatives and other assets so national data may understate bank 
holdings of trading assets, but not substantively so. Figures in parentheses are aggregate 
national level data of monetary financial institutions.   
 
less the same for SIFIs (from 34.4% in 2001 to 33.8% in 2016). As with the 
consolidated national level data, these trends do not show the intervening years, though 
the overall picture does not change substantively.
32
 Thus, even for major global 
banking groups loans, on average, constitute an asset class equal in importance to 
trading assets.  
For SIFIs and banks in general, it also must be acknowledged that trading 
incomes are substantially more diversified than loan income. As we saw in Figure 3.6 
there were a full 10 categories of trading incomes from fixed income to currencies to 
equities to commodities. Jorion (2007: 52) shows that trading revenues across these four 
asset classes among dealer banks ‘behave relatively independently of each other’, 
though fixed income and currencies display significant co-movement. Loan markets 
vary from country but, as we saw in the previous chapter, for most advanced countries 
mortgage lending now comprises the major loan class for banks. For historical and 
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 At the height of the global bubble in 2006, for SIFIs loans were 36.5% of total assets on average 
whereas trading assets were higher at 45.4%. At the system level, little change is discernible from 2001. 
In 2006 loans were 70.5% for the four countries whereas trading assets were 21.3%. 
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institutional reasons cross-border transactions are much more limited in loan markets 
and the scope for diversification within a country is limited. That is, the degree of 
homogeneity in lending far exceeds that in bank financial trading. 
It is also the case that mortgage markets have become much more volatile in the 
last number of decades. For the vast majority of advanced countries for which data is 
available, real house prices barely changed for a 100 years. During the 1960s and 1970s 
prices began to veer off historical trends, and prices began to accelerate rapidly in the 
1990s (Knoll et al., 2017).
33
 Swings in property prices, estimated to be mostly due to 
swings in underlying land values (Knoll et al., 2017; Ryan-Collins et al., 2017), 
typically fall by 70% from the peak of a bubble (Kelly, 2007). The availability of cheap 
credit in an open economy system implies that a fixed-supply, difficult-to-short, and 
increasingly commodified asset such as property/land is subject to large price swings. 
Being the major store of wealth for most people, undulations in land and property 
markets can lead to a cascade risk-taking throughout the macroeconomy (Goodhart and 
Hoffman, 2008; Jorda et al., 2015; 2016). The fact that mortgage and property-based 
lending is the major single asset class for the banking system as a whole reinforces the 
point, and particularly its propensity for systemic risk-taking compared to, say, complex 
financial trading suggests that it has been commercial banking that has made investment 
banking more unstable, and not the converse.  
 Our reading of the global financial crisis does little to dissuade us of the primacy 
of credit over trading in the stability of the banking system. It is true that proprietary 
trading losses were a major component of the crises in both the US (Crotty et al., 2010) 
and Europe (Hardie and Howarth, 2009). Even then, credit-based losses rather than 
trading losses have still shouldered the lion’s share of write downs. Though still of 
course very large, only about one fifth in the UK and one third of write downs in the US 
among banks over 2007-10 were securities losses (IMF, 2010). The remainder were 
loan losses. In the Euro Area, securities losses were higher at two fifths of total, but still 
not as large as loan losses.  
Moreover, the major securities losses related to credit losses in the form of 
write-downs on mortgage-backed and other securitised products. In the US these were 
tied to its domestic housing market. As we detail in the following chapter, in Europe 
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 In Amsterdam, for instance, using a repeat sales series, and thus avoiding the vagaries of adjusting for 
size and quality, the level of real house prices in 1992 has been found to be the same as in 1646! As has 
happened elsewhere, prices have since exploded (Monnery, 2011: 75-92). 
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bank losses on securitised products entailed a large cross-border component, especially 
based on the US and UK property markets. It is undoubtedly the case that major 
investment banks knowingly sold dubious securities on to investors and earned large fee 
revenues from structuring them. In doing so they were a key link in the financial chain 
and helped to ignite the bubbles which, after collapsing, rendered many of the securities 
worthless. That said, large loan/credit losses are and were a precondition for large losses 
on mortgage securities, but the opposite is and was not the case. In the countries that 
experienced the largest housing bubbles such as Ireland and Spain, securitisation played 
a role, but was less prominent than in the US and the UK, which experienced smaller 
property bubbles. It is also the case, as we have already said and detail more later, that 
the ultimate demand for securitisation came from institutional investors. Large banks, as 
they do, benefited and earned trading revenues from dynamics that emanated elsewhere 
in capital markets. Thus while proprietary trading among major banks heightened the 
financial crisis, losses on those securities originated in loan markets. The genesis of 
those loan losses, moreover, is ultimately traceable to property and land markets, and 
their interaction with cross-border financial flows and domestic credit.   
As the crisis unfolded, European banks began to invest heavily in peripheral 
sovereign debt. Peripheral-country debt was high-yielding and risky but continued to be 
applied the same haircuts in ECB refinancing operations, and incurred the same capital 
charges as if it were no different from debt of more stable countries. By borrowing in 
short-term money markets European banks thus availed of ‘the greatest carry trade ever’ 
(Archarya and Steffen, 2015), and subsequently suffered large losses on that carry trade 
as those countries came under stress. This is an apparent example of large trading losses 
with systemic implications. But two things are noteworthy. One is that the primary 
reason for European bank holdings of sovereign debt from the periphery was liquidity 
management through, for instance, its use as collateral in repo financing operations 
(Gabor and Ban, 2016). Carry trade holdings emerged as the crisis developed but 
always comprised a smaller part (ibid.). Second the systemic implications and pressures 
in sovereign debt markets arose primarily from ECB policy actions (see Weisbrot, 2015: 
20-55). Bank losses did not arise from relative value, swap spread, or other types of 
trades one would associate with bank positions in government instruments.
34
 While 
banks no doubt made positional trades in government instruments once they owned 
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 A relative value trade is a trade on the relationship between securities or on the relationship between 
securities and the yield curve. A swap spread is the difference between the rate on the fixed leg of an 
interest rate swap and a government bond of the same maturity.   
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them, the fact that the major reason for their holdings was repo-based liquidity 
management implies those losses would have been suffered independent of any bets that 
were made. It is therefore misleading to attribute most of these losses as being due to 
proprietary trading. Historically there has been a close relationship between government 
debt markets and the state (Goodhart, 1998). It is therefore inconceivable that had 
governments retained control over monetary policy that they would have allowed their 
paper to incur such stress. In turn banks would not have suffered losses on government 
bonds. Rather than being an example of losses on financial assets due to proprietary 
trading, it is more an example of losses due to the ceding of national policy control. 
Given the growth of repo markets is but a component of the larger growth in capital 
market volume-led expansion of money markets, the debacle is also, incidentally, 
another example of how bank trading dynamics are mediated and shaped by 
institutional investors.  
In sum, the conception of investment banking and proprietary trading as a 
self-aggrandising casino that has expanded through deregulation and ever greater 
risk-taking does us little service if we desire to understand the intricacies of the financial 
system. While bank trading has no doubt become more risky, and of course the 
regulatory framework plays a crucial role, bank proprietary and other actors’ trading is 
ultimately underpinned by capital market actors. Despite the large growth in trading, 
loans, of course, continue to be the major asset class of the system as a whole, and for 
many global banks as well. Financial trading and transactions, especially cross-border, 
play a crucial role in the provision of liquidity and in stimulating credit cycles. Thus, it 
is important to recognise but not exaggerate risks posed by bank proprietary trading as 
doing so may detract from other sources of financial instability.  
 
3.4 Policy implications 
The post-crisis regulatory landscape has taken the issue of financial trading seriously. 
All of the major advanced countries and blocs most deeply implicated in the crisis have 
introduced or are introducing initiatives aimed at curbing risky trading practices, 
especially as they relate to the banking system. In the US this has taken the form of the 
Volcker restriction on proprietary trading as part of the larger Dodd-Frank reforms. In 
the UK the 2013 ‘Financial Services (Banking Reform) bill’ builds on the Vickers 
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Commission’s proposal of ring-fencing retail and wholesale/investment banking 
activities (see Krahnen et al., 2017). 
 In 2011 the EU set up a ‘High-level Expert Group’ chaired by Erik Liikanen to 
evaluate structural reforms of the EU banking sector. Like Vickers but unlike the 
Volcker Rule the Liikanen report calls not for a ban on proprietary trading per se but for 
a conditional separation of retail/commercial banking from trading activities. One of the 
conditions for separation is if the volume of trading activities is considered significant 
(greater than EUR100 billion or 15-25% of total bank assets)
35
 from a financial 
stability perspective. The Liikanen proposals then formed the basis for the January 2014 
EU Commission Barnier proposal. The Barnier proposal calls for conditional separation 
of trading activities for big banks combined with a ban on proprietary trading in which 
the sole purpose is profit making (see Krahnen et al., 2017). Its implementation has 
varied from country to country with France ring-fencing speculative proprietary trading, 
but not banning it. In Germany, it is only certain forms of proprietary trading (such as 
HFT and credit trading) and trading that does not serve clients that are to be separated 
(Goto Grant, 2014: 1256-1260).  
 These reforms in conjunction with closing regulatory loopholes on securitisation, 
restrictions on performance-related pay, Basel III provisions on leverage and liquidity, 
and other policies are likely to diminish the risks associated with proprietary trading. 
Restrictions on hedge funds’ ability to undertake leverage are also helpful, albeit they 
do not go far enough (Johnston, 2015). Ring-fencing trading into a non-depository 
separate entity is further likely to reduce too-big-to-fail subsidies. But they are premised 
on a misunderstanding of bank proprietary trading as arising from risk-loving 
investment banks. By its own admission the Liikanen report notes ‘no particular 
business model fared particularly well, or particularly poorly in the financial crisis’ 
(Liikanen et al., 2012: 99).While trading generally tends to be highly concentrated, it is 
noteworthy that in Germany it was not the largest most sophisticated banks that were hit 
hardest but smaller, medium-sized banks investing in AAA-rated securities (Hardie and 
Howarth, 2009). Banks, in aggregate, have not just grown their trading divisions based 
on a decision to expand, but have been able to do so because of the expansion in 
institutional-led trading. The emphasis on large-bank thresholds and risky trading 
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 In particular bank assets ‘held for trading and available for sale’ must exceed such thresholds 
(Liikanen, 2011: 101). This is a narrower definition of trading assets than in Table 3, which for SIFIs 
includes financial assets held for asset-liability management and securities obtained through (reverse) 
repo agreements. 
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strategies, moreover, may serve to limit the frequency of large trading losses at large 
institutions (though even here the evidence is debatable), but is unlikely to prevent 
trading losses of a more systemic nature. 
 To prevent systemic losses, one needs to address the incentive structures that 
result in financial actors to act systemically, that is concertedly. This applies as much to 
financial trading as it does to credit creation. As well as emulation and competitive 
effects (Alves Jr. et al., 2008), the core reason for homogeneity in financial market 
behaviour is the similarity in the types of models participants use in calculating what 
assets to hold, what not to hold, and how much capital to hold against them (Persaud, 
2015). Thus if one actor deems an asset to be undervalued, others will too, and its value 
may quickly become inflated. The converse is true if an asset is deemed to be 
undervalued. This, more than complex or risky proprietary trading strategies needs to be 
the forefront of regulatory initiatives to curb the level of systemic risk. Reducing 
homogeneity in financial markets in no easy task and interventions utilising capital 
charges based on the degree of correlation with the rest of the financial system have 
been proposed, for instance (Goodhart and Wagner, 2012). 
Whether such a policy would work in practice is anyone’s guess. Rather than (or 
as well as) trying to cajole financial market participants to act in more financially 
sustainable ways, a more ‘geographic fix’ may be in order. This may operate on a 
number of levels. The tendency for capital flows to stimulate asset bubbles and financial 
instability when it crosses borders in an uneven world implies that focusing on curbing 
trading at the investor level, be they banks, hedge funds, or some combination misses 
the mark. The spatiality of financial trading requires appropriate policy levers so that the 
use of capital controls need not in principal be the preserve of developing countries. The 
fact that the core of modern financial trading is crucially underpinned by institutional 
investors that manage household savings implies that, at his juncture, a full reversion to 
a Bretton Woods style management of capital is unfeasible. Institutional investors 
require a mix of safe and higher-yielding asset classes to invest in. In a world of low 
interest rates and a globalised and Europeanised context, that implies some cross-border 
diversification. Selective use of controls as and when necessary to stave off asset 
bubbles and manage stability is justified. This may require temporary and contingent 
relief from EU strictures given its dedication to free movement of capital.  
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Another geographic fix may come in the form of wrestling back monetary 
control from the ECB. The deterritorialisation of political-economic authority from the 
national to the European level has engendered an arbitrariness to how financial 
instability develops. This is all the more so given the commitment of said authorities to 
neoliberal restructuring. European bank losses on sovereign debt are a classic example. 
Much of the European sovereign debt crisis was thoroughly avoidable had the ECB 
acted more responsibly. Leaving the euro is a drastic step, but may well have saved 
peripheral countries from a lot of unnecessary suffering (Weisbrot and Montecino, 
2012). It should be noted, though, that monetary sovereignty did not prevent housing 
bubbles from forming in the US and UK. As well as instigating a currency crisis 
immediately, leaving the euro also puts back on the table the spectre of currency crises 
going forward. Small peripheral countries such as Greece or Portugal, or even Spain do 
not have sufficiently large capital market or histories of institutional stability for their 
securities to be considered safe assets in the mould of, say, German bunds. Global 
investors would simply have more exit options during spates of uncertainty and periodic 
changes in sentiment. 
As economies bounce back from the crisis the case for leaving the euro weakens, 
not least politically. The final and probably the most feasible geographic fix is to 
address underlying problems in land and property markets. Basel III does little to 
contain the prospect of housing bubbles per se. The so-called ‘portfolio invariance’ 
embedded in Basel Accords evaluates risk on the basis of individual asset risk, and not 
the marginal contribution to the risk of the portfolio. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it thus fails to penalise asset concentration (Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson, 
2010: 4). While the exact policy mix will vary depending on the local context, countries 
such as Germany with robust systems of affordable housing are far less susceptible to 
large swings in property prices than the more commodified Anglo-Saxon systems, for 
instance. If the market is unable or unwilling to meet supply, then, as also argued in the 
previous chapter, the state should step in. This would not only provide an essential 
service, but promote financial stability. Of course, Germany was not insulated from the 
financial crisis as it imported house-price instability from abroad. This points to the 
importance of limiting both direct credit risks and credit risks embedded in other 
financial assets. Germany, for instance, has listed credit guarantees (along with HFT) 
among the proprietary trading practices to be banned.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has asked two important questions. First what contribution has financial 
trading made to the development of systemic financial instability among advanced 
countries? Second, what is the nature of bank proprietary trading and what has its 
contribution been to said instability. These questions have been posed with respect to 
Europe and with the US as a necessary comparator.   
 The answer to the first question is that overall financial trading, broadly defined, 
has been central to the development of systemic instability among European countries 
and also the US. In particular, it has been cross-border financial trading that has been 
key to the propagation of financial fragility. In this respect the effect of financial trading 
on stability has been geographically contingent. In the early Bretton Woods period this 
came in the form of currency trading and manifested itself in repeated currency crises. 
As cross-border financial trading evolved through the emergence of institutional 
investors, and through economic liberalisation and unity in Europe, Europe graduated 
from repeated currency to repeated banking crises. Thus, in the latter period the role of 
trading has been more indirect through the provision of funding. Institutional 
investor-based financial flows in particular have the potential to engender instability in 
housing markets, which have been the main focal point of instability in recent years.  
 With regards to proprietary trading, we find that existing accounts based on a 
liberalised, risk-loving sector fail to capture its essence. The growth of proprietary 
trading has been crucially intertwined with the expansion of institutional-led capital 
market trading. Up until the global financial crisis, major trading losses (among 
advanced countries) had generally not led to systemic events. Given the greater 
diversity of income sources in bank trading, its potential for complexity, and the 
continued importance of loans in the banking system, we find that the risks associated 
with proprietary trading have sometimes been overstated. Our reading of the financial 
crisis leads us to believe that it has been more the commercial banking sector that has 
made investment banking more unstable than the converse. While recent reforms around 
proprietary trading are likely to improve financial stability, a more pointed reading of 
economic and financial history would lead to a ‘geographic fix’. In particular, the most 
pressing need is to dampen the large swings in property and land prices that have 
plagued advanced and European financial systems in recent years.  
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Chapter 4 : Global banks or global Investors? The case of 
European debt flows 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the determinants of European cross-border debt flows in the 
2000s. As such, we apply and develop further what we have learned so far in terms of 
salience of institutional investors in cross-border dynamics, the relationship between 
banks and institutional investors, and financialisation as a demand-led process. 
Specifically, this chapter explains the trajectory and drivers of cross-border portfolio 
debt flows emanating from core Eurozone countries in the 2000s and beyond. It 
critiques bank-centered approaches as applied to the Eurozone and elucidates an 
alternative, investor-based paradigm. We consider two main lines of analysis motivated 
by patterns of financial fragility. Cross-border debt flows emanating from the core 
countries into both US and UK securitised markets are considered on the one hand, and 
bank inflows into the periphery are examined on the other. Core Eurozone denotes 
Eurozone-12 excluding the peripheral countries Greece, Italy, Ireland and Spain (GIIPS). 
Additionally, we also examine public debt flows into the periphery post-crisis. 
We find bank-centered approaches provide an incomplete account of the growth 
of debt flows since the 2000s. Though bank actions explain a significant portion of 
securitised-based transactions, and public debt flows post-crisis through arbitrage, there 
is little evidence that this constituted the central mechanism for channelling debt flows 
overall. While the importance these analyses attach to agents and actors is welcome, we 
argue they place too much emphasis on banks without due regard for the range of 
investor types that exist in modern financial markets. The expansion of debt flows is 
instead explained by the need of long-term institutional investors and investment funds 
for dated fixed income instruments and the losses suffered by such funds after the 
bursting of the late 1990s technology bubbles. Coupled with secular declines in the 
supply of, and yields on government bonds, this culminated to produce long-term 
asset-liability mismatches for particularly long-term investors. One consequence was 
greater allocations towards financial sector bonds. These disproportionately originated 
in the periphery, and offered higher returns and enhanced asset-liability matching. A 
second consequence was demand pressures on the part of institutional investors for the 
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creation of yielding instruments which found expression in the growth of securitised 
products, and drove flows into the US/UK.  
The chapter thus challenges the consensus that it is large banking groups that are 
central to understanding global financial processes, a view that has garnered support 
within and outside the mainstream (Cerutti et al., 2014; Shin, 2012; Gabor, 2014; 
Tokunaga and Epstein, 2014). This chapter is instead related to the work of Caballero 
(2010), Pozsar (2015), Lysandrou (2011), Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2015), and 
Lysandrou and Shabani (2015) which sees the growth of fixed income imbalances 
arising from pressures from cash pools for yielding products. We cast our net more 
widely and explain investment in on-balance sheet bank bonds as well. This enables us 
to explain debt flows into the periphery, which existing research cannot. Moreover, 
unlike existing work on cash pools which lack explicit theoretical grounding, we also 
forward an analytical framework that centres on institutional investors, and highlights 
how these groups differ from banks in how they engage in fixed income markets. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of trends 
in debt flows within and outside the Eurozone and how they have been interpreted in the 
literature. The following section offers a critique of bank-centred analyses in relation to 
fixed income markets and emphasises the importance of global investors. Section 4.4 
examines the empirical limitations of bank-centred approaches to global financial 
processes as applied to (core) Eurozone-centered debt flows. Section 5 advances an 
explanation of cross-border debt flows in terms of asset-liability mismatches and the 
demand for yielding instruments. The penultimate section discusses some policy 
implications before we conclude.  
 
4.2 Accounting for debt flows: Trends and the importance of banks 
Standard explanations of euro area capital flows examine the importance of convergence 
phenomena and the opportunities the monetary union provided for diversification. A 
single exchange rate obviated currency-matching requirements for many portfolio funds 
and reduced exchange rate risk, and thus allowed the expansion of intra-Eurozone flows 
(De Santis and Gérard, 2009; Lane, 2013). The imposition of a single monetary policy 
and the apparent backing of all EMU members by the ECB led to convergence of interest 
rates in public and private debt markets. A key initiative was the encouragement of the 
use of peripheral debt as collateral in euro-wide repo markets (Gabor and Ban, 2016). 
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That said, while integration within the Eurozone no doubt fostered the level of flows there, 
a simple convergence story belies the fact that these processes were absent in the US and 
UK, which experienced similar cross-border debt trajectories.    
Focusing on outflows from the core Eurozone-12 and inflows into the other 
regions, we can see from Figure 4.1 below that both the US/UK and the periphery 
experienced a surge in debt inflows in the 2000s, coincident with a large expansion of 
outflows from core countries. These can be disaggregated based on the issuing institution, 
but not the investor. Thus, much of the outflows from the core Eurozone-12 went into 
debt securities of ‘other financial institutions’ (OFIs), which comprise a variety of 
non-bank institutions including various financial vehicle corporations central to 
securitisation processes. Inflows into the periphery were dominated by bank flows, 
meaning banks located in the periphery issued debt securities that were bought by 
non-residents. To avoid clutter we have not disaggregated, but bank flows 
overwhelmingly comprise long-term bank debt pre-crisis.
36
 Post-crisis, public inflows 
substituted for private inflows, which often turned negative as investors repatriated 
capital. US data provide little in the way of breakdown of debt flows except to note that 
the trajectory of debt flows indeed followed a similar pattern to the other regions. In the 
UK, the major issuers of cross-border debt were OFIs and banks. The may reflect the 
UK’s large securitisation market and its status as a financial centre in that both British and 
British-based banks were major issuers of long-term debt. 
 The leading paradigm through which these flows have been interpreted and 
which accounts for the contemporaneous spread of flows across regions centres on 
global banks and their leverage and investment cycles as developed by Shin and others 
(Shin and Adrian, 2008, 2010, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2014). Banks actively manage 
their balance sheets through adjustment of leverage. Balance sheet slack arises during 
periods of calm as assessments of risk decline, during, for instance, a period of loose 
monetary policy. A decline in the perceived level of risk leads to a fall in risk weights in 
internal models. As a result banks hold less capital against assets. Through an economic 
expansion, bank asset values may increase though proportionately not as much as equity
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 Over the period 2000-07, long-term bank inflows into the periphery comprised over 80% of annual 
bank inflows on average (IMF balance of payments database).  
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Figure ‎4-1: Trends in portfolio debt flows (% GDP).     
Source: IMF Balance of Payments and World Bank. 
Upper left figure excludes Luxembourg as it distorts averages.
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Core portfolio debt flows (average) 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Peripheral portfolio debt flows (average) 
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
UK portfolio debt Flows  
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
US portfolio debt flows 
Tot. In Tot. Out
127 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-2: The Global Bank framework. 
 
values.
37 
This creates additional slack on the balance sheet, which facilitates further asset 
expansion, and so on. 
Banks expand their balance sheet using debt instruments as shown in Figure 4.2. In 
particular, the rapidly changing profile of bank balance sheets in a mark-to-market context 
requires the use of nimble funding devices such as repos, and other short-term debt 
instruments. Non-bank entities play a facilitating role down the chain in providing leverage 
through acquisition of debt instruments from the banking system. But it is banks that are 
the central agents in the initiation and propagation of financial cycles.  
Insofar as either the wholesale funding markets from which banks draw or the 
subsequent destinations into which they invest are located across borders, bank leverage 
cycles give rise to significant capital flows. As can be seen in Figure 4.3 below, core 
Eurozone-12 entities drew finance from the rest of the world and funded positions in debt 
securities of GIIPS, and also the US and UK on aggregate. Consistent with Figure 4.1, the 
process began in the early 2000s and accelerated through the mid-2000s with the largest 
increases in debt holdings occurring during the years 2004-06. Post-crisis, while the level 
of core indebtedness vis a vis the rest of world remained relatively stable, core holdings of  
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 In a simplified, static context A – D = E, where A, D and E denote assets, debt and equity respectively. 
Assuming D to be constant, E changes proportionately more than A for a given change in A. A given rise in A 
implies a fall in A/D such that banks have spare capacity on their balance sheets (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; 
2011). 
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Figure ‎4-3: Core net portfolio debt positions (% GDP). 
Source: IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey and World Bank. 
As per Figure 4.1, positive figures indicate borrowing/inflows, negative represent 
investment/outflows. 
 
peripheral debt contracted markedly. Though investments in the US and the UK appear to 
have been relatively limited, it is important to note that net data (and indeed both gross debt 
and capital flow data) reveal little about the nature of the flows, omit derivative transactions 
and may misstate ultimate positions between countries due to routing through, for instance, 
financial centres. It may be the case that core-US/UK transactions were quantitatively 
comparable to or even greater than core-periphery flows.
38
 This points to the need for 
detailed analysis of multi and bilateral cross border financial relationships.    
Bertaut et al. (2012) detail how debt flows from the core to the US/UK grew to a 
significant degree through acquisitions of asset-backed securities as well as other corporate 
debt products. A major component was through off-shore conduit and other shadow 
banking entities sponsored by banks in principally Germany, but also France and the 
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 For example, according to figures by Blommestein et al. (2011) US securitisation issuance in 2006 was 
approximately $3 trillion, of which perhaps one quarter was held in Europe (Bertaut et al., 2013). This is 
quantitatively similar to the total long-term debt securities outstanding (excluding securitisation) of peripheral 
banks which stood at around €900 billion in 2006 (ECB, 2016). About half of this is accounted for by banks 
in Italy, whose financial system is known to have high levels of home bias. 
 
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Core net porfolio debt positions 
Periphery UK US ROW
129 
 
Netherlands. As securitisation peaked (around 2005/06), issuance of collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs) expanded, the most toxic of the securitised products. Shin (2012) 
details that European banks and investors raised dollar funding through a variety of means 
to buy securitised products primarily originated in the US, but also the UK (and to a lesser 
extent peripheral countries). Most directly, shadow banking entities issued asset-backed 
commercial paper from US money market funds (Acharya and Schnabel, 2010), but dollar 
funding was also obtained through US-based subsidiaries (Noeth and Sengupta, 2012) and 
through FX swaps (McGuire and von Peter, 2009).  
Regarding flows into the periphery, long-term bank inflows dominated portfolio 
flows into that region pre-crisis. Core investors borrowed heavily through subsidiaries 
located in financial centres such as the UK and extra-EU markets (Hale and Obstfeld, 2016). 
The proceeds were then deployed to debt products of peripheral banks such as unsecured 
and covered bonds (and securitised debt). While aggregated data is not publicly available 
that decomposes various instruments according to country, Le Lesle (2012) does so at the 
European level. Unsecured debt (~60-70%) and covered bonds (~20-30%) were the 
dominant forms of on-balance long-term funding for banking systems in the major 
European countries. After the initial stages of the crisis, public flows substituted for the 
long-term private flows, again funded through money market borrowings (Archarya and 
Steffen, 2015). 
On a more explanatory level, Shin’s leverage framework has been directly deployed 
in a broad European crisis context (O’Connell, 2015), in European investment in the US 
shadow banking system (Shin, 2009, 2012), as well as case study analysis of the peripheral 
crisis (Everett, 2015). Often extending the leverage framework, a related literature focuses 
on carry trade possibilities available to core European banks. For Archarya and Schnabel 
(2010) and Bertaut et al. (2012), the core bank borrowings from US markets deployed back 
into US securitised products constituted carry trade positions. Lax regulation in Europe 
enabled proprietary gains as minimal to no capital charges needed to be held against bank 
holdings of assets in off-balance sheet vehicles. Similarly, for O’Connell (2015) and Hale 
and Obstfeld (2016) cheap extra-European borrowing among core banks for investment in 
higher-yielding peripheral debt products constituted a carry trade. Core banks’ comparative 
advantage in lending to the periphery was facilitated by ECB loose monetary policy and 
reduced transaction costs through harmonisation and liberalisation of regulations (ibid.).  
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Within public debt markets, perhaps the major stimulus to core investment in 
peripheral markets during the 2000s was the creation of European repo markets. Debt from 
peripheral countries was increasingly used as collateral for funding operations by core 
banks (Gabor and Ban, 2016). Post-crisis in the context of collapsing state revenues, 
governments across Europe borrowed heavily. Sovereign peripheral debt had varied ratings 
and yields, but continued to be applied the same collateral haircut as other Eurozone debt 
by the ECB, and also carried zero risk weights in capital charges (Hale and Obstfeld, 
2016).
39
 Funded using cheap money market liquidity, core banks were able to expand their 
holdings of sovereign peripheral debt and avail of the ‘greatest carry trade ever’ (Archarya 
and Steffen, 2015).  
 In sum, the convergence of interest rates within the Eurozone and obviation of 
exchange rate risk provides a useful framework for understanding the level of debt flows, 
but fails to account for the simultaneity of flows across regions. The US experienced 
largely the same trajectory of flows as the Eurozone but where for the former a single 
monetary policy prevailed long before 1999. Bank-centered approaches put leverage 
operations and collateral-based funding as central to the propagation of financial cycles in 
this respect. Shin’s leverage framework has been explicitly deployed in the context of 
European and core-bank engagement in the US securitisation market as well as the crisis 
within the Eurozone. A related and overlapping literature also focuses on banks and their 
leverage operations, and emphasises arbitrage and carry trade positions. Such approaches 
have significant explanatory power in analysing securitised flows and public flows 
post-crisis, but as we shall see have both conceptual and empirical weaknesses in their 
ability to explain what drove especially private debt flows overall.   
 
4.3 Global investors and conceptual limitations to bank-centred approaches 
One problem with the bank-based analyses is their focus on income through asset 
expansion using leverage. Banks adjust their balance sheets according to several risk 
criteria, and their motivations for holding securities are accordingly multifaceted. 
According to one industry survey in the 1990s (BAI quoted in Tschampion et al., 2007), 
banks hold securities first to manage interest rate risk, second to manage liquidity risk, then 
                                                          
39
 In August 2010, the ECB applied haircuts to sovereign collateral rated BBB+ and lower (Gabor and Ban, 
2016: 629). 
131 
 
produce yield and finally to mitigate credit risk. The massive level of maturity 
transformation modern banks engage in implies a heightened sensitivity to liquidity and 
interest rate risk. Thus, banks’ intrinsic demand for longer-term fixed income securities is 
somewhat limited. And, as noted, it is primarily longer-term instruments that have 
dominated cross-border debt flows within and across the Eurozone. 
As banking groups have consolidated and financial markets have expanded the 
opportunities for larger entities to provide market-making services and take proprietary 
positions have grown. As we have seen, the access to wide networks of customers that 
dealers have confers on them access to a wide array of products and the information and 
expertise to trade on them (see also Stigum and Crescenzi, 2007: 416). Using repo-funded 
books to minimise inventories, large dealer banks make markets but also avail of a variety 
of trading strategies to profit from their strategic insertion in financial markets (see, for 
example, Euroclear, 2009: 15-20). Banks, though, do not only position on relationships 
between securities. To take one relevant example, Mehrling (2011: 79-82) describes how 
banks can circumvent the regulatory framework and produce yield through swap-based 
synthetic fixed income exposures. Were a bank to hold a bond directly it would have to 
hold capital against it. But using an interest rate swap, the same exposure can be replicated 
but without incurring a capital charge. This raises the important point that the degree to 
which banks engage in or hold dated fixed income securities for position taking is strongly 
associated with their ability to circumvent prudential and other rules. That is, bank trading 
income in associated with regulatory arbitrage.   
Non-bank institutional investors on the other hand have a structural need for 
longer-dated securities, especially highly-rated, safe assets. Insurance companies and 
pension funds have long-dated liabilities which come due as policyholders retire, die or 
incur some other life event. Equity holdings provide yield and inflation protection, 
particularly for schemes that offer retirement income flows as some proportion of earnings, 
though equity values are volatile over the short-term. Large allocations to dated bonds 
provide stability for matching purposes through a steady stream of income flows. 
Consequently, changes in the macro environment, especially interest rates, change the 
present value of the assets and liabilities. Institutional investors therefore need to trade 
regularly so as to avoid mismatches. But the maturity of their liabilities is largely 
determined by demographic factors for most funds. Given the general increases in life 
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expectancy, the maturity of their liabilities and hence the need for longer-dated assets is 
actualliy increasing.  
Due to the uncertainty involved in longevity calculations and the limited availability 
of appropriate instruments, perfect matching of the cash flows of assets and liabilities is 
unfeasible in practice. It may also be suboptimal, assuming investors desire greater returns 
than those offered through risk-minimisation. So-called core-satellite portfolio management 
provides a solution, and accounts for two thirds of institutionally managed investment 
portfolios in Europe (Lysandrou, 2009). It is a so-called contingent optimisation technique 
that allows access to a desired level of risk, but subject to the liability constraints that a 
fund may face (Amenc et al., 2004). 
As we have seen previously, the core portfolio comprises a large passively managed 
share, including investment-grade debt and liquid equities. The selected benchmarks are 
chosen on the basis of the fund’s goals, and may change over time as the liability structure 
evolves. For fixed income funds management or ‘immunisation’ of interest rate risk is key. 
The satellite section is devoted to producing yield or alpha, and may entail large allocations 
towards alternative investments. That said, portfolios are managed in an integrated regime 
using complex algorithms and trading strategies such that clean assignment of securities 
into core or satellite is not always possible. Broadly, though, institutional investors can be 
seen as structuring portfolios into a section of relatively safe assets and a yield-producing 
section, subject to liability constraints.  
Fixed-income mutual funds are similarly constrained in the types of instruments 
they invest in. Like long-term institutional investors, they are subject to performance 
appraisal. A commonly used metric is tracking error, which, to as before, measures the 
standard deviation of the portfolio’s return with respect to the benchmark they track. Such 
funds accordingly mimic their benchmark so that the degree to which they can deviate in 
terms of the maturity profile of their portfolio is limited. Empirically, investment funds 
occupy an intermediate position between long-term institutional investors and banks in 
their need for long-term bonds (Domanski et al., 2015: 22).   
In contrast to institutional investors, banks’ allocation to fixed income and securities 
markets has varied more through time and according to local conditions. In the post-war 
period banks were ‘stuffed’ with government debt, after which holdings were necessarily 
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reduced (Goodhart and Perotti, 2015). Basel I encouraged banks to hold more debt, though 
to this day bank holdings of securities as a proportion of their total assets displays 
remarkable heterogeneity across banking groups and business models (Ayadi et al., 2016). 
Moreover, banks’ mark-to-market valuations, short-term funding and thin capital 
buffers render them more susceptible to pro-cyclicality, and their presence vis a vis 
institutional investors is found to be associated with higher bond yields (Andritsky, 2012). 
Banks tend to enter and exit fixed income markets more, whereas institutional investors 
favour buy-to-hold strategies so as to match assets with liabilities. Many banks reportedly 
have tighter position limits on their proprietary holdings of longer-maturity bonds given the 
greater price risk and the inherent difficulties in predicting long-term interest rates (Stigum 
and Crescenzi, 2007: 424-430). Indeed, a repeated finding during the 2000s was that 
demand from institutional investors was the central force in shaping the slope of the yield 
curve (ECB, 2006). In short, purge the financial system of institutional investors, and one 
purges much of the demand for dated fixed income instruments. With it the preponderance 
of income banks derive from dealing and positioning such securities vanishes.   
 An apparent exception is public debt in which banks have historically been central 
players, though often strong-armed into investing by their respective governments.
40
 As 
discussed, banks demand government (and other long-term) securities to use as collateral in 
repo agreements, a key financing tool for larger banks and their leveraged trading strategies. 
Adrian and Shin (2010) show repo usage to be strongly correlated with asset growth among 
US investment banks. But insofar as this derived from securitised investments, for instance, 
the growth of such income is traceable to demand pressures from institutional investors 
(Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2014).
41
 More generally, as a form of substitute, or near 
money, the growth of repos and other short-term money market instruments is a function of 
the growth of transactions, namely financial trading. As per Chapter 3, the growth in 
                                                          
40
 It could be argued banks’ demand for government debt through the need for high-quality liquid assets 
imposed by Basel III. While we acknowledge banks need for public securities for liquidity management, this 
is distinct from holdings for investment purposes. Choudry (2012: 627-629) reports that many banks may 
actually lose on instruments held for liquidity purposes. While banks may be inclined to hold longer dated 
bonds to produce yield, the key criterion is liquidity and longer term bonds entail greater price risk (ibid). Our 
contention is that banks’ intrinsic demand for dated instruments is relatively limited, but that they make 
markets and position in them as opportunities arise. 
41
 In Europe large banks similarly dominate the repo market (Gabor and Vestergaard, 2016: 12-13). For 
banks this may be an inexpensive source of funding as institutional and other investors use it to park stocks of 
cash (Poszar, 2013). 
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trading volume, in turn, has been driven by standardisation of asset management and the 
imposition of core-satellite investment mandates (Grahl and Lysandrou, 2003; 2006). 
Recent years has witnessed a growth in trading volume in equity and FX spot markets from 
high-frequency traders. Such firms, though, depend and piggyback on the orders of 
institutional and other investors (Grahl and Lysandrou, 2014). The above point thus 
remains that modern banks’ reliance on repos and hence government and other longer-term 
debt-based funding cannot be detached from ultimate pressures placed on the banking 
system from institutional investors. 
 Rather than a global bank framework, as per Figure 4.4 above we put forward a 
global investor paradigm which views institutional investors as central participants, not 
passive players in debt cycles. To the extent that cross-border long-term debt instruments 
are driven by international factors, demand is primarily driven by the presence of 
institutional investors and their structural need for dated, safe securities. Banks, of course, 
have a demand for fixed income securities and may demand longer-term assets in a 
low-yield environment. But their engagement in modern fixed income markets is ultimately 
shaped by demand from institutional investors. 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4-4: The Global Investor framework.  
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Banks do occupy a central node in relation to investors in the global financial 
architecture. As mentioned, they provide market-making services, have access to central 
bank financing, and are the production factories for many of the instruments that other 
investors use. In providing many of the key infrastructures in the global financial system, 
they are strategically placed to exploit opportunities for gain as they arise. Thus, as 
opportunities for carry trades and regulatory arbitrage arise, for example, so does the 
saliency of banks in fixed income markets.  
  In sum, banks do not have a structural demand for dated fixed income securities 
the way institutional investors do. Institutional investors require fixed income securities for 
asset-liability matching, but also generate yield through a variety of riskier investments. 
Insofar as regulatory arbitrage and income considerations arise in the context of 
cross-border debt flows, banks are likely to be key in their propagation. This Chapter 
argues that bank and public inflows into the periphery constituted an asset-liability 
matching device, whereas investments in securitised products in the US/UK also entailed a 
yield-seeking strategy.  
 
4.4 Global investors and the empirical limits of bank-centred approaches to European 
debt flows  
4.4.1 Empirical limits 
Bank-based approaches have a number of empirical limitations in the context of Eurozone 
debt flows. For one, banks were generally not the main movers of those fixed income 
markets most central to debt flows from the core countries. Second, the notion that carry 
trade operations among banks explains securitised flows is weakened by the fact that 
securitisation accelerated as interest spreads narrowed between the Eurozone and the US 
(Bertaut et al. 2012), and also, incidentally, within the EMU (Lane, 2013). Finally, 
regarding flows to the periphery core banks’ engagement in cross-border portfolio bank 
debt appears to have declined at precisely the time debt flows accelerated.  
Table 4.1 shows the breakdown by investor type of the major debt instruments in 
intra and extra-Eurozone debt flows in terms of ownership and trading volume among 
European investors. We see that in the case of investment grade debt, a large proportion of 
which is accounted for by unsecured bank debt, banks’ share of the market is 
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approximately one third in both trading volume and ownership terms. IMF figures show 
banks’ ownership share of Eurozone private bonds to be almost one half, excluding 
vehicles (IMF, 2016: 8). Figures for covered bonds and asset-backed securities (ABSs), 
broadly defined as a range of mortgage and other asset-backed instruments, slightly favour 
banks in ownership terms but are otherwise even. A 2009 survey shows institutional 
funds’/institutional investors’ ownership share to be twice that of banks in covered bonds 
(SIFMA, 2009). Government bond markets are evenly split between banks and institutional 
investors in ownership terms, though the latter dominate in terms of trading volume. 
Structured finance volume (such as CDOs) is dominated by banks in ownership terms, but 
by hedge funds in volume. Thus, a mixed picture emerges with banks somewhat more 
prominent in securitised markets and institutional investors somewhat more prominent in 
government and corporate markets.  
 
 Investment 
grade debt 
(2005) 
Covered 
bonds  
(2007) 
Asset-backed 
securities
a 
(2004-07) 
Structured 
finance 
(2007) 
Government 
bonds
 
(2005) 
 
Bank/Vehicles (33) 31  (45)  45  (48) 49 (19) 80 (19) 48 
Institutional 
funds 
(57) 46 (47) 37  (43) 42 (19) 18 (67) 52
b
 
Hedge funds (7) 9  (2) (8) 6 (58) 2 (5) 
Table ‎4-1: European market movers by investor type. 
Figures inside parentheses indicate percentage of non-interdealer trading volume for 2014 among 
European investors and are based on Greenwich Associates (2014a-d) (cited with permission). 
Outside parentheses indicate ownership percentage among European investors. The survey year is 
indicated below the security type.  
Source: AFME (2012), Caouette et al. (2008), Casey and Lannoo (2005), Greenwich Associates 
(2014a-d), IMF (2016), Packer et al. (2007). 
a
ABS ownership figures based on primary issues over entire 2004-07 period.  
b
 This figure includes OFIs which we assume includes only asset management funds and not 
financial vehicles in the case of government debt. 
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While non-bank engagement in debt instruments is high, particularly in volume 
terms, Table 4.1 says little about whether securities are held domestically or otherwise. It 
not easy to precisely gauge the contribution of institutional investors and funds to 
cross-border flows relative to banks in these figures alone. Home bias in bank holdings of 
debt securities issued by other euro area banks is lower than for long-term institutional 
investors.
42
 This is very likely not the case for investment/mutual funds which are 
overwhelmingly domiciled offshore and are major participants in European bond markets 
(IMF, 2016: 94). Moreover, the vast majority of on-balance sheet bank debt such as 
unsecured and covered bonds is issued internationally (ECB, 2011: 83).
43
 We thus argue 
the salience of institutional funds in European fixed income markets presented in Table 1 
translates into cross-border flows.  
Regarding the timing of flows, the focus on risk appetite and sentiment of banks 
allows bank-based analyses to be somewhat arbitrarily deployed always and anytime to 
account for the beginning of a financial expansion. But a number of anomalies exist in 
relation to the timing of securitised flows. Securitised flows from Europe to the US began 
to take off around 2003, and growth continued thereafter (Bertaut et al., 2012). ECB rates 
did decline in 2003, but this coincided with a narrowing of interest rate spreads vis a vis the 
US, from which core banks drew much of their funding. Bertaut et al. point that the spread 
between highly-rated corporate debt and short-term funding costs had flattened in 2005, 
mysteriously a peak year for the creation of subprime mortgages and core acquisitions in 
US debt (ibid.). Similarly, within the Eurozone a convergence of interest rates is observable 
and thus confounds why investors would increasingly hold large levels of cross-border 
financial debt for carry trades (Lane, 2013). We return to this mystery later.  
Thieman (2012), based on interview evidence, makes the crucial point that the low 
arbitrage margins in core banks’ holdings of securitised instruments implied that any 
requirement to hold capital against them would have rendered them unprofitable (Thieman, 
                                                          
42
 Home bias in European bank holdings of bank debt ranged from over 70% in the early 2000s to 50% 
pre-crisis to around 60% currently (ECB, 2015: 22). Home bias similarly increased in the insurance sectors 
post-crisis (ESRBa, 2015: 9). In France and Germany a recent survey indicates overall home bias in bank debt 
to be just under 80% (ERSBb, 2015: 5). 
43
 An important reason for doing so is to appeal to a wider range of investors. After issuance, fixed income 
securities are typically traded frequently before being held to maturity, often by long-term investors such as 
pension and insurance companies. Home bias among long-term institutional investors can thus not be 
assumed to preclude capital flows but may entail round-tripping as securities are issued off-shore but 
ultimately held by domestic investors due to informational, regulatory and other advantages. 
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2012: 44). Capital alleviation-based gains may have been present in the case of covered 
bonds too, but to a lesser degree unsecured debt (Packer et al., 2007: 46). It stands, though, 
that a major component of non-securitised debt flows such as bank inflows into the 
periphery were driven by factors other than carry trades. Indeed, the investment share of 
banks in these markets appears to have declined as debt flows accelerated.  
Figure 4.5 displays an estimate of core holdings of debt securities issued by 
non-core BIS reporting banks. This series is disaggregated on an investor basis between 
unallocated investors, banks and non-banks, which we take to be institutional investors.   
 
 
Figure ‎4-5: Core EZ-12 investors’ share of cross-border non-loan/deposit liabilities of BIS reporting 
banks. 
Source: Calculated using BIS Locational Statistics. 
Disaggregated liabilities by counterparty type are not available at the country level. The series is 
estimated on the basis of the liability holders or counterparties of BIS-reporting banks located in the 
core countries. The series was computed by using banks’ non-loan and non-deposit liabilities as a 
proxy for debt securities. Counterparties can be identified according to banks, non-banks or 
unallocated. Data before 2002/03 is highly sensitive to the low-levels of non-deposit/loan liabilities 
and so was not included. 
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Looking at the ratio of bank to non-bank holdings, the share of non-banks grew 
markedly relative to banks from about 2003 on. This is precisely the time when capital 
flows began to accelerate.
44
 Moreover, the correlation between the unallocated share and 
the non-bank to bank share suggests that unallocated holdings proxy for non-bank 
holdings.
45 46
 Overall, the evidence indicates that among investors in the core, institutional 
funds increased their share of those debt markets most central to flows in the periphery at 
precisely the time that debt flows in that region grew. 
 
4.4.2 Financial system opaqueness: What do we know? 
An obvious riposte to our critique of carry trading as the central explanatory tool and the 
apparent disengagement of the banking system from cross-border bank debt is that the 
banking system is opaque and as such definitive conclusions cannot be drawn. It might be 
reasonably argued that banks engage in complex trading strategies in which synergies and 
conflicts are created through various client-related activities and proprietary operations. It 
may be that large banks’ engagement with institutional investors in, for instance, covered 
bonds and unsecured debt is part of a broader proprietary strategy so that analytical focus 
should remain on banks. Indeed, any fixed income holding necessarily constitutes a view 
on the direction interest rates and the yield curve. Leveraged trading strategies that utilise 
repos and hypothecation may also point to the need to focus on banks over institutional 
investors. Given, though, the heterogeneity and illiquidity of many private bonds, it is 
sovereign debt that dominates the private repo market (Gabor, 2012: 11). In terms of fee 
generation from institutional investors securitisation was a major generator of revenues for 
banks. This can be most clearly seen in the case of structured finance in which the banking 
system extracted large fees from hedge funds which trade in high volumes. But there is less 
evidence to support this view in the case of non-securitised debt products. Crotty (2008) 
reports that large banks barely broke even on brokerage activities, the traditional domain of 
                                                          
44
 Of course, counterparties located in core countries do not invest exclusively in, for instance, long-term 
peripheral debt instruments, but have positions in bank debt in countries around the world. However, 
peripheral countries (along with the UK) experienced the greatest surge in bank inflows. 
45
 Because of data unavailability, unallocated counterparties comprise a very large share. BIS (2010) looks at 
international liability holders of developed country BIS banks more generally and finds that the share held by 
non-banks increased during the 2000s. They attribute this to increasing reliance on wholesale funding (BIS, 
2010: 12-15), which is principally due to institutional investors. 
46
 Note the unallocated share was very low when the identified share of banks was high, but grew along with 
the identified share of non-banks (though the relationship breaks down during the crisis). 
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asset management. Underwriting fees in European bond markets, moreover, fell markedly 
with introduction of the euro (Casey and Lannoo, 2005: 35). 
 Without detailed access to trading records, the precise reason for holding certain 
securities is impossible to verify. As discussed, for banks bond holdings are motivated by a 
variety of factors, including liquidity management. Traditionally, liquid assets are held in 
the form government bonds but the low yields during the 2000s rendered them unattractive. 
Financial sector securities, which were also increasingly used as collateral in ECB liquidity 
operations, offered an attractive alternative. A distinction should be made, though, between 
holdings of these instruments for a variety of purposes, and the explicit moving of large 
amounts of securitised fixed income products into off-balance sheet conduits for carry trade 
positions.    
In terms of analytical focus, there is evidence of investors pushing banks, as 
opposed to banks pushing investors to hold products. Due to increased demand for 
long-term instruments from pension funds and insurance companies, long-term interest 
rates began to fall around late 2004/early 2005 (see ECB, 2006). This process continued 
through 2006 on as the yield curve continued to flatten (up until economic stresses began to 
manifest before the crisis broke). This explains why despite policy rates rising during the 
mid-2000s bank long-term debt issuance expanded so as to lock-in long-term funding. It is 
also consistent with a rising share of institutional investor engagement in bank debt as 
suggested in Figure 4.5. Rather than being passive vessels into which banks shovel 
products, causality to a significant extent runs in the opposite direction. Institutional 
investors created the conditions under which regional and other banks, mediated by larger 
banking entities through their market making and warehousing operations, expanded their 
long-term debt issuance.  
In sum, institutional investors are the central players in many European fixed 
income markets, though banks are particularly prominent in securitised markets. The 
narrowing of interest spreads through the 2000s indicates bank-based arbitrage analyses 
provide an incomplete account of core-to-US/UK securitised flows. Regarding inflows to 
the periphery, core institutional investor and fund engagement in cross-border bank debt 
markets increased precisely the time that bank inflows into the region expanded. This 
points to the need to pay attention to institutional investors. 
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4.5 Institutional investors and the demand for yielding products 
4.5.1 Enhanced matching 
To explain the move into cross-border bank and financial debt in the early 2000s, we 
examine the constraints investors faced in this period. The collapsing of equity values and 
depressed yields on government bonds led to reallocation towards higher yielding bank debt. 
This strategy best explains flows into the periphery, which we label risk-enhanced matching. 
Funds also sought yield-seeking and alternative investments which the growth of 
securitisation met, and explains flows into the US/UK.   
Figure 4.6 shows the asset allocation of long-term institutional investors among core 
Eurozone-12 investors for which data are available. As shown, pension and insurance funds 
had a quarter of their total assets directly allocated to equities as of 2000. Unfortunately, we 
cannot see the split between government and corporate bonds in terms of asset allocation 
except to note that debt securities directly accounted for a fifth of total assets for the pension 
 
 
Figure ‎4-6: Core European institutional investor asset allocation (% total assets). 
Total direct allocation based on Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
Source: OECD Institutional Investors Database. 
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and insurance sector, with considerable variation between countries.
47
 These figures stand in 
contrast to banks for which loans constitute the bulk of assets. Euro area banks had just 5.2% 
exposure to equities and held 7% of their assets in government debt in 2000 (BIS, 2001). 
Pension funds and insurance companies experienced large losses on these equity 
investments through the bursting of the equity bubble. In the three years after the peak in 
late 1999/2000 the Euronext 100 index lost over half its value. Moreover, a combination of 
factors also led to poor returns on fixed income generally and government debt in particular. 
This included low policy rates, increased demand due to the rise of cash pools from 
corporate reserves and high-net worth individuals, and, in an era of austere macroeconomic 
budget management, a reduced supply of public debt (see Pozsar, 2015). The consequent 
depressed returns and asset-liability mismatches necessitated an alternative investment 
policy.
48
 
One option is greater duration matching. This is achieved through extending the 
duration of assets so as to match the duration of liabilities. In so doing, funds can squeeze 
more yield from their core asset portfolio and immunise it from interest rate risk.
49
 This 
has been cited a major response on the part of institutional investors to depressed returns, 
and as an attractive alternative to a pure yield-type movement into volatile equities or 
sub-investment grade securities, for instance (IMF, 2011). Indeed, the institutional investor 
demand for longer dated securities implied by duration matching may help explain the 
progressive lengthening of bond maturities in Europe since the 1990s, a point suggested by 
Casey and Lannoo (2005: 17). 
Bank debt was attractive given its investment grade rating, yield pick-up and 
tendency to be better spread over the maturity spectrum than non-financial corporate debt, 
which facilitates asset-liability matching (ECB, 2001). The range of new and existing 
                                                          
47
 In particular, due to unusually large allocations towards investment funds direct debt allocation in German 
insurance and pension funds is only 10% of total assets whereas the other countries allocate 30-60% towards 
debt. Figure 4.6 therefore significantly understates overall allocations towards debt (and equity). Also, ECB 
data available for the post-crisis period show pension and insurance share of allocations to both financial 
sector and government debt has increased. 
48
 Pozsar argues that leveraged mutual bond funds reached for yield. Aggregated OECD data show that 
mutual funds did not experience a shift towards debt securities overall, so we focus on longer-term 
institutional investors. 
49
 As well as being a weighted measure of maturity, duration measures the responsiveness of a bond to 
changes in underlying yields or interests rates. Thus, with a duration-matched portfolio the change in the 
value of assets matches the change in value of liabilities, for a given change in interest rates. 
143 
 
instruments brought to the market during the 2000s enabled return-enhanced matching 
capabilities in the context depressed returns. Overwhelmingly investment grade senior 
unsecured bank debt, whose yield depends largely on the rating of the issuing institution, 
offered a considerable margin relative to the benchmark sovereign rate (IMF, 2013). While 
unsecured debt tends to be issued more by large, established banks (von Rixtel et al., 2015), 
yields on peripheral bank debt were particularly attractive (IMF, 2013). Covered bonds also 
offered a margin over government debt. Moreover, their known, bullet payment schedule is 
also suitable for matching.
50
 
Similarly, asset-liability matching is a major reason for institutional investor interest 
in government debt. This is illustrated in the development of ultra long-dated public bonds 
during the 2000s as demographic pressures posed rising longevity risk. Post-crisis, while 
banks were clearly incentivised to increase peripheral holdings arising from regulatory 
arbitrage, the share of institutional investors funds in euro area public debt markets was the 
same 2016 as it was in the mid-2000s (IMF, 2016: 94). That is, over an extended period of 
time institutional investors’ ownership of public debt has been stable. As Table 1 showed, 
moreover, in volume terms institutional investors dominate European sovereign bond 
markets. This is because their high levels of liquidity enables funds to cost effectively 
mimic benchmarks through constant trading (Grahl and Lysandrou, 2006). As soon as the 
peripherals were downgraded or in danger of being, though, institutional investors likely 
exited. 
Thus, much of the growth in cross-border debt transactions from the core to the 
periphery in the 2000s was driven by reallocations by institutional investors.
51
 In the 
context of asset-liability mismatches created by the bursting of the IT-bubble and depressed 
sovereign returns, bank debt offered greater yield and enhanced matching capabilities. 
Though large carry trade opportunities existed for banks in sovereign peripheral debt 
post-crisis, institutional investors maintained significant positions in these markets. 
Institutional investors, though, not only need to match assets and liabilities or track 
                                                          
50
 A bullet bond is one in which the face value is redeemed all at once rather than amortised. 
51
 Regulatory developments through fair value accounting also discouraged pension funds to allocate towards 
equities (BlackRock, 2014). For insurers, solvency requirements penalise equities through higher capital 
charges, while fixed income securities receive favourable treatment (BIS, 2011b). 
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benchmarks, but attempt to create yield. The 2000s thus also saw a range of leveraged and 
yield-based strategies into US/UK securitised products. 
 
4.5.2 Securitisation and the search for yield 
Securitised instruments are one such mechanism through which funds generate yield, as 
well as facilitating matching. A classic satellite strategy is indirect exposure to 
securitisation through leveraged mutual and hedge funds, which allocate towards the higher 
risk, shorter maturity securitised tranches (Langley, 2006: 295). Hedge funds in particular 
are a favoured alternative investment class and are the central players in trading CDOs, as 
seen. Pension and insurance funds account for up to 35% of capital invested in hedge funds 
(Aglietta and Rigot, 2009). As shown in Figure 4.7, long-term institutional investors greatly 
increased their exposures to investment funds more broadly, which of course includes a 
variety of asset classes. Nevertheless it is illustrative as the process accelerated around 2004, 
which coincides  
 
Figure ‎4-7: Pension and insurance funds allocation to investment funds (% total assets). 
Countries as per Figure 4.6.  
Source: OECD Institutional Investors Database. 
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with a flattening of the yield curve. That is, institutional investors’ allocations to 
higher-yielding assets accelerated as long-term rates and returns declined.  
Longer-term institutional investors are also major direct investors in securitisation. 
ABSs are typically of higher credit quality than the originating bank as the assets backing 
the securities are ‘bankruptcy remote’. Unlike a regular bond, the credit quality of a 
securitised bond depends only on the loans/assets on which it is secured, rather than on 
bank solvency more broadly. But because mortgages in particular are subject prepayment 
risk, the value of a mortgage-backed security (MBS) is less subject to rise when, for 
example, interest rates fall. As rates fall, more mortgages, and hence cash flows to the 
security get prepaid, but at lower rates than would otherwise be the case had interest rates 
remained unchanged. Coupled with the difficulty in their valuation, their relative illiquidity, 
and the systematic risk associated with mortgage markets, investors are compensated with 
higher yield, while still being highly-rated. Theoretically, they thus have a yield margin 
compared to covered bonds, and often have a higher rating than an institution’s unsecured 
debt.
52
 
In practice, securitisation markets during the 2000s were rife with conflicts of 
interest. The fact that ratings agencies were in receipt of large fee incomes from the 
banking groups whose securities they were supposed to independently rate is a case in point. 
Banks actively solicited ratings companies on how to structure the products so as receive 
the highest ratings. Investors in turn were provided with little information as minimal 
disclosure meant they too had to rely on ratings companies. MBSs thus provided further 
yield as they had sub-quality mortgages but ‘carried the same imprimatur from the credit 
rating agencies’ as AAA-rated securities (Wilmarth, 2009: 1028). The same is true to an 
even greater extent of structured finance CDOs. 
We believe the presence of institutional investors provides a plausible explanation 
for the trajectory of securitised flows as spreads between the core countries and the US 
narrowed. For longer-term institutional investors a major appeal of securitisation is the 
ability of products to be tailored to meet investor-specific demands in terms of duration, 
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 The uncertainty of their cash flows and the non-standard discount rates applied to them renders securitised 
instruments less suitable for asset-liability matching than government or corporate instruments. Many 
investment brochures locate ABSs as part of the satellite investment portfolio strategy. However, ABSs are 
included in many benchmarks and are clearly investment rated fixed income products such that clean 
assignment into core or satellite is not possible. 
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risk and yield. The peak of securitisation issuance in Europe and the US combined was 
2006. This coincided with the mid-decade flattening of the yield curve such that long-term 
interest rates were further depressed. It is noteworthy that the expansion of securitised 
products also coincides with long-term institutional investor allocations to investment funds 
from the mid-2000s as shown in Figure 4.7. That is, securitisation peaked as the search for 
yield was greatest. 
While it is the case that a flatter yield curve squeezes banks’ interest margins, and in 
so doing can encourage greater leverage and hence investment in securitised products, the 
development of securitisation indicates otherwise. The two types of securities that 
experienced the largest relative growth were MBSs and CDOs. MBSs are more associated 
with the generation of fee income, as opposed to arbitrage holdings. The longer duration of 
MBSs compared to other securitised products renders them attractive for institutional 
investors. A significant chunk of CDOs remained within banking conduits for arbitrage 
purposes, as reflected in the large share of banking entities as primary investors. But CDO 
growth during this period was driven by so-called synthetic and index tranche CDOs. And 
the major investors in these were non-banks, primarily hedge funds (Lysandrou and 
Nesvetailova, 2014). 
The expansion of cross-border securitised instruments is therefore strongly 
indicative of demand pull pressures on banks from funds to create safe high-yield fixed 
income securities. The relative expansion of MBSs and CDOs particularly indicate 
pressures for yield but for which insufficient materials were available from the prevailing 
pool of securities. This may help explain why banks increased their investments in arbitrage 
conduits and how capital flows from the core to the US peaked as interest differentials 
between the two regions declined. Interest rates began to rise in the US mid-2004, but the 
ECB held rates flat until 2006. Moreover, as noted long-term yields lowered further in the 
Eurozone (and elsewhere) as the yield curve began to flatten. Thus the narrowing of rates 
between the regions did little to abate the reach for yield, and hence the flow of capital from 
the core. Despite this narrowing, the flows of securitised products necessitated by pressures 
within funds enabled banking groups to continue to reap income from securitised 
investments, but in larger volumes.  
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Another possible, but related explanation emphasises developments on the funding 
side. The key instrument used by the various shadow banking vehicles and conduits was 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Shabani and Lysandrou (2015) argue the 
development of this market, especially during the years immediately before the crisis, 
points to a search for yield among institutional investors. For instance, the composition of 
asset holdings among US money market mutual funds (MMMF), the major purchasers of 
ABCP issued by European shadow banking entities, shifted away from corporate and 
financial paper and towards ABCP. The composition of the collateral backing ABCP began 
to shift as well, away from credit loans and towards securities, presumably securitised 
assets. This, according to Shabani and Lysandrou, is indicative of pressures from 
institutional investors (MMMFs in this case) in which it was the search for yield in the 
ABCP market that drove European banks continued investment in US securitised assets as 
interest rates between the two continents narrowed. The point remains that whether driven 
by developments on the funding side MMMFs or by longer-term institutional investors as 
above, bank engagement in these markets has been crucially shaped by developments 
outside the putative banking system.         
In sum, the expansion of debt-related flows in the 2000s should be seen in terms of 
investor reallocations in the context of depressed sovereign returns and large equity losses 
at the turn of the century. This entailed greater allocations towards peripheral bank bonds as 
investors sought return-enhanced matching. Allocations towards US/UK securitised 
products constituted a search for yield. While arbitrage investments among banks were 
undoubtedly a central component, the timing and composition of the production of 
securitised products points to the driving force being demand pull pressures on the part of 
institutional investors.  
 
4.6 Policy implications 
Much of the post-crisis regulatory response (such as Basel III) has focused on the banking 
sector. This is understandable given the immediacy of the banking sector in the various 
crises that began in 2007/08. It is also true that financial crises in which the banking sector 
is insulated from tend to be far less severe, as demonstrated by, for instance, the relatively 
modest socioeconomic effects of the IT bubble crash of the early 2000s compared to the 
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recent global crisis. That said, it has been our contention that the institutional investor and 
fund sector has been central to the propagation of destabilising debt flows through the 
demand for return-enhancing and yield-producing debt products and strategies. The 
identification of institutional funds and long-term institutional investors as opposed to 
banks requires a somewhat different menu of policy prescriptions. 
 In terms of where policy reform should ultimately lie, it is contestable to what 
extent global versus domestic forces encouraged excessive debt issuance on the part of 
domestic banks in various countries. Notwithstanding the undoubted importance of 
distribution in affecting aggregate demand, and hence debt accumulation, as we saw in 
Chapter 2 income inequality slowed among advanced countries in the 2000s. This does not 
sit well with accounts that give primacy to distributional dynamics in precipitating the 
demand for credit that debt-based capital flows met (see, for example, Stockhammer and 
Onaran, 2011; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012). Moreover, approaches to domestic-global 
credit dynamics that focus on deregulation and financial innovation have difficulty 
explaining the timing of credit growth. Covered bonds and unsecured debt products, and 
many of the legal infrastructures surrounding them are not new, but they began to grow 
rapidly around 2003/04. Part of the reason is a desire among banking groups to lock-in low 
rates over a long-term horizon. In the case of securitisation, however, such a domestic focus 
is less convincing. While Acharya and Schnabl (2010) document that legislation for 
conduits clustered around the early 2000s consistent with a regulation-centric approach, is 
the timing of such simultaneous regulatory initiatives chance? The coincidence of debt 
expansion with large asset-liability mismatches implies pressures from 
internationally-active institutional investors as the key driving force, and necessitates a 
corresponding international policy response. 
Given the myriad of ways nations finance long-term savings and retirement plans, 
regulation of long-term institutional investors at the European level has been until recently 
relatively underdeveloped. The major post-crisis reform is Solvency II, the EU directive for 
European insurers.
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 By imposing capital charges on riskier investments, it may indeed 
reduce the risk characteristics of various funds. It does not, however, address the underlying 
problem which led investors to take on more risk in the first place – depressed returns and 
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 Regarding investment funds, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive has been introduced at 
the European level. 
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large asset-liability mismatches in the context of a low return environment. To the extent 
that funds are allowed to take on more risks, financial stability is threatened. According to a 
recent IMF financial stability report, low interest rates are ‘eroding the viability of business 
models’ and ‘threatening solvency over the medium term’ for European and 
advanced-country insurance and pension funds (IMF, 2016: 24). In the Eurozone there is 
evidence that ECB asset purchases are leading long-term institutional investors to further 
extend the duration of their portfolios, which compresses long-term rates more, and may 
then magnify the original mismatch (Domanski et al., 2017). But to the extent that funds are 
prevented from taking on risk, which current initiatives attempt to do, returns on savings 
and retirement incomes may suffer. This is in a context of already large strains put on 
European social safety nets in recent years. 
Such problems are only exacerbated by the drive towards more restrictive 
macroeconomic policies by the EU and ECB. On the one hand, putative fiscal prudency has 
a deflationary impact on the economy, which in turn creates the need for monetary stimulus. 
But it also reduces the supply of government debt, which further encourages a search for 
alternative investments. The response of many national governments, spurred on by the EU, 
has been to introduce various measures aimed at shifting the burden onto savers. This has 
included increases in the retirement age and a greater tendency towards defined 
contribution pensions. This constitutes a further reliance on market mechanisms at precisely 
the time various forms of social safety provision have become more precarious. It is also 
the case that greater marketisation of social security is not particularly cost effective. 
Private and occupational-based schemes tend to have significantly higher administrative 
costs than public schemes given the large economies of scale of the latter (see Grahl, 2009).   
It could thus be argued that a move towards deinstitutionalisation of savings and 
large cash pools may be desirable from a financial stability perspective. 
Deinstitutionalisation of savings or a move towards public provision constitutes a 
significant departure from the current direction of EU policy. According to a recent EU 
Commission ageing report, though, the required increase in public pension expenditure 
ranges from 0.4% to 11.7% of GDP  for the period up to 2040, followed by comparable 
declines in spending for the period to 2060 (EU Commission, 2015: 74). Of course there is 
much variation between countries and it is also assumed that various eligibility criteria are 
to be restricted. In France, for instance, current expenditure is 15% of GDP (ibid.). Greater 
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public funding of long-term savings may therefore be quite feasible. Nevertheless, national 
retirement and savings systems have developed over decades and exhibit high degrees of 
path dependence. This is despite the considerable influence of social democratic and 
left-oriented parties in the post-war period, and converging forces in the neoliberal era. A 
comprehensive move towards, for instance, pay-as-you-earn systems is thus unlikely.  
A more sensible policy would entail shifting the burden of macroeconomic 
management back onto fiscal policy and away from monetary stimulation alone, which 
would contribute to alleviating mismatch imbalances in financial markets. On the cash pool 
side improvements in employment and wage growth are likely to reduce inequality and the 
supply idle funds, so that a growth strategy would complement a more expansionary fiscal 
stance from a stability perspective. This would create the context in which policies aimed at 
diminishing destabilising debt flows through various fund and financial regulatory 
initiatives are likely to be effective.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has argued that the emphasis accorded to banks in understanding global fixed 
income processes is misplaced. Using Europe as an example, we have argued that 
institutional investors play a central role in the propagation and dynamics of cross-border 
debt flows. We analysed debt flows emanating from the core Eurozone-12 countries in the 
form of long-term bank and public flows into the periphery, and securitised flows into the 
US and UK. Bank-centered approaches plausibly explain a large portion of cross-border 
bank and public debt flows and much cross-border securitised flows as opportunities arose 
for income-based strategies.  
There are, though, a number of anomalies with bank-based approaches. Banks are 
generally not the main movers of those European fixed income markets most central to 
cross-border debt flows. Bank analyses fail to account for the timing of flows. Core banks’ 
engagement in cross-border bank securities appears to have declined precisely as bank 
inflows in the periphery accelerated. Securitised flows into the US and UK peaked as 
spreads narrowed between the Eurozone and the US, and also within the Eurozone. While 
the precise reasons for bank investment in fixed income securities may be unknowable 
without access to trading records, the coincidence of fixed income expansions with 
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asset-liability mismatches among institutional investors indicates the driving force in 
core-centered debt flows lay outside the banking system.    
In the context of collapsing equity markets and depressed yields on government 
debt, large institutional investors began to adopt return-enhanced and yield-seeking 
strategies. Institutional investors were able to avail of peripheral banks’ desire to issue 
long-term debt instruments for extra yield and enhanced asset-liability matching. Moreover, 
the search for yield created pressures for the production of yielding instruments that 
securitisation met. These developments have strong implications for public policy in that 
financial stability is difficult to reconcile with long-term savings strategies if the current 
policy of low interest rates is continued. Of course, low rates are justified in the context of 
sluggish growth which points to other domains such as fiscal expansion to lighten the 
burden on monetary policy in promoting recovery.    
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined a variety of topics in financialisation and cross-border 
financial stability in Europe, and also the US. It has utilised institutional and political 
economy analysis, and developed an analytical framework grounded in historical 
materialism as elucidated in Chapter 2. This informed and provided a basis for work in later 
chapters. The thesis has addressed a number of issues about the nature of financialisation, 
financial trading, housing dynamics, and on the roles and relationships between 
institutional actors in financial markets. It made several claims about what the true nature 
of financial change has been. Many of the central propositions of the thesis can be 
generalised to other and non-European contexts, and some of them can not. In concluding 
we summarise our findings, evaluate their generalisability, explore avenues for future 
research, and integrate our policy conclusions. 
 Chapter 2 challenged the consensus on the transformation of banking, especially in 
relation to disintermediation. It developed a materialist framework based on neoliberalism, 
accumulation, and standardisation. It argued that neither the withdrawal of non-financial 
firms from the financial system nor competition for deposits from non-bank investors had 
been responsible for the decline in intermediation returns over the period considered, with 
the exception of France. The idea, then, that banks transformed themselves, in aggregate, 
through reorienting their activities towards more profitable endeavours is false. The growth 
in mortgage lending was instead a result of the imposition of the Basel Accords and 
associated capital adequacy rules, and neoliberalisation of domestic property and credit 
markets. Distributional dynamics have played only a secondary role. The increase in scale 
and scope of investment banking activities was seen to be a result of the growth of capital 
markets, itself to a considerable extent traceable to advances in medical knowledge. This 
then created a demand for investment banking activities. Deregulation of financial service 
activities has played a relatively minor role in terms of the scale and size of the overall 
sector. 
 The idea that disintermediation has not been responsible for the decline in 
intermediation returns among banking systems is context dependent. Disintermediation has 
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been an important determinant of banking change for some countries, especially operating 
at the micro level. As before, Dymski (1999; 2000) and Kregel (1998) provide convincing 
accounts (in the US before the period under consideration and France) of how 
disintermediation contributed to a decline in lending income and encouraged, along with 
other factors, consolidation and acquisition of fee-generating entities. As mentioned, we 
found evidence of this in France, but less so in Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK where 
mortgage lending, not disintermediation processes, initiated the decline in lending returns. 
Whether countries follow a US/French model or whether they conform to the experiences 
of Germany et al. is an avenue for future research. Given the experience of the US, data on 
the countries examined here before the 1980s might also produce some interesting results. 
 That the neoliberalisation of domestic credit and property markets has been a major 
factor in the expansion of mortgage lending is quite uncontroversial. It is equally applicable 
to countries other than the six studied here. That the imposition of the Basel Accords has 
been the major precipitating factor in the expansion of credit cannot be universally assumed 
given, the experience of especially the UK. The somewhat delayed secular growth of 
housing and mortgage markets in the US and France compared to the other countries also 
merits further probing. But it seems likely to be the case that capital adequacy agreements 
have had a powerful effect elsewhere as indicated by multiple-country/aggregate credit data 
(see Jorda et al., 2016). Our critique of distributional factors as a major explanatory 
mechanism in the increase in indebtedness is, in our view, likely to be applicable outside 
our six countries. As mentioned, lower income groups tend to be excluded from mortgage 
markets and inequality decreased in several countries during the 2000s as economies 
boomed. An exception, of course, was US subprime lending, but with regard to the overall 
expansion in property lending, the quantitative contribution of lower-income groups’ 
inclusion in mortgage markets needs to be established. 
 The connection between the growth of capital markets and the rise of investment 
banking is a logical one. As we have repeatedly stressed, more financial market activity 
necessitates more investment banking services. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the 
relationship holds across all six countries. The relationship may be more difficult to discern 
in financial centres such as Luxembourg or Ireland, as it was in the UK. Capital markets 
there have grown out of all proportion to the local economy, and are not serviced by the 
domestic banking system. As well as continued internationalisation of banking, greater 
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competition or consumer protection in the sector may alter fee structures and disrupt the 
relationship. Though it may not always be readily revealed in the data, the relationship can 
be generalised. Consequently, deregulation of financial service activities has not been the 
driving force behind the aggregate growth of investment banking, though it has facilitated 
the growth in size of financial institutions.  
 Chapter 3 posed two questions. First what contribution has financial trading made to 
the development of systemic financial instability in Europe and the US? Second what are 
the nature and financial stability implications of proprietary trading? It was argued that 
financial trading, especially cross-border trading, has had a major impact on the 
development of financial instability. In the early post-Bretton Woods period this came in 
the form of repeated currency crises as investors took positions and availed of exchange 
rate volatility. As Europe graduated to repeated housing and credit-led banking crises, the 
role of trading became more indirect. Institutional investors in particular provided liquidity 
to financial intermediaries. It was further argued that proprietary trading has been driven by 
the institutional investor-led expansion in trading as banks have availed of opportunities for 
gain. We found that proprietary trading has not posed comparable financial stability 
implications as the expansion of property lending has. The latter has been more frequently 
associated with systemic crashes. 
The generalisability of these findings is a more complex question than it is for 
Chapter 2. Our region of interest was Europe and the US so the findings are unlikely to be 
applicable to most other regions given the wide disparities in development. It is highly 
unlikely that Africa is about to be beset by a series of housing bubbles. The spectre of 
currency crises has not vanished from Latin America either. Within Europe the size and 
stability of capital markets will have a large effect on the susceptibility of countries outside 
of the euro to currency attack. The continued growth of capital markets relative to lending 
would also increase the susceptibility of banking systems to trading losses. The degree of 
commodification of housing, along with bank funding mechanisms, are among the 
determinants of a country’s vulnerability to housing bubbles.  
Similar to the growth of investment banking more generally, the connection 
between capital market trading volume and proprietary trading was a logical one. However, 
scale effects are likely to be especially important in market-making, and hence proprietary 
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trading. As a result, proprietary trading is more regionally concentrated. This may help to 
explain why the relationship between bank trading income and capital market volume is not 
as strong as the connection between the size of capital markets and investment banking 
income generally. First-mover advantages, the size of financial intermediaries, and other 
historical and institutional factors are likely to shape the scale of trading. The expansion in 
capital market volume is, though, the driving force. Credit and housing market 
developments are likely to be of even greater consequence for financial stability outside of 
the major countries that were the subject of Chapter 3. This assertion, though, needs to be 
established.  
Chapter 4 examined the determinants of debt flows emanating from core European 
countries into the periphery and the US and UK securitisation markets. Contra the global 
bank framework, Chapter 4 forwarded an explanatory paradigm which posited that 
institutional investors shape the trajectory of long-term fixed income markets. A la Chapter 
3, major banking groups avail of trading opportunities when they arise, but ultimately they 
do not shape markets in the sense that institutional investors do. This proposition was then 
substantiated empirically. It found that existing research on European capital flows had put 
too much emphasis on bank position taking. Due to asset-liability mismatches, institutional 
investors reallocated towards peripheral debt instruments, and US and UK securitised 
products. 
The salience of institutional investors in financial markets and cross-border 
transactions is an insight that can be applied elsewhere, but needs to be modified according 
to local conditions. As outlined in Chapter 3 and reinforced in Chapter 4, when 
opportunities for short-term trading gains arise due to, for instance, currency speculation or 
cross-border carry trades banks have historically featured prominently. More recently, 
though, hedge funds have emerged as major players in short-term speculative markets, all 
the more so since the weakening of bank own-account trading in the post-crisis landscape. 
But when financial transactions are more associated with investment in capital market 
securities, namely debt and equity instruments, institutional players are likely to be the 
driving force. Financial flows between developed countries are thus likely to be driven by 
longer and medium-term investors such as insurance, pension, and mutual funds. 
Developed-country institutional investors are important in portfolio flows to developing 
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countries as they search for yield, and hedge funds feature prominently there too. In both 
instances banks may take large positions but, as before, are unlikely to lead proceedings.         
Outside of generalisability claims per se, the PhD leaves a number of questions 
unanswered and opens up avenues for future research. One is why did France but not the 
remaining countries experience a decline in intermediation returns? What is it about those 
financial systems that insulated them from declines in profitability arising from competition 
for deposits. Was this merely a result of the timeframe of the study as is surely the case in 
the US? A historical institutional comparison of France with the US, or a contrast between 
France and the US on the one hand, and Germany and co. on the other may be revealing. 
Similarly, why was the effect of the Basel Accords and associated capital adequacy rules 
delayed in some countries but immediately manifest through greater mortgage lending in 
others? The Basel Accords clearly had an important allocative effect on the French banking 
system, for instance, as indicated by increased holdings of government debt. This may call 
for a more in-depth study of the French, UK and US housing markets and/or detailed 
examination of their banks’ asset portfolios during the period in question. 
 Chapter 3 similarly poses a number of questions. In terms of proprietary trading, the 
mechanisms through which banks earn income from own-account positions need to be 
more fully fleshed out. For instance, some historical data comparing the swap spread – the 
difference in yield between the fixed leg of an interest rate swap and a government treasury 
– before and since the early 1990s could prove informative. If the relationship has grown 
more unstable over time, then that would be further evidence that the expansion in 
institutional investor demand for treasuries (or swaps) created opportunities for position 
taking. More generally, the enormous growth in the interest rate swap market needs to be 
mapped-out and chronicled more fully.  
 With regards to cross-border transactions, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 raise similar 
issues. There is a significant body of research on the domestic institutional conditions that 
increase the likelihood that capital inflows will destabilise the economy. This sits alongside 
a lack of awareness of how the expansion in capital flows and cross-border transactions 
since the early 1990s has been driven by institutional investor benchmarking and the 
standardisation of asset management. And then during the 2000s, debt flows in Europe 
were driven by searches for yield among investors. These insights, then, need to be 
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incorporated into an understanding of domestic processes. For instance, to what extent does 
greater use of deposit and/or short-term money market instruments versus longer-term debt 
instruments in bank funding insulate an economy from cycles of financial flows? 
Interestingly the Scandinavian housing bubbles of the late 1980s and early 1990s predate 
the recent expansion in cross-border transactions. They were more associated with 
international interbank flows. 
 As for policy implications, Chapter 2 considered the possibilities of reducing the 
size of the financial sector going forward. It argued that reducing the size of mortgage 
markets is difficult in the medium run given the institutional inertia embedded in, and 
coordination problems in changing, international agreements. There is little reason to 
suppose, though, that the growth in mortgage lending necessarily leads to large swings in 
land and property markets. Reducing the size of the commercial banking sector is, however, 
more feasible than large reductions in the scale of investment banking. This so as 
investment banking derives from the expansion of capital markets, where the latter’s 
current size and scale is likely to be a permanent feature of advanced countries going 
forward. Chapter 3 similarly concluded that the most pressing financial stability need given 
available tools is the mitigation of large undulations in housing and land markets. Reducing 
swings in property prices and the size of the commercial banking sector through policy 
reversals is, as mentioned, difficult given the adherence to market openness and capital 
adequacy agreements by the EU. A range of macro-prudential tools are also available to 
policymakers such as stricter loan-to-value ratios or debt service-to-income caps. Leverage 
caps and levies on non-core liabilities have also been proposed and incorporated into Basel 
III in one form or another (Shin, 2013). Such tools are more associated with preventing 
bubbles and, as such, require policymakers to correctly identify a bubble is emerging. Their 
efficacy is also strongly dependent on timing as they may do little to deflate a bubble that is 
in its latter stages, when it is more likely to be spotted. More generally, aside from capital 
adequacy reform, macro-prudential regulation does little to reduce the size of, or rebalance 
the economy away from finance. This underscores the importance of interventions on the 
real side that give rise to outcomes on the financial side. As before, this may be achieved 
indirectly through stronger regulation of tenant-landlord relationships, rent controls, social 
housing programmes, and other interventions. 
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 The difficulties associated with large reductions in the size of the investment 
banking sector do not obviate the need for other interventions. Chapter 2 also made the 
point that reducing the large fees the sector extracts from consumers and investors is 
desirable. We saw in the following chapter that US investment banks earn very large fees 
through equity transactions, for instance. Chapter 3 more generally examined in some depth 
how the sector extracts income from investors through proprietary trading. Though 
proprietary trading has not posed the same financial stability problems as property lending 
according to recent economic history, these risks are far from negligible as the recent crisis 
demonstrated. Threats to the payments system can still arise as in Germany, France and 
other European countries through trading in ‘toxic’ securities. Initiatives aimed at curbing 
and greatly reducing such practices are desirable. This is especially true of banks’ trading 
of securities that embody credit risks such as credit guarantees, which have been restricted 
in Germany. As always, regulations, such as those on proprietary trading, must be 
counterbalanced against the possibility that banks may withdraw from market making 
operations. But insofar as the rise of speculative trading involves unacceptable transfers of 
income between entities, and restrictions on bank trading merely result in such practices 
migrating to hedge funds, more needs to be done. Much more heavy-handed consumer 
protection in investment services is in order as is seriously scaling back the power of hedge 
funds. This is another avenue for further research in financialisation. 
 As Chapters 3 and 4 developed, the risks posed by financial trading is less to be 
found in large, speculative positions as it is centred on the provision of liquidity to the 
banking system. As noted already, provision of liquidity cannot be reduced to institutional 
investors, but they are the driving force in cross-border financial flows today. Low interest 
rates in a context of fiscal tightening can engender destabilising searches for yield. The 
shortage of ‘safe’, government instruments can, as we have seen, lead to reallocations 
toward banking system liabilities, with possibly disastrous consequences. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, a redistributive growth strategy would have a number of welcome side-effects. 
Greater use of fiscal expansion would ease the burden on monetary policy to stimulate the 
economy. As the economy recovered, a stronger case could be made for raising interest 
rates. The increased supply of, and higher returns on government debt would greatly 
mitigate the need for shifting into alternative asset classes. Redistribution, especially away 
from the super-rich, would diminish the supply of idle cash pools. Combined, these two, 
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incidentally, would also diminish the need for speculative vehicles such as hedge funds. 
Addressing imbalances in the fund sector, then, complements attempts to make the banking 
system more stable and less prone to housing and credit boom-bust cycles. It also helps 
efforts that address problems arising from speculative and proprietary trading. 
 In sum, this PhD has found financialisation to be a multifaceted phenomenon. It is 
variegated across locales though homogenising trends are also apparent. Many of the 
findings of the thesis are applicable to other contexts, whereas some are not. The question 
of to what degree this may be true provides avenues for future research. The expansion of 
capital markets was found to be a fundamental process, from which others derive. Rather 
than trying to reduce the size of the financial sector in this domain, the issue is managing it 
and its consequences. This includes risk-taking within investment banking and asset 
management, with the latter in particular directly linked to macroeconomic policy. 
Interventions that have been subject to discussion in policy circles, such as proprietary 
trading, have also been discussed here. We are not opposed to more far-reaching 
interventions such as greater public ownership in the financial sector. This seems especially 
pressing in the case of commercial banking. Large expansions in property lending, another 
key feature of financialisation, have been implicated in most systemic events over the last 
number of decades. Interventions could take the forms of greater public ownership of the 
housing stock which, if implemented, would help mitigate large undulations in land and 
property markets. Such initiatives would serve to limit the adverse effect of capital market 
growth; for instance, cross-border debt flows inflating asset bubbles. The precise policy 
mix would, of course, depend on local circumstances.      
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